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Disability and Race in British Literature, 1580-1833, examines the ways Both Spanish 
and English peasants and lower classes were regarded as intrinsically different from the nobility 
in which concepts of disability and race are deployed as human disqualifications in literary, 
medical, natural historical, and travel texts written between 1580 and 1833, the year Britain 
abolished slavery in its colonies. This long chronological spread allows me to demonstrate how 
informal taxonomies are recruited by empire in the service of defining, differentiating, and 
hierarchizing human bodies in the production of a “civilized” British subject. Using disability 
studies and critical race theory, my project specifically looks at how medical and colonial 
discourses work together to construct concepts of disability and race in ways that are at some 
points mutually constitutive and at others mutually aligned, often through references to 
animality. In the periods and discourses that I examine, disabled and racialized people are 
aligned in consistent but unexpected ways to stabilize definitions of the human, reflecting how 
white able-bodied British writers wanted to see themselves in an era of nascent nation and 
empire building. 
Across this chronological spread, I focus on three distinct cases of dehumanization and 
pathologization as they entail issues of race and disability, particularly around bodily difference 
and language use and ability. In the second chapter, I examine the way in which discourses of 
race are figured through the language of disability by looking at texts by George Best, Robert 
Burton, and Ben Jonson before centering my discussion on William Shakespeare’s The Tempest. 
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Covering the works of Rene Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Bulwer, 
John Wallis, and John Wilkins, my third chapter demonstrates how discourses of disability and 
race were aligned in the construction of Enlightenment ideals of reason expressed through 
language. I examine the way in which “making signs” is deployed in deaf education manuals and 
travel literature as able to communicate reason. I consider the way in which race intersects with 
what Stephanie Kerschbaum refers to as the “presumed wholeness of a hearing identity” to 
analyze the writings of both deaf instruction manuals and the reception of the poetry of Francis 
Williams, a black Jamaican scholar who wrote poetry in Latin. In my fourth chapter, I 
demonstrate the deep continuities of thought between early modern scientific research and 
Romantic-era concerns surrounding health, disease, and blood. I argue that, in Frankenstein, 
Victor conceives of the creature in terms of pathology by examining the use of the 
slaughterhouse in the novel and the history of blood transfusion experiments. I use these histories 
to provide a matrix of meaning to understand how both health and disease are constructed 
through biocultural significations of blood. In the Coda, I do a comparative analysis of Caliban 
and Frankenstein’s Creature to consider the way in which eloquence intersects with the 




Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 Disability and Race in British Literature, 1580-1833, examines the way in which 
concepts of disability and race are deployed and aligned in literary, medical, natural historical, 
and travel texts written in the long eighteenth century. Methodologically, this long view of 
history presents different discursive formations in which both disability and race are recruited 
across this chronological spread: at times intersectional, and at other times aligned or parallel. 
My dissertation makes several distinctive contributions by bringing together disability and race 
in a long view of history. First, it allows me to demonstrate how hierarchies of human difference 
are recruited by empire in the service of defining, differentiating, and hierarchizing human 
bodies in the production of a “civilized” British subject. Second, it enables me to establish how 
the work of differentiation is connected to the pathologizing and animalization of both disabled 
and racialized bodies. Lastly, it authorizes my examination of the way such pathologies were 
thought of as transferable through methods such as blood transfusions and ingestion. Although 
important scholarship has been produced on the connections between race and gender, conduct, 
and religion, scholarship has not yet adequately addressed the ways in which race and disability 
are connected. In this dissertation, I attempt to begin filling in that gap— although much work 
remains to be done.  
The development of informal and formal hierarchical taxonomies during this time period 
occurs alongside an interest in — and anxiety about — a categorization of species that 
differentiates the human against non-human animals, and that racialized and disabled people are 
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often positioned as test cases that define the human. A recurrent theme throughout the works I 
discuss in my dissertation is the invocation of the animal as a human measurement. In taxonomic 
schemes, this often entails lengthy enumerations of both differences and similarities between 
apes and humans; in philosophies of language, it marks anxieties around using language as 
criteria of human status. As a barometer of the limits around which the human was defined, the 
animal is also invoked at key moments to de-humanize certain groups of people, often on the 
basis of disability or race. I define “race” as a social relationality structured through shifting 
power relations and interstitial beliefs relating to human difference, religion, class, gender, and 
language. In each chapter, I look at a different type of disability and racialization as they relate to 
either forms of bodily difference or language use and acquisition. I argue that neither disability 
nor race is deployed as a static form of categorization; rather, both are discursively mobile. This 
discursive mobility is central to understanding both disability and race as culturally constructed; 
my project specifically looks at how medical and colonial discourses work together to construct 
concepts of disability and race in ways that are at some points constitutive and at others mutually 
aligned. By carefully policing the limits of the human, early modern British thinkers positioned 
racialized and disabled others in a binary opposition against the human, effectively 
homogenizing physical difference and variation as “other.”  
In this dissertation, I use both disability studies and critical race theory as primary modes 
of analysis. This project began with my observation that many of the racialized figures in early 
modern and eighteenth-century works are described through the language of disability. 
Deformity, disease, and impairment become racialized under certain circumstances, as when 
George Best refers to blackness as an “infection,” or when Jean Bodin writes that “we see men as 
well as plants degenerate little by little when the soil has been changed, and it is for the same 
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reason that fire and sun color men black.”1 Bodin here relies partly on a geohumoral framework 
of race that attributes different bodily and mental qualities to geographic regions to describe 
blackness as the product of a deteriorating body, corrupted by its environment. In doing so, he 
rhetorically positions Africa as a site of disease and deformity. He continues: “because self-
control was difficult, particularly when plunging into lust, they gave themselves over to horrible 
excesses. Promiscuous coition of men and animals took place, wherefore the regions of Africa 
produce for us so many monsters.”2 Premised on racial stereotypes about promiscuity, Bodin 
dehumanizes Africans as the product of human/animal copulations. Geoffrey Goodman would 
repeat a similar claim in 1616, declaring that “Monsters are rare and seldom appear to us . . . 
[although] Affrica be a fruitfull mother of monsters.”3 Although these formulations rely partly on 
geohumoralism, they also naturalize race as a set of characteristics that have been reproduced 
through generations of “degenerate” bodies and animal couplings.  
Although animality is an undercurrent throughout each chapter, this dissertation does not 
seriously investigate the status of animals or utilize animal studies theory. Instead, I am 
interested in the ways in which humans are positioned in relation to animals, and how 
animalizing tropes are deployed in a dehumanizing way in the texts that I examine. For instance, 
David Turner writes, "Dwarfs were sometimes referred to as 'apes,' and other deformed or 
crooked people as 'monkeys.' Such analogies marked out deformity as stigma, a spoiled identity 
 
1
 Jean Bodin, Method for the Easy Comprehension of History (1566). Trans. Beatrice Reynolds. 
Race in Early Modern England: A Documentary Companion. Eds. Ania Loomba and Jonathan 
Burton. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 94. 
2
 Bodin, 96.  
3
 Geoffrey Goodman, The Fall of Man, or the Corruption of Nature, Proved by the Light of Our 
Naturall Reason. (London, 1616), 23. 
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that threatened to contaminate the integrity of the species itself."4 Similarly, I take up animality 
to demonstrate the way in which discourses of race and disability are inflected through 




In the past two decades, vital and groundbreaking work has been done on race in early 
modern England. Works such as Ania Loomba's Gender, Race, and Renaissance Drama (1989); 
Women, "Race," and Writing in the Early Modern Period (1994), edited by Margo Hendricks 
and Patricia Parker; and Kim F. Hall's Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in 
Early Modern England (1995); Arthur Little's Shakespeare Jungle Fever: National-Imperial Re-
visions of Race, Rape, and Sacrifice (2000); and Ania Loomba’s Shakespeare, Race, and 
Colonialism (2002), to name just a few, have formed the foundation on this research. However, 
despite the publication of many major monographs, scholarship on early modern race faces many 
challenges. As Peter Erickson and Kim F. Hall write in "'A New Scholarly Song': Rereading 
Early Modern Race" in a special issue of the Shakespeare Quarterly dedicated to race: 
the recursiveness of early modern race studies, where the importance of race is 
either ignored altogether or subject to an unhealthy back-and-forth in which 
scholars focusing on race confront the same (already addressed) questions and 
pushback from editors, readers, and audience members whose only investment in 
race seems to be disciplinary. Many scholars genially dismissive of race know 
little of the extensive scholarship on race-in either its early modern or modern 
form. . . . After years of being on the forefront of questions of early modern race 
 
4
 David Turner, "Disability Humor and the Meanings of Impairment in Early Modern England." 
Recovering Disability in Early Modern England. Eds. Allison Hobgood and David Houston 
Wood. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2013): 52-72; 61. 
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and colonialism in particular, the conversation in the world of Shakespeare had 
clearly stalled.5  
 
As Erickson and Hall continue, "Initial opposition to early modern race studies . . . was 
encapsulated in the single word 'anachronism' and informally deployed as a scare tactic and 
conversation stopper.”6 As Kyle Grady reminds us in his comparative analysis of Othello and 
Colin Powell, “Othello, Colin Powell, and Post-Racial Anachronisms,” contemporary hang ups 
about race frequently leak into historical analysis of race:    
A pervasive misconception that racialism is unambiguous often precludes an 
investigation of those ubiquitous, less overt systems of racism that intersect with 
ancillary social mechanisms and ostensibly mitigating factors . . . Whereas in the 
contemporary moment this notion takes the form of post-racialism, this trend in 
early modern scholarship could be said to employ a pre-racial orientation.7  
 
By flattening racism into an overt, “unidimensional and definitive matter” while simultaneously 
tokenizing figures such as Othello, Colin Powell, and Barack Obama as figures of post-racial 
progressiveness, scholars neglect to attend to the nuanced forms of racialism in both the early 
modern and the contemporary moment.  
Claims of anachronism when dealing with race in early modern England engaged on a 
multi-dimensional front meant to produce deflection from the topic. Although early modern 
English conceptions of race are different from contemporary American understandings of race, 
this does not mean that race did not exist at all. Indeed, as Ania Loomba argues in Shakespeare, 
Race, and Colonialism, limiting definitions of race to only those that appeal to biology 
oversimplify historical and contemporary understandings of race:  
 
5Peter Erickson and Kim F. Hall, "'A New Scholarly Song': Rereading Early Modern Race." 
Shakespeare Quarterly 67.1 (2016): 1-13; 2-3.  
6
 Erickson and Hall, 4. 
7
 Kyle Grady, “Othello, Colin Powell, and Post-Racial Anachronisms.” Shakespeare Quarterly 
67.1 (2016): 69-83; 69.  
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The rise of modern racism is often seen in terms of a shift from a cultural (and 
more benign) to a more biological (and inflexible) view of racial difference. But 
although the biological understanding of race made it more pernicious, we should 
be wary of positing a simple opposition between nature and culture or suggesting 
that a ‘cultural’ understanding of race is somehow benign or flexible. In fact, what 
we call ‘race’ and what we call ‘culture’ cannot be readily separated, especially 
during the early modern period when a people’s inferior culture implied a 
biologically inferior people.8  
 
In this way, religion and nationality are often racialized in the early modern period. We see this 
interconnection perhaps most poignantly in the term “blackamoor,” which fuses together religion 
and skin color in a way that cannot be untangled; in fact, Loomba argues that the word “Moor” 
itself is an “amalgam of both religious and color difference.”9 Rather than prioritize one category 
over the other, Loomba reminds us that it is important to see how both religion and skin color 
were understood as mutually constitutive: “it is sometimes suggested that hatred and fear of 
Muslims was more important than colour prejudice in English culture. . . . religion should not 
obscure or undermine the place of somatic difference; instead, we need to locate how the two 
come together and transform each other in the early modern period.”10 Although it is important 
for scholars to understand individual categories of difference, we should also be cognizant of 
how these categories inform and intersect each other.  
 In the early modern period, the term “race” could refer to one’s family or household, 
religion, lineage, class, nation, disability status, or other human categories. However, as seen in 
the religious and racial linkage in the term “blackamoor,” many of these meanings were 
connected through sexuality and reproduction. Loomba argues that “sexuality is central to the 
idea of ‘race’ understood as lineage, or a bloodline, because the idea of racial purity depends 
 
8 Ania Loomba, Shakespeare, Race, and Colonialism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
38.  
9
 Loomba, 46. 
10
 Loomba, 46.  
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upon the strict control of lineage. . . . but in every case, the boundaries of [a] group could only be 
guarded or expanded by carefully regulating sexual behaviour, especially that of women.”11 
Sexuality and reproduction connect seemingly disparate types of social organization that fall 
under the heading “race” at multiple levels. For instance, one’s class is also a product of one’s 
lineage or bloodline; class thus becomes incorporated under “race” through the same mechanism 
as lineage by a second degree. Further, as Loomba explains, the term “blue blood” of the nobility 
is: 
a translation of the Spanish sangre azul, which was claimed by several aristocratic 
families who declared they had never been contaminated by Moorish or Jewish 
blood, and hence had fair skins through which their blue blood could be seen. 
Thus blue blood is closely related to the idea of racial purity or limpezia de sangre 
which developed as the Inquisition sought to identify ‘pure’ Christians as opposed 
to those who had been ‘contaminated’ by mixing with Jews and Moors, or ‘New 
Christians’ who were converted Moors and Jews. All over Europe, the nobility 
were often understood  as a ‘race’ distinct from ordinary folk, and colonial 
relations drew heavily upon pre-existing notions of class difference, although they 
also restructured the relationships between classes within Europe.12  
 
Loomba further reminds us that in feudal societies, class was understood as inherited and rooted 
in blood, rather than an attribute that could be shed through upward social mobility of any kind. 
Class and race or ethnicity are thus linked through the concept of “blue blood” and racial purity; 
it “not only defines a certain economic section of the people in terms of their skin colour, but 
also suggests that their characteristics are transmitted from parents to children.”13 Both Spanish 
and English peasants and lower classes were regarded as intrinsically different from the nobility, 
perceived as dark, rude, unrefined, unintelligent, and barbaric.  
 
11
 Loomba, 32.  
12
 Loomba, 7.  
13
 Loomba, 33.  
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Although biological racism did not come into existence until the nineteenth century (the 
concept of “biology” itself did not come into existence until the nineteenth century either), 
understandings of race and racism have always been and continue to be multivalent, working 
across different areas of sociality at once. As Etienne Balibar theorizes, “biological or genetic 
naturalism is not the only means of naturalizing human beings and social affinities” because 
culture itself “can also function like a nature, and it can in particular function as a way of locking 
individual groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable and intangible 
in origin.”14 Racism is never rooted solely in concepts of biology, but is visible through the way 
it: 
inscribes itself in practices (forms of violence, contempt, intolerance, humiliation 
and exploitation), in discourses and representations which are so many intellectual 
elaborations of the phantasm of the prophylaxis or segregation (the need to purify 
the social body, to preserve ‘one’s own’ or ‘our’ identity from all forms of 
mixing, interbreeding or invasion) and which are articulated around stigmata of 
otherness (name, skin colour, religious practices).15  
 
Balibar sees race and racism as co-constitutive with nationalism; racism is "constantly emerging 
out of nationalism, not only towards the exterior but towards the interior."16 Balibar’s 
contemporary work on racism and nationalism provides an important link to understanding early 
modern understandings of racism as tied to emergent notions of British national identity. Felicity 
Nussbaum has similarly argued that the effort to define British national identity was tied to 
efforts to define the human by explicitly defining the human as civilized in terms that are 
 
14
 Etienne Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. Eds. 
Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein. Trans. Etienne Balibar and Chris Turner. (London: 
Verso, 1991): 17-28; 22.  
15
 Balibar, 17-18.  
16
 Balibar, 53.  
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gendered, racialized, ableist, and culturally British.17 Similarly, in Things of Darkness, Kim Hall 
argues that British writers used tropes of Blackness as a way to define and organize proper 
gendered behaviors. She writes: 
Tropes of blackness were discovered by white English writers (both male and 
female) to be infinitely malleable ways of establishing a sense of the proper 
organization of the Western European male and female in the Renaissance: 
notions of proper gender relations shape the terms for describing proper colonial 
organization. Further, the English/European division of beauty into ‘white’ or 
‘black’ not only served aesthetic purposes but supported an ideology that still 
continues to serve the interests of white supremacy and male hegemony.18 
 
As a result, white British women function to mediate difference and propriety as concern for “the 
whiteness of English women and the blackness of African men (and the mixture of both) projects 
onto the bodies of white women the anxieties of an evolving monarchical nation-state in which 
women are the repository of the symbolic boundaries of the nation.”19 And as Michael Hechter 
reminds us, "Nation-building in its earliest stages might better be thought of as empire 
building."20 Barbara Fuchs adds that "Nation-states coalesce, that is, through overland expansion, 
annexing adjacent territories and gradually achieving legitimacy. Overseas expansion continues 
this project, sharpening the distinctions among emerging nations as they compete for colonies."21 
Through competition with other European empires, and with Spain in particular, and through 
 
17
 Felicity Nussbaum. Limits of the Human: Fictions of Anomaly, Race, and Gender in the Long 
Eighteenth Century. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003).  
18
 Kim F. Hall, Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 4.   
19
 Hall, 9.  
20
 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 
2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 65.  
21
 Barbara Fuchs, "Imperium Studies: Theorizing Early Modern Expansion." Postcolonial 
Moves: Medieval through Modern. Ed. Patricia Clare Ingham and Michelle R. Warren. (New 
York: Palgrave, 2003): 71-90; 73-4.   
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exploration and subsequent colonization of non-European, non-white countries, the British come 
to define themselves, in Balibar’s words, through “stigmas of otherness.”22 
Nussbaum, Hall, and others have focused specifically on the intersection between race 
and gender in their analyses; much less time has been spent considering the intersection between 
race and disability. For the purposes of this dissertation, I am primarily interested in the ways 
stigmas of otherness, particularly stigmas of race and disability, express themselves through 
classifications of the human. For Balibar, classification is indeed one of the first steps in the 
process of racialization: 
First of all, there is the fundamental operation of classification— that is, the 
reflection within the human species of the difference that constitutes it, the search 
for criteria by which men can be said to be ‘men’: What makes them so? To what 
extent are they so? Of what kind are they? Such classification is presupposed by 
any form of hierarchical ranking . . . Classification and hierarchy are operations of 
naturalization par excellence or, more accurately, of projection of historical and 
social differences into the realm of an imaginary nature. But we must not be taken 
in by the self-evident character of the results. ‘Human nature,’ closely shadowed 
by a system of ‘natural differences’ within the human species, in no way 
represents an unmediated category.23  
 
In the early modern period, we see this process of classification establish hierarchies of white 
supremacy and ableism in travel narratives and early taxonomic and scientific writings. Through 
an oppositional and binary logic of difference, whiteness and able-bodiedness emerge as the 
“original” from which degeneration occurs.  
 
 
22 Laura Lunger Knoppers and Joan B. Landes, in their introduction to Monstrous 
Bodies/Political Monstrosities, similarly write: “Monsters emerge in the early modern period as 
just such crucial definitional Others in the processes of European self and nation formation; at 
the same time, they constantly threaten the very identities they help to define.” Monstrous 
Bodies/Political Monsters. eds. Laura Lunger Knoppers and Joan B. Landes. (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 7.  
23





 The social model of disability considers the ways in which society is organized to create 
disabilities through negative attitudes, exclusion, legal and institutional barriers, and structured, 
inaccessible environments.  Importantly, it does not locate lack or inferiority as a characteristic 
of the body, but rather how the body is interpreted and constructed. As Lennard Davis writes, 
"the disabled body is not a discrete object but rather a set of social relations."24 Davis further 
distinguishes between an impairment and a disability. He writes: 
Disability is not so much the lack of a sense or the presence of a physical 
or mental impairment as it is the reception and construction of that 
difference. Contemporary theoreticians of disability distinguish between 
an impairment and a disability. An impairment is a physical fact, but a 
disability is a social construction.25  
 
In other words, he writes, “lack of mobility is an impairment, but an environment without ramps 
turns that impairment into a disability.”26 Disability, defined in this way, is both socially and 
environmentally constructed. For instance, in the 2008 movie WALL-E, all human characters 
aboard the spaceship use mobile, levitating chairs to move through their environments along 
light paths on the floor. Because the environment of the spaceship is specifically constructed to  
 
24
 Lennard Davis, Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body. (London and New 
York: Verso, 1995), 11. 
25
 Lennard Davis, “Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and the Discourse of Disability in the Eighteenth 
Century.” “Defects”: Engendering the Modern Body. Eds. Helen Deutsch and Felicity 
Nussbaum. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 54-74; 56.  
26




accommodate chair users, rather than walkers, the environment is also a paragon of accessibility: 
here, walking impairments are not a disability.27 Similarly, as Thomson reminds us, “Printed 
information accommodates the sighted but ‘limits’ blind persons. Deafness is not a disabling 
condition in a community that communicates by signing as well as speaking.”28 Leonard 
continues: 
For the sake of argument, I define physical disability as a disruption in the 
sensory field of the observer. Disability, in this sense, is located in the observer, 
not the observed, and is therefore more about the viewer than about the person 
using a cane or a wheelchair. The term disability is a categorization tied to the 
development of discourses that aim to cure, remediate, or catalog variations in 
bodies. Thus, disability is a part of a continuum that includes differences in 
gender, as well as bodily features indicative of race, sexual preference, and even 




 Unfortunately, the film represents the use of these chairs as a form of “laziness” produced by 
out-of-control consumerism.  
28
 Rosemarie Garland Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in 
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In the texts that I consider in this dissertation, disability is constructed through representational 
discourse in plays, travel texts, and medical treatises, as well as through legal structures and 
laws.  
 The distinction between impairment and disability is useful insofar as it helps us 
highlight the ways in which built structures (including discursive, legal, and physical structures) 
are not inherently neutral, but built around specific bodies and abilities. It also exposes the way 
in which power is built into such environments through the exclusion of certain bodies and 
abilities. At the same time, however, theorists such as Alison Kafer have pointed out that the 
distinction between an impairment and a disability are not always useful. She writes that the 
social model of disability, "in its well-intentioned focus on the disabling effects of society, it 
overlooks the often-disabling effects of our bodies. People with chronic illness, pain, and fatigue 
have been among the most critical of this aspect of the social model, rightly noting that social 
and structural changes will do little to make one's joints stop aching or to alleviate back pain."30 
In other words, there are times when the impairment itself is disabling, especially in instances of 
chronic pain. Susan Wendell also reminds us that social factors can also create impairments and 
disabilities:  
In this direct sense of damaging people’s bodies in ways that are disabling in their 
environments, much disability is created by the violence of invasions, wars, civil 
wars, and terrorism, which cause disabilities not only through direct injuries to 
combatants and noncombatants, but also through the spread of disease and the 
deprivations of basic needs that result from the chaos they create.31 
 
In addition to the extreme violence of war and terror, more mundane environments such as an 
unsafe workplace, “abuse and neglect of children, low public safety standards, the degradation of 
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the environment by contamination of air, water, and food, and the overwork, stress, and daily 
grinding deprivations of poverty”32 can also create disability. It is this lens, for instance, through 
which I examine Caliban in Chapter 2: Disability and Race in The Tempest. Caliban is disabled 
in multiple ways, one of which is the chronic pain he experiences as a result of Prospero’s 
violence when Caliban refuses to comply with his demands.  
Formulating constructions of disability in the early modern period is challenging because 
it is a period of transition: the religious model certainly continued as a newer medical model 
took its roots. Both models co-existed, their discourses influencing and contesting each other. As 
Deutsch and Nussbaum write: 
In the medieval period, miracles and prodigies were imagined to be at once part of 
the natural order and divine signs from God, but in the early modern period this 
preternatural realm of strange events and unusual beings began to provoke 
multiple interpretations. As the miraculous event was redefined as a natural fact, 
cultural meaning was constructed and contested upon evidence . . . The cause of a 
monstrous birth might be both the bestiality of the parents and divine displeasure 
at such sinful acts.33  
 
Importantly, the medical model was assisted not simply by medicine itself, but by the work of 
natural historians and comparative anatomists who sought to evaluate and classify natural life 
and variable bodies. This transformation, which Thomson refers to “a narrative of the marvelous 
to a narrative of the deviant” in which “wonder becomes error” worked in both models, religious 
and medical, however, to “reveal.” As has been remarked numerable times, the word “monster,” 
which people with disabilities and deformities were frequently referred to as, comes from the 
Latin monstra, meaning to warn, show, sign, or demonstrate. As portents under the religious 
model, “monsters” “revealed” God’s divine plan; as anomalies under the medical model, they 
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“confirmed, repudiated, or revised what humanity imagined as the order of things.”34 As such, 
they played an important role in defining what is and isn’t human for early modern scientists and 
readers.  
 Although there have been some claims that discussing disability in the early modern 
period is anachronistic, as Allison P. Hobgood and David Houston Wood argue in their essay 
"Ethical Staring: Disabling the English Renaissance,” "the notion of early modern disability is 
not anachronistic because human variation, though conceived of and responded to diversely, has 
always existed."35 In the early modern period, disability was also a legal status that determined 
whether one qualified for government aid. As Linda Woodbridge explains, disability played an 
important role in separating the “deserving” from the “undeserving” poor. She writes:  
  Writers on poverty always made an exception for the disabled: disability was the  
only legitimate alternative to hard work. In a sample tally of the parish poor in An 
Ease for Overseers of the Poor, the column headed 'Defects' lists 'palsy,' 'idiot,' 
'lame,' 'deaf,' 'diseased,' 'dumb,' 'bedrid,' and 'blind' as sample defects and 
recommends as a basic principle of poor relief 'that they may have a proportional 
allowance according to the continuation and measure of their maladies and 
miseries.' The emphasis on disability rests on the underlying assumption that 
anyone physically capable of work will be able to find work.36 
 
Lindsey Row-Heyveld argues that the centering of disability as “deserving” of aid led to the 
“specter of feigned disability” and the fear of counterfeit disability among vagrants who would 
otherwise be “undeserving.” Row-Heyveld writes, “In an escalating cycle, the increased policing 
of boundaries between the deserving and undeserving poor justified the fear of counterfeit 
disability, and the fear of counterfeit disability flourished because of the increased policing of 
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those boundaries.”37 The result of this escalation was a lasting association between disability and 
fraudulence: “Although disability was consistently presented as the only legitimate qualification 
for charity, disability was never believed to be truly deserving of charity.” 
 Although there are scholars that use terms such as defect or deformity as analytic terms 
for their subjects, I employ disability and disabled as my terms of analysis to signify my 
approach to understanding bodily difference within systems of power and discourse. While such 
scholars are interested in understanding the terms of disability from the historical perspective of 
their primary sources and to avoid anachronism, I worry that this in fact reproduces the power 
dynamics they supposedly seek to make visible. As Thomson writes, “By examining the 
‘disabled figure,’ rather than discussing the ‘grotesque’ or ‘cripple’ or ‘deformed,’ I hope to 
catapult this analysis out of a purely aesthetic context and into a political one.”38 David T. 
Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder take a similar approach: 
Unlike the terms handicapped and crippled, which suggest inherent biological 
limitations and individual abnormalities, this collection employs a definition of 
disability that denotes the social, historical, political, and mythological 
coordinates that define disabled people as excessive to traditional social circuits 
of interaction and as the objects of institutionalized discourses.39  
 
Although terms such as “deformity” or “infection” allow for a rhetorical facility across the topics 
that I discuss, I have deliberately used “disability” as my analytic key term to highlight the social 
and political ways in which disability and race are constructed. As Hobgood and Wood argue, 
 
37
 Lindsey Row-Heyveld, Dissembling Disability in Early Modern English Drama. (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018), 9.  
38
 Thomson, 15.  
39
 David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, The Body and Physical Difference: Discourses of 
Disability. Eds. David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997), 2-3.  
17 
 
insisting on disability as a term of analysis is important to avoid flattening scholarship. They 
write: 
'Disabled' was indeed an operational identity category in the English Renaissance, 
though it continues to be misidentified, or at the very least underexplored, in early 
modern scholarship. Many useful and important, though discursively and 
theoretically inflexible works, insist on inertly conceptualizing the marvelous, 
monstrous, and deformed, for instance, to describe early modern bodily 
difference. [We resist] limiting early modern disability as such.40   
 
Although my primary sources do often use terms such as “deformity” and “infection” to describe 
human beings, I position these terms under the umbrella of “disability” to avoid the way in 
which such language could otherwise naturalize such differences as inherently defective or 
lacking.  
 Importantly, although I use disability as a lens of analysis in this dissertation, I do not 
mean to claim that any of the characters or people I cover would have necessarily identified as 
“disabled” as an identity category of group membership. Rather, I use disability studies as a 
mode of analysis to examine the ways in which, in the texts that I consider, the body is subject to 
disabling violence, dehumanized, made extant to the legal system, and subject to oralist 
pedagogical practices. As Kafer explains, examining disability in a capacious way allows us to 
rethink what is possible: 
Thinking through this collective 'we,' this forging of crip communities, means 
accounting for those who do 'have' illnesses or impairments, and who might be 
recognized by others as part of this 'disabled we,' but who do not recognize 
themselves as such. This group would include the largest proportion of disabled 
people: those folks with hearing impairments, or low vision, or 'bum knees,' or 
asthma, or diabetes who, for a whole host of reasons, would claim neither crip 
identity nor disability. . . . One answer to these questions is that it doesn't matter 
whether such people claim crip or not: rethinking our cultural assumptions about 
disability, imagining our disability futures differently, will benefit us all, 
regardless of our identities.41 
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My goal in this dissertation, then, is not to “claim” such persons or characters would have 
identified “as disabled,” but rather to think through systems and discourses that are disabling. 
Similarly, following scholars such as Hobgood, Wood, Garland, and others, I resist reading 
disabled characters as purely rhetorical or metaphorical. As Garland writes: 
   The disparity between ‘disabled’ as an attributed, decontextualizing  
identity and the perceptions and experiences of real people living with 
disabilities suggests that this figure of otherness emerges from positioning, 
interpreting, and conferring meaning upon bodies. . . . If we accept the 
convention that fiction has some mimetic relation to life, we grant it power 
to further shape our perceptions of the world. . . . Most disabled characters 
are enveloped by the otherness that their disability signals in the text.42 
 
Such “otherness” indeed informs how the body is read and understood, and functions to 
elaborate a discourse of disability through its stigmatization.  
 Disability studies is a useful analytical framework to understand some forms of early 
modern racialization because of the way in which it attends to the pathologization of difference. 
As Ellen Samuels writes in Fantasies of Identification, “Fantasies of identification are haunted 
by disability even when disabled bodies are not their immediate focus, for disability functions as 
the trope and embodiment of true physical difference.”43 Disability is a master trope through 
which physical difference is described and marked as aberrant, a citation through which the body 
is understood. Importantly, I do not mean to suggest that race “is” somehow a disability, or that 
disability is a more salient feature of oppression and difference than race. Instead, I examine the 
ways in which race is constructed through the language of disability to demonstrate the ways in 
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which discourses of disability and race were aligned in the long eighteenth century. As Thomson 
writes:  
integrating disability does not obscure our critical focus on the registers of race, 
sexuality, ethnicity, or gender, nor is it additive . . . considering disability shifts 
the conceptual framework to strengthen our understanding of how these multiple 
systems intertwine, redefine, and mutually constitute one another . . . Integrating 
disability clarifies how this aggregate of systems operates together, yet distinctly, 
to support an imaginary norm and structure the relations that grant power, 
privilege, and status to that norm.44 
 
Because the texts that I take up in this dissertation construct race through the language of 
disability, I use both critical race theory and disability studies to understand how the people and 




Chapter Two, “Disability and Race in The Tempest,” intervenes in early modern race 
studies by arguing that early modern discourses of race are often figured through the language of 
disability as “defect” or “infection.” My work utilizes the social model of disability, which 
Lennard Davis describes as “not so much the lack of a sense or the presence of a physical or 
mental impairment as it is the reception and construction of that difference.”45 Because disability 
is “a categorization tied to the development of discourses that aim to cure, remediate, or catalog 
variations in bodies,”46 the social model also allows us to make sense of the way in which early 
modern writers often framed Blackness as a “defect,” the impossible cure to which was 
 
44
 Rosemarie Garland Thomson, “Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory.” 
NWSA Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3, Feminist Disability Studies (Autumn 2002): 1-32; 4. 
45Davis, “Dr. Johnson,” 54-74; 56. 
46
 Davis, “Dr. Johnson,” 56. 
20 
 
“whiteness.” It also allows us to understand how people with disabilities and deformities as well 
as non-white people are recruited into discussions of monstrosity: disabled people and non-
Europeans both become defined as animalistic or monstrous “varieties” of able-bodied 
whiteness. By looking at the way in which descriptions of Caliban’s body are over-determined 
by race, deformity, and animality, I argue that The Tempest constructs Caliban’s disability, 
racialization, and ambiguous species status as suitable for enslavement at a time when England 
was beginning to demonstrate its interest in colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade. 
Because discourses of disability and race did not have a single, coherent form, my third 
chapter, “‘Making Signs’: Travel Literature, Philosophies of Language, and Deaf Education 
Manuals,” demonstrates how disability and race were positioned as aligned, rather than 
constitutive, in the construction of Enlightenment ideals of reason expressed through language. I 
examine the way in which “making signs” is deployed in deaf education manuals and travel 
literature as able to communicate reason. Although almost all deaf people would have used a 
sign language, these signs were considered “dumb” — as in, inarticulate and lacking voice, as 
often only articulate sound was taken as the measure of “reason.” At the same time, white able-
bodied men are portrayed in travel narratives as “making signs” during moments of cultural 
encounters to communicate complex political and economic ideas. As British oral speakers, their 
reason is never in question, and their signs are never “dumb.” Contrariwise, non-European 
languages are represented as “primitive,” explorers claim that some Native Americans speak 
mostly in manual signs, and Africans are compared to parrots who can mimic language but who 
do not possess language. Chapter Three ends with an examination of the reception of the poetry 
of Francis Williams, a free Black Jamaican scholar who wrote poetry in Latin, travelled to 
Europe, became a citizen of Britain, and set up a free school for Black children in Jamaica. 
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Despite his accomplishments, writers such as Daivd Hume and Edward Long routinely dismissed 
Williams’ poetry as mere “parroting,” rather than the skillful execution of “real” language.  
In Chapter Four, “Frankenstein, Slaughterhouses, and Blood,” I demonstrate the deep 
continuities of thought between early modern scientific research and Romantic-era concerns 
surrounding health, disease, and blood. I argue that, in Frankenstein, Victor conceives of the 
creature in terms of pathology; his project is to “banish disease from the human frame, and 
render man invulnerable to any but a violent death!”47 I present a history of slaughterhouses and 
blood transfusion experiments to understand the medical production of the creature’s body as a 
blood transfusion recipient. I first argue that Victor’s visits to the slaughterhouse for body 
materials are most likely for blood, and consider how this might reshape the creature as a human-
animal hybrid. Underpinning this discussion, I demonstrate that slaughterhouses were closely 
associated with death, disease, and blood; whereas a history of blood transfusion experiments — 
beginning in the 1660s — presents an opposing axis on which blood is associated with life, 
invigoration, health, and virtue. Because the source of the creature’s generation is transfused and 
tainted animal blood, the creature thus rests on multiple planes of ambiguity: human and animal, 
dead and alive, healthy and diseased. I use these histories to provide a matrix of meaning to 
understand how both health and disease are constructed through biocultural significations of 
blood. Although this chapter deviates from the way in which I discuss disability and race in 
earlier chapters, it similarly seeks to highlight the ways in which deviance and virtue are 
constructed as natural attributes of the body, and specifically through blood.  
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In this dissertation, I use disability studies as a method to examine different forms of 
racialization. Disability studies provides an opportunity to consider not only physical difference, 
but also the way in which physical differences are stigmatized and pathologized. As Thomson 
notes: 
Because disability is defined not as a set of observable, predictable traits— like 
racialized or gendered features— but rather as any departure from an unstated 
physical and functional norm, disability highlights individual differences. In other 
words, the concept of disability unites a highly marked, heterogeneous group 
whose only commonality is being considered abnormal.48 
 
In the texts that I examine in this dissertation, Blackness and disability are positioned not as a 
neutral form of physical difference— but one that is inferior and pathologized as a form of 
physical, mental, and social deviance.  
By representing disabled bodies as a “lack” or “deficiency,” negative constructions of 
disability inherently carry a normative imperative. As Thomson notes:  
disability is a representation, a cultural interpretation of physical transformation 
or configuration, and a comparison of bodies that structures social relations and 
institutions. Disability, then, is the attribution of corporeal deviance— not so 
much a property of bodies as a product of cultural rules about what bodies should 
be or do.49 
 
It should not be surprising, then, that in the texts in which I examine Blackness and disability 
there appears a concurrent compulsion to “cure,” “fix,” or “improve” such bodies. In The 
Tempest, Prospero and Miranda attempt to “improve” Caliban by teaching him their language 
and manners. In Ben Jonson’s The Masque of Blackness, Niger brings his daughters to the shores 
of Albion to “cure” their Blackness and make them white. In eighteenth-century British deaf 
instruction manuals, authors attempt to “fix” their students’ deafness by teaching them to speak 
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orally and lip read, rather than cultivating the sign languages they already employed. Connecting 
these texts is the construction of a social and bodily imperative of white able-bodiedness.   
Across these chapters, disability and race are entangled through invocations of the animal 
through discourses of monstrosity, animality, and language acquisition. Importantly, bodily 
comportment/appearance and language ability are two of the primary categories that are 
deployed most consistently throughout this period. In the periods and discourses that I examine, 
disabled and racialized people are aligned in consistent but unexpected ways to stabilize 
definitions of the human, reflecting how white able-bodied British writers wanted to see 









Chapter 2 Disability and Race in The Tempest 
 
 In the scholarship on The Tempest, the island has been variously located in the 
Mediterranean50, the Caribbean51, America52, and Ireland5354. This scholarship has been 
important, in part because it often works to develop the way in which the play is concerned with 
early colonialist pursuits. At the same time, however, by attempting to determine a precise 
location for the island, and therefore also trying to understand Caliban’s cultural location, we 
miss how the play is also concerned with hybridity and ambiguity. As Ania Loomba notes, 
“Caliban’s ‘vile race’ indicates an amalgam of location, religion, culture, language, sexuality, 
and physique, all of which were part of the discourse of ‘race’ which was to remain volatile and 
variable in years to come.”55 However, scholarship has not yet adequately examined the way in 
which Caliban’s “vile race” is also figured through the language of disability.  In this chapter, I 
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also examine Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, George Best’s A True Discourse of the 
Late Voyages of Discoverie, and Ben Jonson’s The Masque of Blackness and The masque of 
Beauty. By looking at these texts through a disability studies framework, I argue that race is not 
only figured as a threatening disease and deformity, but that whiteness is positioned as a “cure” 
for Blackness.  
Although my reading of The Tempest does regard Caliban as a colonized and racialized 
other, I do not attempt to locate Caliban in a specific place or culture, aside from knowing that 
his mother is from Algiers. Instead, I consider the ways in which the ambiguity surrounding 
Caliban is productive in harnessing together the discourses of race and disability. Early modern 
racialization takes place through a variety of mechanisms; I demonstrate that race, in these texts, 
is figured through the language of disability. Much work has been done on race and gender in the 
early modern period; however, there remains a large gap in examining the ways in which race 
and disability interact with each other as constructed categories of difference. My definition of 
race in the early modern period draws from Ian Smith, who writes that "'race' is less a unitary 
identity than a relationship predicated on difference in privilege, power, and perceived agency 
that reinforces a distinct status for an authorized subject."56 This understanding of race is 
particularly useful for The Tempest and examining the way in which Prospero’s authority is 
established through his enslavement of Caliban, whose labor he extracts under the threat of 
corporal punishment.  
It is this corporal punishment, and the chronic pain that it entails for Caliban, that I read 
as one way in which Caliban is constructed as disabled in the text. In this chapter, I work with 
 
56
 Ian Smith, Race and Rhetoric in the Renaissance: Barbarian Errors. (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 12.  
26 
 
Alison Kafer’s political/relational model of disability. In the political/relational model of 
disability, Kafer explains that: 
 the problem of disability no longer resides in the minds and bodies of individuals  
but in built environments and social patterns that exclude or stigmatize particular 
kinds of bodies, minds, and ways of being. . . . Under a political/relational model 
of disability, however, the problem of disability is located in inaccessible 
buildings, discriminatory attitudes, and ideological systems that attribute 
normalcy and deviance to particular minds and bodies.57 
 
Although I do not look at inaccessible environments in this chapter, I do look at the ways in 
which ideologies were constructed around race and disability that position Caliban as “deviant.” 
Further, this chapter is invested in the ways in which social relations as determined by power 
function to both pathologize and racialize particular bodies and ways of being, particularly in the 
writings of George Best and Robert Burton. More specifically, I examine the ideological 
structure that relies on the already-stigmatized status of disability and disease as one aspect of 
racialization. For Caliban, whose body is overdetermined by disability, race, animality, and 
Prospero’s lasting marks of punishment which leave him marked with “stripes,” such ideological 
structures work together with power to produce the conditions of his enslavement. 
Disability and Race 
 
Although discourses on disability and race are distinct enough for each to borrow from 
each other, they also overlap considerably in literature on “monsters and prodigies.” Both groups 
are lumped together into a heterogeneous and yet undifferentiated category of "monsters”; this 
convergence is largely accomplished through animalization and the maternal imagination. The 
“monstrous” thus represents highly diverse groups of people, and, as Susan Hiller writes, it is 
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“against this difference the characteristics of self and society are formed and clarified.”58 As 
such, “monstrous” literature gives us a negative outline of the development of Western European 
norms about the body: its number of arms and legs— and their correct shape, its height, its 
appropriate amount of hair, its gait and posture, its genitals, and its skin color. 
 Rosemarie Garland Thomson refers to this negative outline as “the normate”: “the figure 
outlined by the array of deviant others whose marked bodies shore up the normate’s 
boundaries.”59 Against the bodies of deviant others— disabled, non-white, and female—the 
normate emerges as  “. . . the social figure through which people can represent themselves as 
definitive human beings.”60 To define “the human” is to limit the possibilities of what is human. 
In the early modern period, these limits were bound to emergent notions of British national 
identity that conceived of the body as both fair/white and abled. Because the “normate subject 
emerges . . . only when we scrutinize the social processes and discourses that constitute physical 
and cultural otherness,”61 the texts I consider in this chapter cover a range of genres that address 
physical and cultural otherness and constitute the discursive field through which the body’s 
contours are scrutinized for human status.   
The “aberrant,” deviant, or simply non-normative body circulates in early modern texts as 
anchors through which the normate is defined and known. Because disability functions as a 
primary framework for human difference,62 early modern conceptions of race relied heavily on 
the language of disability to describe physical difference. As Thomson writes: 
  Because disability is defined not as a set of observable, predictable traits— like  
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racialized or gendered features— but rather as any departure from an unstated 
physical and functional norm, disability highlights individual differences. In other 
words, the concept of disability unites a highly marked, heterogeneous group 
whose only commonality is being considered abnormal.63 
 
In the early modern period, whiteness itself can sometimes function as a physical and functional 
norm, particularly in discourses around fairness and complexion. As Kim Hall notes, the 
"semantic shift" of the word "fair" to refer to a light, as opposed to a dark, complexion "appears 
just at the moment of intensified English interest in colonial travel and African trade" in the 
1550s.64 Hall argues:  
it is England's sense of losing its traditional insularity that provokes the 
development of 'racialism.’ This moment of transition-- England's movement 
from geographic isolation into military and mercantile contest with other 
countries-- sets the stage for the longer process by which preexisting literary 
tropes of blackness profoundly interacted with the fast-changing economic 
relations of white Europeans and their darker 'others' during the Renaissance.65 
 
Complexion brings together discourses of both racialism and humoral health in the way that it 
attributes different types of health and illness to different geographical locations and peoples. For 
instance, in Anatomy of Melancholy, Robert Burton describes Jews as having “goggle eyes” and 
that their complexion, “voice, pace, gesture and looks are likewise derived from all the rest of 
their conditions and infirmities" and passed along by "propagation.”66 Burton also writes more 
broadly of the connection between hereditary diseases and complexion. Because “corruption is 
derived from the father to the son,” Burton worries that, in England, “by our too much facility in 
this kind, in giving way for all to marry that will, too much liberty and indulgence in tolerating 
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all sorts, there is a vast confusion of hereditary diseases, no family secure, no man, almost, free 
from some grievous infirmity or other,” that it may come to pass that “our generation is corrupt . 
. . many feral diseases raging among us.”67  However, there are other peoples that he imagines as 
free from disease: 
in all ages there should be (as usually there is) once in six hundred years, a 
transmigration of nations, to amend and purify their blood, as we alter seed upon 
our land, and that there should be, as it were, an inundation of those northern 
Goths and Vandals, and many such-like people which came out of that continent 
of Scandia and Sarmatia (as some suppose) and overran, as a deluge, most part of 
Europe and Africa, to alter for our good our complexions, which were much 
defaced with hereditary infirmities, which by our lust and intemperance we had 
contracted. A sound generation of strong and able men were sent amongst us, as 
those northern men usually are, innocuous, free from riot, and free from 
diseases.68 
 
Burton imagines an earlier time in which the British were “defaced with hereditary infirmities” 
before the introduction of “northern men” who “amend[ed] and purif[ied] their blood”-- as well 
as their complexions.69  
Burton, like many authors of the period, is clearly influenced by the geohumoral theory 
that different climates affect bodies in terms of both their health and morality. Later, for instance, 
he writes, “I read of those isles of Cape Verde, fourteen degrees from the Equator . . . one calls 
them the unhealthiest clime of the world, for luxes, fevers, frenzies, calentures.”70 Here, the 
climate itself is unhealthy— it affects both natives and travellers. In the previous page, however, 
the healthy bodies produced by northern climates retain their health outside of their climate and 
are able to “cure” an entirely new set of people with the introduction of their blood through 
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reproduction. In other texts, Blackness is treated as and referred to explicitly as an “infection.” In 
A True Discourse of the Late Voyages of Discoverie, George Best writes: 
I my selfe have seene an Ethiopian as blacke as a cole broughte into Englande, 
who taking a faire Englishe woman to Wife, begatte a Sonne in all respectes as 
blacke as the Father was, although England were his native Countrey, & an 
English woman his Mother: whereby it seemeth this blacknesse proceedeth rather 
of some naturall infection of that man, which was so strong, that neyther the 
nature of the Clime, neyther the good complexion of the Mother concurring, 
coulde any thing alter.71  
 
Best uses this story to argue that climate doesn’t play a role in determining one’s race; he 
concludes: “therefore we can not impute it to the nature of the Clime.”72 What is interesting 
about this story, in addition to Best’s dismissal of a geohumoral theory of race, is that, unlike the 
accounts of maternal imagination which produced Black children from white parents, Best’s 
narrative describes a white parent and a Black parent. In the Aristotelian tradition, the male 
sperm was thought of as being the “active” and dominant agent in conception, while the female 
material was passive. Here, however, Best is clearly surprised that the white, English woman’s 
reproductive capabilities weren’t active or powerful enough to overwhelm that of her Black 
partner’s, tiering race above sex as a determining factor. Instead, Best interprets the dominance 
of the Black male partner not as a product of biology, as in the Aristotelian tradition, but as 
“some naturall infection of that man.” Later he continues: "And the most probable cause to my 
judgemente is, that this blacknesse proceedeth of naturall infection of the first inhabitants of that 
Countrey, and so all the whole progenie of them descended, are still poluted with the same blot 
of infection."73 For Best, it is Blackness itself that is an “infection.” It is not the active principle 
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or the dominance of the male sperm that shapes a man’s children, but rather a “polution” that is 
passed down through his “progenie.” As Hall argues in regards to this passage:  
Both the complexion of the 'faire English woman' and the clime are characterized 
as 'good,' which immediately positions white/black on the same conceptual grid as 
the good/evil dichotomy. His formulation also associates England with whiteness, 
because 'the nature of the Clime' is rhetorically associated with the 'good 
complexion' of the mother. To heighten the threat of blackness, it is paradoxically 
seen as invisible, as an infection, a troping that works to naturalize the difference 
between the black man and his white wife.74 
 
Although Best positions Englishness and Blackness as mutually exclusive categories in this 
passage, he also presents Blackness as a threat to Englishness in the form of an “infection” that 
even one of England’s own “faire” women could not stop from spreading.  
 In Best’s narrative, race and disability are thus impossible to distinguish from each other: 
race here is presented as disability. By constructing Black skin as a disability or “infection,” Best 
implies that the absence of such an infection is white skin; Black skin thus emerges as “disabled 
white skin” in this formulation. As “infection,” disability threatens the integrity of other bodies, 
and specifically the British populace if such couples continue to reproduce a “whole progenie” 
which may be “poluted with the same blot of infection.” By categorizing Blackness as a 
disability, the threat of disability is the fulcrum upon which Best is able to pose Blackness as a 
threat to the white British body: disability is the structure through which Blackness “spreads” or 
“polutes.” 
 Ben Jonson’s The Masque of Blackness and The Masque of Beauty reinforce the idea of 
Blackness as a defect or infection, as well as the idea that certain races are able to “cure” others. 
Whereas Burton imagined “northern men” purifying the blood of England, and whereas Best 
figured Blackness as an innate infection immutable to the climate and complexion of England, 
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Jonson combines both ideas. As Sara B. T. Thiel notes, Masque of Blackness draws on “existing 
cultural constructions that associated whiteness with beautiful civility and blackness with 
disfigured barbarity.”75 The Masque of Blackness begins with Niger claiming that nothing, not 
even death, can change the Black color of his daughters’ skins and the fixed nature daughters’ 
Blackness is repeated several times: "Since Death hir selfe (hir selfe being pale & blue) / Can 
neuer alter their most faith-full hew."76 The daughters lament their Blackness after learning that 
it is actually fairness that is considered beautiful, and not Blackness. However, the moon 
goddess, Aethiopia reveals that Britania has the power to blanch their skin and make them white; 
Britannia, “whose Beames shine day, and night, and are of force / To blanch an Aethiope, and 
reuiue a Cor’s / His light scientiall is, and (past mere nature) / Can salue the rude defects of euery 
creature.”77 The blanching of the Aesthiope’s skin is situated alongside Britain’s ability to “salue 
the rude defects of euery creature.” Although Masque of Blackness demonstrates that a 
“sustained focus on the relationship between external temperature and physiology clearly 
connects the work to prevalent climate theories of the period," it also uniquely isolates Britain as 
able to provide the transformation the daughters seek. Britain is repeatedly associated with 
fairness throughout the masque, which as Hall notes "references . . . the new status of England as 
the seat of a growing empire and the significance of its identity as Britannia . . . This pride in the 
revival of an ancient Britain is continually yoked to the glorification of whiteness."78 Masque of 
Blackness begins with Best’s assumption that Blackness is immutable, but it ends with Burton’s 
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belief that complexion can be transformed or “cured.” In Masque of Beauty, the title of which 
already positions beauty in opposition to Blackness, the daughters emerge as “An Aethiope 
washed white.”79 Britain itself, like Burton’s “northern men,” “purifies” the blood and 
complexion of the daughters. In other words, not only is whiteness figured as the absence of 




 Although Caliban’s racial status is ambiguous, I, like many other scholars, read him as a 
racialized and colonized figure. I argue that Caliban’s racialization occurs through the language 
of disability and deformity. Referred to as “dark,” “deformed,” frequently in pain, and with 
ambiguous animal traits, Caliban is constructed as disabled, racialized, and barely human. 
Although many of the examples I have analyzed so far construct race through the language of 
disability, Caliban is an exceptional aberration. Deformity and animalization are taken literally in 
Caliban’s physicality— he is not simply insulted as dog-like, but his actual species determination 
is blurred across dog, fish, and human. The Tempest constructs Caliban’s disability, racialization, 
and ambiguous species status as suitable for enslavement at a time when England was beginning 
to demonstrate its interest in colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade.  
Rather than focusing on race, location, or colonialism, Mark Thornton Burnett analyzes 
Caliban through the lens of disability. Through close reading, Burnett makes note of the way that 
disability is figured throughout the text; he writes: 
The Tempest is primarily concerned with ‘disability’ and ‘imperfection’ in all of 
their manifestations. Time and time again the drama’s metaphors return to playing 
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variations on physical ailments, flaws and compromises. Miranda affirms that 
Prospero’s ‘tale’ would ‘cure deafness’ (I.ii.106); Ariel claims that the 
shipwrecked party has arrived without a ‘blemish’ (I.ii.43); Ferdinand, stained 
with a ‘canker’ (I.ii.416) of grief, refused earlier offers of marriage because of 
‘some defect’ (III.i.44) in the ‘women’ (III.i.43) to whom he was introduced; and 
Prospero regrets his ‘infirmity’ (IV.i.160). Throughout, it would appear as if the 
material body is an inherently unstable property in danger of becoming a 
‘monsterized’ version of its potentially more perfect self.80   
 
Burnett’s analysis of the way in which the text uses monstrosity to construct Caliban, and its 
ongoing interest in disability throughout the play, is indeed illuminating and important— and I 
am in agreement with him about this. However, Burnett buttresses this argument through the 
suppression of colonial elements in the text, which, because they are unignorable, he attempts to 
diminish in importance. On the one hand, Burnett writes that “Caliban’s unassimilable alterity 
has been understandable only through the tried and trusted tropes of contemporary travellers’ 
tales.”81 However, he then argues that Caliban is described more in terms of deformed and/or 
poor Englishmen than in terms of colonial others: “For Caliban is marked more by his local 
colourings; in particular, he is assessed within the conventions of English ballads, many of which 
were devoted to describing either a ‘strange fish’ or a ‘monstrous birth.’”82 What Burnett fails to 
notice is that the English borrow from their native “others” to describe colonial others, especially 
in terms of disability and deformity. Burnett goes on:  
Stephano initially places on Caliban’s ‘monstrosity’ a colonial focus. His 
immediate points of reference are ‘savages and men of Ind’ (II.ii.57). In 
Stephano’s simultaneous references to ‘tricks’ (II.ii.57), however, there is an echo 
of Prospero and his ‘Iuglers cheats,’ suggesting that the butler’s imperial 
identifications take second place to his role as an ironic showman. Thus, in 
assuming that the form beneath the gabardine has ‘four legs’ (II.ii.58-9) but only 
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one head, Stephano regards Caliban not so much as a New World ‘monster’ as a 
conjoined twin — a type of eusomphalien pygopage or syncephalus ectopagus.83 
 
In order to make his argument, Burnett has to constantly suppress the importance of the textual 
evidence that Caliban is figured as a colonial other. It also requires him to ignore that Caliban is 
an actual brown person that Prospero finds on an island and literally enslaves. Highlighting the 
way in which Caliban is figured as disabled or monstrous need not come at the price of 
diminishing the colonialist figurations in the play. Loomba reminds us of the way that 
scholarship can sometimes privilege one axis of identity, such as religion, over another, such as 
race: “religion should not obscure or undermine the place of somatic difference; instead, we need 
to locate how the two come together and transform each other in the early modern period.”84 So, 
too, we need not use disability to obscure the very real way in which Caliban is racialized in the 
text. 
 Burnett is right in pointing out the frequency of language referring to disability, 
deformity, and ailments in the play. At the same time, such figurations of disability are 
constantly intersected with Caliban’s race and status as a native islander. Caliban and Sycorax’s 
racial and national heritage is clearly important to Prospero, as we learn from his conversation 
with Ariel:  
Prospero: Where was she born? Speak. Tell me.  
Ariel: Sir, in Algiers.  
Prospero: O, was she so? I must 
Once in a month recount what thou hast been, 
Which thou forget’st. . . .  
. . . Thou, my slave, 
As thou report’st thyself, was then her servant;  
And for thou wast a spirit too delicate 
To act her earthy and abhorred commands,  
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Refusing her grand hests, she did confine thee85 
 
Prospero evidently finds it necessary to remind Ariel once a month not only of what Sycorax did 
to Ariel (thus prompting the reminder of how Prospero then saved him), but where Sycorax is 
from, as though Sycorax’s racial background were necessary to understand the wrongdoing done 
to Ariel. Irene Lara points out, however, that we only ever hear Sycorax’s story as ventriloquized 
through Prospero, and never from Sycorax herself; rather, Sycorax exists within the play as a 
haunting absence. When Caliban says "This island's mine by Sycorax my mother, / Which thou 
tak'st from me . . .,"86 Lara reminds us that  
  Prospero's taking of the island goes hand in hand with his taking of Sycorax.  
Within the colonial modus operandi, Sycorax could very well have been raped 
and/or murdered, as many native women were literally taken from their children 
by the colonizers. The implication is that Prospero's success in colonizing the land 
depends on also taking Sycorax: her soul, culture, knowledge, history, literacy.87  
 
Because Sycorax is "a symbol of actual women of color whose historical agency has been 
negated,"88 her story “exemplifies the power of the storyteller to narrate the past in ways that 
justify the present and shape the future. In alliance with feminist, subaltern, decolonial, queer, 
and other 'minority' studies, a language of Sycorax challenges this type of monolingualism 
practiced by dominant groups who have the power to narrate official history."89 Ariel may no 
longer be confined in a tree, but he is certainly not free: Prospero’s claims as liberator disguise 
his power. And it is Ariel’s request for liberty that seems to, at least monthly, prompt Prospero’s 
retelling of Sycorax’s story. Because his colonization and life on the island depends on also 
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taking Sycorax, Prospero’s retelling of Sycorax’s story also functions as a way of re-legitimizing 
his own power through this “official history.”90 Although Caliban’s race is not nearly as 
remarked upon as his other physical differences, Prospero makes it clear that Sycorax’s, and thus 
Caliban’s, race is frequently at the forefront of his thoughts. We might also assume that, because 
The Tempest is a play, the constant visual reminder of Caliban’s skin color might negate the need 
to continually comment upon it— a point that I will comment further upon later.  
Furthermore, Caliban is figured not only in the language of disability, but also in the 
language of animality and monstrosity. After recounting Sycorax’s death, Prospero says “Then 
was this island / (Save for the son that she did litter here, / A freckled whelp, hag-born) not 
honored with / A human shape.”91 The lines are meant to indicate that no other humans have 
touched the island since Sycorax died except for Caliban, but Caliban’s human status is 
undermined at the same time as it includes him, recuperated only in a double negative. Sycorax 
“did litter here,” rather than gave birth to Caliban, who is described again in terms of animality 
as a “freckled whelp.” Indeed, he is frequently described as both puppy and fish. As Trinculo 
says when he first sees Caliban: 
What have we here? A man or a fish? Dead or alive? A fish: he smells like a fish; 
a very ancient and fishlike smell; a knit of not-of-the-newest poor-John. A strange 
fish. Were I in England now (as once I was) and had but this fish painted, not a 
holiday fool there but would give a piece of silver. There would this monster 
make a man; any strange beast there makes a man. When they will not give a doit 
to relieve a lame beggar, they will lay out ten to see a dead Indian. Legged like a 
man, and his fins like arms.92 
 
In this passage, the figurative ambiguity surrounding Caliban abounds. Caliban is questioned as 
both man and fish, dead and alive, a strange beast, and a dead Indian. In this passage alone, it is 
 
90 Peter Hulme makes a similar point about Prospero as “colonial historian” (Hulme, 125).  
91 Tempest,  I.ii.281-4. 
92 Tempest, II.ii.24-32. 
38 
 
clear that the discourses of animality (“fish”), monstrosity (“a strange beast,” as well as the 
sustained taxonomic ambiguity), and race (“a dead Indian”) are inseparable. When Stephano 
finds Caliban and Trinculo under Caliban’s gaberdine, he has a parallel reaction, first asking 
“Have we devils here? Do you put tricks upon’s with savages and men of Ind?” before 
continuing:  
This is some monster of the isle with four legs, who hath got, as I take it, an ague. 
Where the devil should he learn our language? I will give him some relief if it be 
but for that. If I can recover him, and keep him tame, and get to Naples with him, 
he’s a present for any emperor that ever trod on neat’s leather.93 
 
Importantly, both Stephano and Trinculo’s first reactions to Caliban are to kidnap him so as to 
bring him back to Europe for display—at a freak show at an English fair, for Trinculo, or as a 
present for an emperor or king, for Stephano.  
Even after viewing Caliban in full light, both Stephano and Trinculo continue to refer to 
Caliban in terms of animality and monstrosity. When Trinculo is later chastising Caliban, he 
says: “Why, thou debauched fish thou, was there ever man a coward that hath drunk so much 
sack as I do today? Wilt thou tell a monstrous lie, being but half a fish and half a monster?”94, 
and later calling him a “puppy-headed monster. A most scurvy monster.”95 "Scurvy" here 
functions not only to imply that Caliban might have a disease common to sailors with a vitamin 
C deficiency, a now obsolete meaning as an adjective, to be "covered with scurf; suffering from, 
or of the nature of, skin disease; scurfy, scabby," perhaps again referring to Caliban being fish-
 
93 Tempest, II.ii.62-67. 
94
 Tempest, III.ii.24-28. 
95
 Tempest, II.ii.149-50. 
39 
 
like and scaly9697. Somewhere between a man, a puppy, a fish, deformed, alive or dead, Caliban 
emerges from these ambiguities as a monster born of taxonomic ambiguity. Furthermore, 
Stephano refers to him as a “moon-calf.”98 Definitions for "moon-calf" range from  "a false 
conception" to "A born fool; a congenital idiot; a simpleton" to "A deformed animal; a monster," 
or a "mole"— “An abnormal mass within the uterus”99, or shapeless mass in the womb. The first 
English translation of Pliny’s Natural History described a mooncalf as “a lumpe of flesh without 
shape, without life, . . . Howbeit, a kind of moving it hath.”100 
Trinculo’s reference to Caliban as “puppy-headed” might be a reference to cynocephali, a 
supposed race of dog-headed people in Ethiopia and India. In Orang-Outang, sive Homo 
Sylvestris: or, the Anatomy of  a Pygmie, Edward Tyson describes them as an animal-human link 
in creation: “Some Animals are of an intermediate Nature, between a Man and Quadrupeds, as 
Apes, the Cebi, and Cynocephali."101 Tyson, referencing the ancient Greek physician Ctesias, 
writes: 
certain Men, who have Heads like Dogs, are cloathed with Skins of wild Beasts, 
speak no Language, but bark like Dogs, and thereby understand one another. They 
have Teeth larger than Dogs; and Nails like Dogs, but longer and rounder. They 
dwell up in the Mountains, as far as the River Indus; they are black and very just, 




 The OED also includes a seventeenth century entry that describes the flesh of a leper as 
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Although this passage may not help us understand Caliban’s fish-like traits, it does provide a 
clearer image of what Trinculo means by “puppy-headed.” They are likened to animals so 
thoroughly that it becomes difficult to determine whether this is simply a racist portrayal of a 
culture of humans, or an entirely mythical non-human race (“heads like dogs,” “teeth larger than 
dogs; and nails like dogs”). In an earlier musing on the cynocephali, Tyson describes the 
taxonomic dilemma: “For tho’ the Philosopher [Aristotle] makes them only a sort of Ape or 
Monkey, yet there have been those, that would impose them on the World for a Race of Men; . . . 
tho’ Galen tells us, they are much less like a Man, than an Ape is; For they can scarce stand 
upright, much less walk or run so.”103 Whether or not they are actually human determines the 
meaning of the following information we are given: they are “black and very just, as are the 
other Indians with whom they are mixt.” It is unclear if the description is meant to indicate that 
the cynocephali are simply other Indians with different physiological features, or if they, like the 
pygmie, are an entirely different species that have sexual relationships with humans.104 Like 
Caliban, their human status is unclear.  
Although we don’t know exactly how Caliban was portrayed on the early modern stage, 
we do have a number of clues to work from.  Alden T. Vaughan and Virginia Mason Vaughan's 
Shakespeare's Caliban: A Cultural History and Lauren Eriks Cline’s “Becoming Caliban: 
Monster Methods and Performance Theories” both document Caliban’s performance history. 
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Cline’s essay compares theater reviews of Caliban’s performance, noting that, in the early 
twentieth century, “A dark face seemed so appropriate as to excite no comment, while a white 
one was rejected out of hand,” suggesting “that certain performances have the potential to 
naturalize relationships between abjection and blackness.”105 Nineteenth-century performances,  
 
while still ambivalently racialized, tended to focus on Caliban’s animalistic traits, drawing 
inspiration from animals as diverse as monkeys, fish, seals, and reptiles. Prior to the nineteenth 
century, we have far less information. William Hogarth’s Scene from Shakespeare’s The Tempest 
(ca. 1736–1738) depicts Caliban as short statured, with a forehead that both slopes downward 
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and has a flap of skin moving upward toward into his hairline, large ears, a red gaberdine that 
seems sewn into his arm, and legs that become green scales at the calf and descend into webbed 
reptilian looking feet. His skin is tawny and noticeably darker than Prospero, Ferdinand, or 
Miranda’s. Michael Bard Saenger persuasively argues that the costumes for Caliban and Ariel 
are likely costumes that were re-used from a sea pageant put on by the London aldermen for 
Prince Henry in 1610. Noting that Trinculo describes Caliban as "legg'd like a man: and his fins 
like arms!"106, Saenger argues that the "most straightforward reading of this line would be a 
description of green sleeves and trousers with fins attached to them, precisely what one would 
imagine for Amphion" of the sea pageant.107 Saenger argues that it is possible that the acquisition 
of these costumes may have inspired Shakespeare to write The Tempest in the first place and 
wonders if "[p]erhaps Shakespeare found Caliban just as Prospero and Miranda did, a mute 
monster, and taught him how to speak."108  Although these costumes may very well have been 
the inspiration for the characters, it is interesting to note that Saenger rhetorically reduces the 
character of Caliban to his costume—that is, a form of materiality and objecthood, reproducing 
Miranda’s assumption that Caliban is “mute” and lacks language.  
Ian Smith’s historical analysis of the various techniques used to represent non-white skin 
on the early modern stage provides a way to unpack some of the ambiguous features of Caliban’s 
appearance. Cloth, animal skins, and later, cosmetics, were all were all utilized for theatrical 
racial cross-dressing. Imitation of Black skin “was achieved through the use of cloth— 
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pleasance, defined as 'a fine gauzelike fabric'— covering the face, neck, and extremities."109 
Smith argues that the black cloth materializes the absent Black subject on stage as an epidermal 
prosthesis; although textiles and leathers may have been  “less subtle from the point of view of 
verisimilitude, but more ideologically expressive in the representation of the Black body in its 
stark materiality and tangible objecthood."110 Even as cosmetics improved and were used more 
frequently, theaters continued to use black cloth to represent non-white skin in productions as 
late as 1836. Shakespeare references this stage practice in Othello when Cassio regrets having 
drank too much: “O God, that men should put an enemy in their mouths to steal away their 
brains! That we should with joy, pleasance, revel and applause transform ourselves into 
beasts!”111 By “juxtaposing ‘joy’ and ‘pleasance’ — [which] seem[s] to operate synonymously to 
express delight in the revels, [the pun] gives way to the primary material and textile meaning of 
‘pleasance’ and its somatic role in masque culture” while simultaneously demonstrating that “the 
textile and animal skin tradition had migrated to become part of [Shakespeare’s] dramatic 
vocabulary in the public theater.”112 If we consider the way that textiles and, more importantly 
for The Tempest, animal skins, leathers, and furs were used to portray non-white skin, Caliban’s 
portrayal, especially as depicted by Hogarth, becomes more complicated. As a character that is 
described and often portrayed with significant animal features, the textiles used to create 
Caliban’s body become oversignified with both race and animality in ways that are impossible to 
separate. As I mentioned earlier, in Hogarth’s painting, Caliban’s gaberdine seems to be literally 
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emerging from or sewn into his skin. Composed of several different types of textiles, pleasance 
and animal skins, in addition to the cloths that make up Caliban’s clothes, this effect is most 
likely the result of having attached the gabardine to the pleasance. The connection between the 
gabardine and Caliban’s skin is further unified through its color palate: Caliban’s skin color is 
approximately the same shade as the cloth around his waist and the color of Prospero’s robes. 
Rather than layering the costuming over the pleasance and animal skins, the costume is all one 
piece, flattening the difference between skin and clothes as a brutal ensemble of the materiality 
that produces Caliban’s enslavement.  
Prospero and Miranda are clear in voicing their perception that Caliban’s physical and 
behavioral differences are innate and immutable qualities; as Prospero declares, Caliban is “A 
devil born, on whose nature / Nurture can never stick; on whom my pains, / Humanely taken, all, 
all lost, quite lost; / And, as with age his body uglier grows, / So his mind cankers. I will plague 
them all, / Even to roaring.”113 For Prospero, Caliban’s monstrosity is located within his body, 
whose “nature” resists Prospero’s supposedly “humane” care. Indeed, his mind mirrors his body 
which “cankers” as Caliban grows uglier. Prospero later re-emphasizes this perception to Alonso 
when he says “[Caliban] is as disproportioned in his manners / As in his shape.”114 Miranda 
views him similarly: 
Abhorred slave, 
Which any print of goodness wilt not take, 
Being capable of all ill. I pitied thee, 
Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour 
One thing or other. When thou didst not (savage) 
Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like 
A thing most brutish, I endowed thy purposes 
With words that made them known. But thy vile race, 
Though thou didst learn, had that in’t which good natures 
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Could not abide to be with; therefore wast thou  
Deservedly confined into this rock, 
Who hadst deserved more than a prison.115 
 
For Miranda, Caliban’s “abhorred” nature as a “slave” prevents him from learning any kind of 
goodness; as part of a “vile race,” whatever goodness he learns is perverted through his innate 
evil nature. Prospero and Miranda’s equation of Caliban’s physical appearance and his manners 
and behavior are not necessarily surprising: in Galenic medicine, the mind, body, and 
environment are all connected. For most scholars, there is an extreme importance placed on the 
environmental aspect that helps to shape one’s character; climate and food are capable of 
producing different temperaments. Here, however, despite Prospero and Miranda’s efforts to 
provide “humane” care and imprint a stamp of goodness, Caliban’s “nature” resists. As Patricia 
Akhimie notes, conduct, education, and the capacity for self-improvement were also racialized 
issues in the early modern period:  
  Immutability, a pitiable condition, was then associated with visible, bodily marks  
that were themselves immutable and understood as inherited and thus natural. 
This focus is informed by recent scholarship on the early modern belief that 
somatically marked identity categories such as race and sex might be altered or 
challenged by means of humoral, climatological, or sartorial change. Alongside 
these concepts of mutable identity stood an ‘ideology of cultivation’ — a set of 
commonly held beliefs about the moral and material benefits of self-improvement 
through the practice of good conduct. This set of beliefs seemed to allow equal 
access to upward mobility, but in fact served the interests of a dominant social 
group: literate, landed men. I shift the focus of the ongoing debate about 
malleable social identity from the potential malleability of the self by recognizing 
that not all subjects are thought to have the same capacity for self-
transformation.116  
 
As a result, “some individuals were imagined to be capable of moving between groups by means 
of cultivation— the employment of strategies for self-improvement through coded conduct— 
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others were imagined to be incapable of this feat.”117 Caliban’s physical differences— his 
deformities and cankers, which described as the result of his mother’s sexual congress with the 
devil— are naturalized and reinforced by his inability for self-improvement or change. The 
markings of punishment that Prospero leaves on his body in the form of “stripes” and 
“honeycombs” from whippings and pinches further create what Akhimie refers to as “somatic 
markings” that leave the trace of both punishment and Caliban’s incapacity to improve in a way 
that Prospero finds suitable. For Caliban, racialization is shown as immutable and unchanging, 
and in fact, defiant of white European behavioral norms.  
At once a miscarriage and a fully born son; a misshapen human, a fish, and cynocephali; 
a “devil born” as well as “got by the devil himself,”118 Caliban’s enslavement is both conditioned 
on his physical differences and punished with disability. While Prospero sees Caliban’s 
misshapen body and manners as grounds for enslavement, he continually threatens to punish him 
with intense pain. Prospero threatens him with “cramps,” “side-stitches” and pinches “As thick 
as honeycomb, each pinch more stinging / Than bees that made ‘em”119; Caliban complains that 
“sometime am I / all wound with adders, who with cloven tongues / Do hiss me into madder.”120 
Later, when Prospero chastises Caliban, Stephano, and Trinculo for attempting to plot against 
him, he tells Ariel: “Go, charge my goblins that they grind their joints / With dry convulsions, 
shorten up their sinews / With aged cramps, and more pinch-spotted make them / Than pard or 
cat o’mountain.”121 At the same time as Prospero and Miranda insult Caliban for his inability to 
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“improve,” Prospero also continuously keeps Caliban’s body in a state of chronic pain and 
injury.  
 Both the island’s location and Caliban’s cultural status are taxonomically ambiguous and 
messy, and this messiness is indicative of the early modern period’s yoking together of the 
multiple discourses of disability and race to inform one another. Morton Luce describes his 
frustrations with Caliban’s chaotic physical description when he says, “if all the suggestions as to 
Caliban’s form and feature and endowments that are thrown out in the play are collected, it will 
be found that the one half renders the other half impossible.”122 Indeed, Caliban is both human, 
and everything but human.  Charles Frey reads The Tempest within the context of New World 
travel narratives, because "they provide models of Renaissance experience in the New World."123 
Peter Hulme similarly reads the island in a New World setting, but, importantly, structures his 
reading around the way in which the developing vocabulary around the New World borrowed 
and re-imagined words already associated with the Mediterranean— specifically, the moves from 
“tempest” to “hurricane” and “anthropophagi” to “cannibal.” Hulme writes that the “island is the 
meeting place of the play’s topographical dualism, Mediterranean and Atlantic, ground of the 
mutually incompatible reference systems whose copresence serves to frustrate any attempt to 
locate the island on a map.”124 Tied to the island by birth, Caliban similarly encompasses both 
discourses; Hulme writes: 
As a ‘wild man’ or ‘wodehouse,’ with an African mother whose pedigree leads 
back to the Odyssey, he is distinctly Mediterranean. And yet, at the same time, he 
is, as his name suggests, a ‘cannibal’ as that figure had taken shape in colonial 
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discourse: ugly, devilish, ignorant, gullible and treacherous— according to the 
Europeans’ description of him.125   
 
Caliban, like the island, is a hybrid creature: his characterization comes from at least two 
traditions of travel narrative (Mediterranean and Atlantic) and in his taxonomic status (creature 
and human). Although it is tempting to try to determine precisely what and who Caliban is, we 
are left with conflicting information, pulling in opposing directions. In this way, The Tempest 
stages a moment in which these discourses converge, as older and more established discourses 
attempted to bear the weight of new experiences with the New World of the Atlantic.  
Julia Reinhard Lupton reads the connection (and conflict) between the Mediterranean and 
the Atlantic with a slightly different nuance, as a result of Caliban’s exceptionality. She writes: 
As a monstrous exception to the human norm, Caliban's creatureliness propels 
him into the conceptual space occupied by ideas of national and racial difference, 
eliciting a long line of culturalist readings of his oppression. Yet Caliban's 
exceptionality, both deeply singular and highly indeterminate, also prevents him 
from becoming the articulate representative of a single race or culture, be it 
Atlantic or Mediterranean.126   
 
For Lupton, Caliban’s hybridity, and therefore his exceptionality, between Mediterranean and 
Atlantic, prevents him from representing either. Instead, as an aberration, he becomes encoded in 
national and racial difference that produce his abjection.  Lupton, in her reading of Caliban, 
emphasizes the way in which “creatureliness” functions to produce both national and racial 
difference as “a monstrous exception to the human norm.”127 She writes that, particularly in 
theological traditions in the West, “creatureliness has served to localize a moment of passionate 
passivity, of an abjected, thinglike (non)being, a being of subjected becoming, that precipitates 
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out of the divine Logos as its material remnant."128 As abject creature, rather than fellow human, 
Caliban is more suitable to Prospero as his slave. This follows John Mair’s argument in In 
Secundum Librum Senteniarum, that “it is clear that some men are by nature slaves, others by 
nature free”129 — or the idea that some humans are physically and/or mentally inferior and must 
be ruled by others. As Smith notes, race functions as "a means to organize social and 
international relationships using the currency of some distinguishing human feature to lend an air 
of natural, inevitable legitimacy to purportedly self-evident principles of disparity and 
inequality"130 Caliban’s ambiguous ethnicity and nationality produce a convenient way to project 
a negative image of white British nationalism: he defines what they are not— dark, “deformed,” 
and barely human. As a result, Caliban takes on what Giorgio Agamben calls “bare life”— that 
is, “the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed”131 “Bare life” 
is life which is devoid of all political capacity, autonomy, or citizenship— it is life that can be 
killed but not murdered. Although “killing” and “murdering” refers to the same act, a “murder” 
only occurs when committed against a human person who is legally, and in this case 
taxonomically, recognized as such. For Caliban, recognition as either citizen or subject are 
impossible goals: only ambiguously described as human, Caliban exists in the state of exception 
that is slavery under Prospero.  
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 In this chapter, I have examined the way that early modern English writers attributed 
health and illness to geographic locations and the humans that lived there. In doing so, I have 
argued that one way English writers racialized others was through the language of disability— 
primarily as an “infection,” “defect,” or “deformity.” I then focused on Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest and the way that Caliban is racialized and dehumanized through deformities, cankers, 
animal-like appendages, and chronic pain. By examining the way in which Caliban is 
constructed through somatic markings, I have argued that to regard Caliban as an “Abhorred 
slave,” Prospero must first regard Caliban's difference as “deformity” and racial inferiority 






Chapter 3 “Making Signs”: Travel Literature, Philosophies of Language, and Deaf 
Education Manuals 
 
This chapter considers the way in which philosophies of language contributed to both 
harmful oralist pedagogies and defenses of slavery. I demonstrate how disability and race were 
positioned as aligned in the construction of Enlightenment ideals of reason expressed through 
spoken and poetic language. The assumption that only spoken language is the sign of reason 
circulated in philosophies of language in the works of authors such as Rene Descartes, Thomas 
Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and others— and this idea had several consequences. The 
first is that, because only spoken languages are the sign of reason, sign languages 1) are “dumb” 
insofar as they are not connected to reason and 2) are not languages at all. For instance, although 
almost all deaf people would have used a homesign system, these signs were considered “dumb” 
or inarticulate, as only articulate sound was taken as the measure of “reason.” At best, these 
philosophers considered sign languages “primitive” sub-languages— more natural to the body, 
but simultaneously less “civilized.” This cultural alignment of sign language with 
“primitiveness” led writers such as Bernard Mandeville and Jean Jacques Rousseau to assume 
that other humans that they saw as “primitive” must also use sign language— such as Native 
Americans. I examine how eighteenth-century philosophies of language deployed two key ideas: 
the idea that “making signs” was “dumb,” lacking in rationality, and did not count as real 
language; and that real language could be “parroted” by non-rational non-human creatures or 
machines. These two concepts had consequences for both deaf people and Africans whose 
languages were considered as illegitimate by white British writers. By aligning spoken language 
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with civility and signed language with savagery, European writers drew connections between 
deaf people and cultures they saw as “uncivilized” such as Native Americans and Africans.  
Philosophies of language were invested in language as that which separates humans from 
animals— only humans have reason, and only humans express that reason through language. But 
because there are animals that have or can mimic language, philosophers sought to make further 
distinctions on what constitutes rational human language. The last half of this chapter discusses 
how this need to further qualify human language from animal mimics was applied to Africans by 
defenders of slavery, who sought to reduce their articulations to parroted mimics. I examine the 
poetry of Francis Williams, a free Black Jamaican man who wrote poetry in Latin, and the way 
in which the reception of his poetry coincided with defenses of slavery. I argue that, in these 
texts, ableism and white supremacy function as an alliance around the question of who is counted 
as human, who is denigrated as sub-human, and whose language is considered legitimate. 
This chapter is split into several parts. In the first section, I look at the way in which 
“making signs” is shown as communicating reason in early modern travel literature. In the 
second section, I then trace the ways in which philosophies of language, specifically in the works 
of Descartes and Hobbes, use deaf people as a rhetorical tool to theorize a connection between 
language and rationality from which deaf people themselves are excluded. Instead, deaf people 
instead signify the “lowest type of man” and are represented as in close proximity to animals. 
Importantly, these works produce the idea that only spoken language is considered as a sign of 
reason. In the third section, I demonstrate the way in which oralist pedagogies are premised on 
the assumption that only spoken language is the sign of reason by looking at instruction manuals 
for teaching deaf students. In the fourth section, I examine the way in which philosophers of 
language frame sign language as a “primitive” language and Rousseau’s racialized hierarchy of 
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languages. And in the fifth section, I examine the reception of Francis Williams’ poetry and the 
flexibility philosophers of language use to adapt to racial exclusions of language and reason. 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter builds on Alison Kafer’s political/relational model 
of disability by examining ideologies and discourses that produce stigmatization of particular 
kinds of bodies and ways of being— in particular, around deafness and attitudes toward sign 
languages. I also work more explicitly with the social model of disability, which differentiates 
between an impairment and a disability. Whereas an impairment is a fact about the body, a 
disability is the result of inaccessible environments and a lack of accommodations. As Susan 
Wendell explains, “I see disability as socially constructed in ways ranging from social conditions 
that straightforwardly create illnesses, injuries, and poor-physical functioning, to subtle cultural 
factors that determine standards of normality and exclude those who do not meet them from full 
participation in their societies.”132 In this chapter, I consider the deaf students as disabled 
because they are not given accommodations, i.e. they are not allowed to use sign language.133 
This is important and specific to Britain; for instance, in eighteenth-century France, instructors 
did accommodate deaf students by allowing them to learn and use sign language. Charles-Michel 
de l'Épée, a hearing instructor who was taught to sign by other deaf people, founded a school for 
deaf students that focused on sign language. This tradition was carried on in France by 
instructors like Roch-Ambroise Cucurron Sicard, and then to Laurent Clerc, who brought such 
systems to the United States. L’Épée stressed the importance of allowing deaf students to 
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communicate in their own language and challenged the attitudes and practices of his 




In The Journal of Christopher Columbus During his First Voyage, Columbus documents 
his encounters with indigenous natives of America and the Caribbean, many of which are 
accomplished through “making signs.” Importantly, these signs are never presented as “dumb.” 
Early modern and eighteenth-century travelers and merchants often used provisional sign 
languages to facilitate travel and trade in lieu of a universal or common language. Gestural signs 
were an important tool to work across language barriers— to ask for directions, to make 
purchases, and to establish peaceful relations and treaties. By signs, they communicate 
directions, information about natural resources and their locations, when traders will arrive, 
political jurisdiction, and disputes between islands. The complexity of these conversations varies, 
and the indigenous peoples are portrayed as responding back with signs as well. Columbus 
writes, "I saw some with marks of wounds on their bodies, and I made signs to ask what it was, 
and they gave me to understand that the people from other adjacent islands came with the 
intention of seizing them, and that they defended themselves."134 This term, “making signs,” is 
always left vague; we are left to trust what Columbus reports to be as an accurate interpretation 
of an effectively redacted conversation.  This act of interpretation is carried throughout his 
representations of the indigenous cultures he encounters; at another point, he interpolates an 
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indigenous government as a monarchy when he writes that a “native king” tells them of the 
Caribes; the Admiral responds, “by signs, that the Sovereigns of Castille would order the Caribs 
to be destroyed, and that all should be taken with their heads tied together."135 How did he 
communicate this? Occasionally, the admiral simply speaks in his own native tongue, as when he 
reports that the natives of San Salvador island should  “bear faithful testimony that he, in the 
presence of all, had taken, as he now took, possession of the said island for the King and for the 
Queen, his Lords making the declarations that are required.”136 What does it mean to “bear 
faithful testimony” in a language they did not speak? Communication is represented as if fully 
transparent and instantaneous across language barriers in the text.  
 Such redactions were common in early modern travel literature. As Randall C. Davis 
observes: 
A particularly curious phenomenon is that many of the English accounts often 
describe instances of intercultural communication— sometimes involving rather 
abstract concepts— without explaining the method of exchange. One is left with 
perplexing questions about just how Anglo-American writers derived certain 
information— often presented with unwavering confidence—regarding Native 
Americans.137  
 
This tactic of presenting summarized interpretations of conversations as straight-forward 
representations of complex intercultural communication often involved interpolating indigenous 
social structures within a European framework. The account of Sir Francis Drake's 1577-1580 
circumnavigation of the globe in Richard Hakluyt's 1589 Principal Navigations features a 
similar moment of communication. The author writes Drake’s encounter with Native Americans:  
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They made signs to our general to sit down, to whom the king, and divers others 
made supplications, that [Drake] would take their province into his hand, and 
become their king, making signs that they would resign unto him their right and 
title of the whole land, and become his subjects.138  
 
As with the encounter described in The Journal of Christopher Columbus, the signs made to 
communicate these complicated political conversations are redacted from the report.  As Davis 
notes, "the chronicler naturally attributes English terms and European concepts (such as king, 
title, subjects) to an imagined native perspective. English eloquence makes translation 
unnecessary; native and English are depicted as 'on the same page,' as it were, as the natives are 
presumed to subordinate themselves happily to English rule."139  
Travelers, and chroniclers of travels, continued to communicate by “making signs” well 
into the eighteenth century. On his voyage with Captain Cook, English naturalist Joseph Banks, 
when writing about thefts that occurred in Otahite, writes: "The chief then took me by the hand 
to the other end of the house where lay a large quantity of their cloth; this he offered to me piece 
by piece, making signs that if it would make amends, I might take any part or all. I put it back, 
and by signs told him that I wanted nothing but our own, which his people had stolen."140 The 
contents of this conversation seem quite complicated, and Banks never refers to having learned a 
signed system of language. Occasionally, Banks is more transparent about the difficulties of 
speaking across language barriers. When approaching Savu Island, Banks writes: "After a very 
short stay the lieutenant returned, bringing word that he had seen Indians, in all respects, as 
colour, dress, etc., much resembling the Malays; that they very civilly invited him ashore, and 
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conversed with him by signs, but neither party could understand each other."141 This is a rare 
exception; in almost every instance, sign language is represented as capable of communicating 
rational thought. The ultimate purpose of these conversations is connected to colonial 
endeavors— exploring and acquiring more land, discovering exploitable natural resources, 
establishing trade, and collecting flora and fauna for scientific development. In this context, sign 
language is presented as a rational, abstract, and efficient way to discuss complicated political 
matters and interpersonal relationships.  In travel narratives such as these, characters often make 
first contact with other nations by “making signs” — as native oral speakers, their reason is 
never in question, and their signs are never “dumb.” 
Despite the wealth of travel literature that portrays sign language as deeply complex and 
expressive of reason, in many oralist language manuals for the deaf, writers insist that signs are 
“dumbe.” One of the primary concerns of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers of 
language was to demonstrate the relationship between reason, language, and speech; in these 
writings, spoken language comes to function as the sign of reason. But the sign languages used in 
travel texts troubles this widespread idea. Immanuel Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View (1798) points to some clues; he writes: “Is there anything vicarious in the senses, 
that is, can one sense be used as a substitute for another? There may be. One can evoke by 
gestures the usual speech from a deaf person, granted that he has once been able to hear”142 
(emphasis added). Kant grants that men who used to be able to speak and hear can communicate 
by gestures, and see this as a suitable “substitute” for oral speech. But then he continues: “If the 
person is born deaf, however, the sense of seeing the movements of another's organs of speech 
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must convert the sounds, which his teacher has coaxed from him, into a feeling of the 
movements of his own speech muscles. But he will never attain real concepts, since the signs 
necessary to him are not capable of universality.”143 Whereas gestures are a fine “substitute” for 
oral speech for those who used to be able to hear, Kant feels very differently about those deaf 
from birth. Kant does not seem to consider the possibility of a rich and robust sign language for 
those who were born deaf, but immediately turns to how the deaf must learn to mimic speech by 
observing “the movements of another’s organs of speech.” But even if this does qualify as a 
suitable “substitute” for the speech of the hearing, as those born deaf “will never attain real 
concepts.” Spoken language is the sign of reason— but even when deaf people do speak, they 
strangely remain excluded from reasonability: "Persons born deaf, who must therefore remain 
speechless, can never arrive at anything more than an analogue of reason."144 As an “analogue of 
reason,” Kant seems to suggest that those who are born deaf might mimic a mechanical 
performance of reason, but that they never “achieve” reason.  
These two ideas— that spoken language is the sign of reason, and that reason can be 
mimicked by false mechanical performances— reverberate through oralist language instructions 
for the deaf and defenses of slavery that proliferated throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. If spoken language is the sign of reason in these texts, we might also consider the way 
that sign language, unaccompanied by speech, functions as a “sign” of disability. Stephanie 
Kerschbaum writes in "Signs of Disability, Disclosing” that signs of disability are: 
embodied, behavioral, affective, material, and/or discursive, and their 
perceptibility is intimately tied to the constellations . . . between environments, 
beings, and artifacts. Perception is a carefully-chosen word here . . .  to describe 
the sorts of things people might notice as they interacted with others: seeing lips 
moving, hearing voices, smelling scents (soap or shampoo, someone’s lunch, 
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cigarette smoke), feeling textures of clothing or skin, tasting food or beverages—
and more.145  
 
Kerschbaum’s essay is centered on the presence of yellow diamond shaped signs that read "Deaf 
Person in Area'' in white suburbs. The function of the sign is presumably to alert drivers to be 
more careful, as deaf persons may not be aware of a car coming; however, Kerschbaum notes 
that, as a deaf person, "because I know that I won't hear a car coming, I always look.”146 What, 
then, is the function of the sign? Kerschbaum continues: 
[My interlocutors] also draw stark contrasts between hearing ability and deaf 
inability. When I point out that in my college town people regularly walk around 
with earbuds or large headphones over their ears, I am presented with a generous 
belief in the ability of those people to perfectly apprehend their surroundings. 
These defenses of hearing ability co-occur with presumptions of deaf inability to 
move safely through a neighborhood, necessitating the sign. Here again, the sign 
discloses a persistent cultural orientation to disability as a threat, in this case, to 
the presumed wholeness of a hearing identity.147 
 
Here, the “presumed wholeness of a hearing identity” leads Kerschbaum’s interlocutor to assume 
that hearing people, even while temporarily unable to hear their surroundings while wearing 
headphones, are able to navigate streets and crosswalks safely, while maintaining that deaf 
persons, acting under the same conditions, cannot. For Kant, a “presumed wholeness of a hearing 
identity” includes the ability to reason. As a result, for Kant, hearing people who use sign 
language are capable of both having and communicating reason, whereas deaf people who use 












Making Signs and Philosophies of Language 
 
Unlike the signs made by hearing travelers to communicate across language barriers, 
philosophers of language generally defined and restricted “language” as referring specifically to 
spoken languages. “The deaf and dumbe” are frequent figures in these texts, used to test their 
theories as the “lowest type of man” to distinguish humans from animals in regard to rationality 
as expressed through language use. Philosophies of language were intrinsically linked to 
philosophies of mind and logic, political philosophy, and reflections on early human life and the 
origins of language. For these thinkers, language is also a defining attribute of being human: it is 
what makes us “rational animals.” Philosophies of language sought to define the relationship 
between language and mental reasoning: spoken language comes to function as the sign of 
reason. Philosophers further distinguished between the mechanical or functional ability to 
speak— which we share with other animals such as parrots— and spontaneous and creative 
language that only humans have148. Defining the relationship between spoken language and 
mental reasoning abilities this way helped to produce ableist, racist, and pro-slavery writings that 
sought to delegitimize non-oral and non-European modes of language. If only spoken language 
can be understood as the sign of reason, philosophers excluded deaf people from attaining full 
human status as “rational animals” and ignored the complexity of sign languages. At the same 
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time, theorizations on function ability for language versus cognitive ability for language to 
explain how animals such as parrots could speak were picked up by pro-slavery writers to 
dehumanize Africans by claiming they were of lesser intelligence than white Europeans. 
Because philosophies of language are connected to so many different realms of 
philosophy, I will be limiting my attention in this chapter to examining how early modern and 
eighteenth-century thinkers wrote about the relationship between language and thought, 
“articulate sounds” in human vs. non-human language, and their reflections on the origins of 
languages before shifting to the ways in which these theories of language were taken up by 
writers such as John Bulwer, William Holder, and John Wallis, who engaged with those theories 
as they wrote about oralist language instruction for the deaf. Importantly, most seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century writers did not distinguish between gestural and signed language. Whereas 
gestural language encompasses a range of motions that most people are familiar with, such as 
nodding in agreement, waving to say hello, or shaking a fist to mean anger, signed language 
refers to a full system of language that includes grammar and syntax.   
As it relates to deafness, I include in my discussion Descartes’ and Hobbes’ theories on 
the way in which language is connected to reason. Because it was often assumed that deaf people 
were also “dumbe” and incapable of reasoning, the relationship between language and reason 
that is established by these authors is important. The slippage of “dumbe” as meaning “unable to 
speak” and “incapable of reasoning” was already established by the early modern period, as the 
Oxford English Dictionary cites both types of usages during this period. “Dumbe” might refer to 
being "Destitute of the faculty of speech"; "Applied to the lower animals (and, by extension, 
inanimate nature) as naturally incapable of articulate speech"; "Without the power of making 
their voice effectively heard; without any voice in the management of affairs"; "Saying nothing 
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to the understanding; inexpressive, meaningless; stupid, senseless"; or "Foolish, stupid, ignorant 
(chiefly of persons)."149 This slippage is revealing: although “mute” also means “destitute of the 
faculty of speech,” writers of this period often preferred the term “dumbe.” As Lennard Davis 
notes: 
 The Deaf have always resented the term 'dumb' because of its double connotation  
of 'mute' and 'stupid.' In fact, the double meaning of the word reveals the audist 
bias that to be without spoken language is to be without intelligence, like a 'dumb' 
animal. . . . In reality, when audist culture speaks of someone who is 'deaf and 
dumb,' it is confusing two issues— the reception of signs and the production of 
signs. Since it is assumed that the dominant sign production will be oral and sign 
reception will be aural, then the deaf are seen as bereft of language, hence 
humanity. The term 'animal' or 'animalistic' is the most frequently used to indicate 
a life without spoken language. But if sign production is seen as written or 
printed, and if sign reception is seen as reading or signing, then the deaf are fully 
capable of fitting into that world.150  
 
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers frequently imagined speech as that which separated 
humans from other non-human animals, in large part because speech was often, as we see in 
Descartes’ work, understood as the sign of reason. In this way, “reason” becomes the deferred 
referent of speaking ability.  
For Descartes, the body is a machine, and it is only reason, through the acquisition of 
language, that makes a human distinguishable from a machine or non-human animals. Descartes 
describes many of the processes of the body as “automatic,” such as breathing, digesting, and the 
circulation of the blood, insofar as these processes take place unconsciously. However, it is not 
simply the “machinery” of humans which endows them with language, and thus rationality. 
Descartes wants to establish that language is more than the functional capability of speech: 
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although parrots or machines may be able to reproduce the sounds of spoken language, Descartes 
would say that they do not, in fact, have language. This is a distinction between having language 
and using language. He writes: “if there had been such machines, possessing the organs and 
outward form of a monkey or some other animal without reason, we should not have had any 
means of ascertaining that they were not of the same nature as those animals.”151 For Descartes, 
non-human animals and machines share a similar ontological status: both exist as “automata,” 
following the instincts dictated by the machinery of their bodies or the “disposition of their 
organs.”152 As such, Descartes proposes a test to distinguish between non-human animals and 
machines as both are purely material; neither machines nor animals have rational souls:  
they could never use speech or other signs as we do when placing our thoughts on 
record for the benefit of others. For we can easily understand a machine’s being 
constituted so that it can utter words, and even emit some responses to action on it 
of a corporeal kind, which brings about a change in its organs; for instance, if it is 
touched in a particular part it may ask what we wish to say to it; if in another part 
it may exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on. But it never happens that it 
arranges its speech in various ways, in order to reply appropriately to everything 
that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do.153  
 
Because it is possible to make a machine physically capable of speech, Descartes introduces a 
kind of Turing test for language ability. Speech alone is not what distinguishes humans from 
non-human animals and machines; rather, it is spontaneous and creative speech, capable of 
responding “to everything that may be said in its presence.”  
At several points, Descartes uses “the lowest type of man” as a final evaluation to test the 
distinctions he proposes between humans and animals/machines. He continues: 
we may also recognize the difference that exists between man and brutes. 
For it is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, 
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without even excepting idiot, that they cannot arrange different words 
together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their 
thoughts; while on the other hand, there is no other animal, however 
perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. It 
is not the want of organs that brings this to pass, for it is evidence that 
magpies and parrots are able to utter words just like ourselves, and yet 
they cannot speak as we do, that is, so as to give evidence that they can 
think of what they say. On the other hand, men who, being born deaf and 
dumb, are in the same degree, or even more than the brutes, destitute of 
the organs which serve the others for talking, are in the habit of 
themselves inventing certain signs by which they make themselves 
understood by those who, being usually in their company, have leisure to 
learn their language.154  
 
Just as “even the lowest type of man” is capable of producing spontaneous and creative speech, 
here Descartes further specifies that even humans who do not have the “organs” still produce 
spontaneous and creative language by “inventing certain signs.” The “depraved and stupid,” the 
“idiot,” and the “deaf and dumb” all seem to function interchangeably here as the “lowest type of 
man” for Descartes’ purposes. Importantly, however, Descartes does recognize manual sign 
language as spontaneous and creative language— that is, as evidence of a rational soul. 
Contrariwise, although magpies and parrots are physically capable of speech, “they cannot speak 
as we do, that is, so as to give evidence that they can think of what they say” (emphasis added). 
The distinction Descartes is making here is that, for animals, speech is an “automatic” process, 
and not the product of thinking; their vocalizations are either biological outputs or trained.  
For Descartes, language is a means of communicating and representing already-formed 
thoughts and concepts that exist within the mind: creative use of language is the sign or evidence 
of thought. For Hobbes, on the other hand, all thought and language derives from sensory 
experience of the outside world. Hobbes writes: “Singly, [thoughts] are every one a 
Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us; which is 
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commonly called an object.”155 We experience thoughts as mental “representations” of objects 
we have sensed with our body (through sight, sound, smell, taste, or touch). Although we may 
creatively manipulate and imagine representations of objects in our mind to think of new or 
altered objects, “the Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense.”156 Without these sensory 
impressions, “there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, 
been begotten upon the organs of Sense.”157 Whereas Descartes suggests that we cannot trust the 
senses, Hobbes’s materialist philosophy understands sensory perception as our means of 
accessing, thinking, and talking about the world.  
For Hobbes, speech functions as a memory device and communication aid that allows 
humans to build a society. He writes: “the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was 
that of Speech, consisting of Names or Appellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register 
their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall 
utility and conversation.”158 Words are labels that we have applied to mental representations of 
objects, by which we are able to “recall them when they are past” and “declare them to one 
another” in conversation. “Without which,” he continues, “there had been amongst men, neither 
Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and 
Wolves.”159 For Hobbes, like Descartes, language then functions to distinguish between humans 
and non-human animals; however, he arrives at this distinction from a different route. For 
Descartes, creative and spontaneous language is itself the criteria for human status; for Hobbes, 
language is that which enables humans to build “Common-wealth,” “society,” “contract,” and 
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“peace”-- the absence of which leaves us no different than “Lyons, Bears, and Wolves.” 
Language, then, is not in and of itself the distinction between humans and non-human animals; 
rather, it is what allows for the commonwealth that distinguishes humans from animals.  
By conceptualizing language as a memory device, Hobbes also presents language as 
necessary for thought, rather than as the site of thought. He writes: 
By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, 
we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, 
into a reckoning of the consequences of Appellations. For example, a man 
that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly 
deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right 
angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation 
compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those 
two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him 
different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, 
whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath 
the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, 
not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his 
triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; 
and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly 
conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles 
whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall termes, Every 
triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles. And thus the 
consequence found in one particular, comes to be registered and 
remembered, as an Universall rule.160  
 
Hobbes, like Descartes, uses people who are born deaf as a tool for explaining his philosophy. 
For a person born “deafe and dumb” who “hath no use of speech at all,” each sensory impression 
is a unique sensory impression, for “if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the 
former, he cannot know without a new labour.” Without the word “triangle,” two individual 
triangles remain as distinct and unique sensory impressions to the person without language; it is 
the word or concept of “triangle” that unites them. Assigning sensory impressions of objects to a 
 
160
 Hobbes, 103-4.  
67 
 
label such as “triangle,” then, allows speakers to unite “particular” experiences to a “universal” 
rule that they can easily apply to new sensory experiences.  
Hobbes is interested in showing how spoken language provides the ground for reasoning, 
and he does this by building upon his theory of language from the individual units of single 
words, to the way in which words are strung together to make a “consequence,” to how 
“consequences” are added together to create logical “syllogismes.” Unlike Descartes, who 
understands creative and spontaneous language as the sign of reason, Hobbes theorizes that 
language is what makes reasoning possible: “For Reason in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning 
(that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the 
marking and signifying of our thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and 
signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.”161 For Hobbes, 
reason is the manipulation of language (“general names agreed upon”) by creating syllogismes 
through the “adding and substracting” of “Consequences” or statements. We use this process of 
reasoning to signify both to ourselves and to others, and for Hobbes this is the foundation of 
political society. Whereas for Descartes language is the sign of reason, for Hobbes, language is 
the medium through which reason takes place. Hobbes’s framing of both language as the 
apparatus of reason and of deaf people as having “no use of speech at all” demonstrates how his 
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 Oralist pedagogies were the predominant form of deaf language instruction in England, 
and were premised upon the idea that only spoken language is the sign of reason. Alongside 
Enlightenment theories of language, the eighteenth-century saw a simultaneous rise in print 
culture, literacy, and schools for deaf students. We have no records before 1700 for deaf 
instruction having ever existed anywhere in Europe; by 1789, there were twelve schools, and by 
1822 there were sixty.  As Margaret Winzer notes, “Almost since its inception the education of 
deaf people has been marred by divisive controversy concerning the most appropriate modes of 
communication.”162 This controversy centered on teaching deaf students sign language systems 
(the manualists), versus teaching deaf students to speak orally and practice lip reading (the 
oralists). The British (and eventually American) emphasis on oralist pedagogy had lasting 
effects: oralist pedagogical methods became the main form of education for deaf students. This 
tradition lasted well into the nineteenth century and it is still used in some schools today, despite 
a wealth of literature that demonstrates that deaf students experience a better quality of life and 
education when communicating through sign.  
Some scholars see the increased interest in schools and manuals for deaf education as 
connected to the rise in print materials and literacy. As J. Paul Hunter notes, “literacy in the 
English-speaking world grew rapidly between 1600 and 1800 so that by the latter date a vast 
majority of adult males could read and write, whereas two centuries earlier only a select minority 
could do so.”163 Lennard Davis argues that in order for reading to become consolidated as a 
solitary activity, eighteenth-century readers had to “become deaf”: “That is, to read requires 
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muteness and attention to nonverbal signs. Writing and reading became the dominant forms of 
using sign language, the language of printed signs, and thus hearing readers and deaf readers 
could merge as those who could see the voice of the words."164 Understanding deafness as a form 
of sensory engagement that does not involve sound, Davis offers us a way to imagine deafness as 
a way of interacting with print materials.  
 Nicholas Mirzoeff connects the rise of print culture directly with the rise of schools for 
deaf students by highlighting how new print technology made teaching written language to deaf 
students easier. The rise of print culture itself was “an important factor in making deaf sign 
‘visible’ as a communicative system” both by the ability to reproduce signs in print, but also by a 
culture of thinking organized silent and visual communication: reading.165 In France, the Abbé 
Charles-Michel de l'Épée was one of the first prominent instructors of deaf students to publish on 
his methods from a manualist tradition— that is, l'Épée did not attempt to teach his students to 
speak orally. L’Épée instead used “writing to educate the deaf in a fashion that could only have 
been conceived in the print era, for he used metal plates to teach spelling, each bearing one letter. 
Thus, by using the same metal plates in the construction of different words, he instilled the 
notion of the alphabet to students for whom sound had no meaning.”166 Print materials can be 
seen as an important historical moment of accommodation in deaf education. Mirzoeff points to 
how the legacy of deaf people working with print materials and printing presses began in this 
period: “By 1791, the deaf were sufficiently skilled compositors and proof readers that they were 
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printing the scholarly Journal des Savants at the deaf school.”167 Deaf presses produced 
newspapers, pamphlets, and books for both hearing and deaf audiences.  
 Richard Nash contextualizes seventeenth- and eighteenth-century interests in teaching 
spoken language to deaf students in terms of taxonomic constructions of human identity within 
natural history. Nash argues that British instructors for deaf students focused specifically on an 
oralist pedagogy because they were motivated by anxieties around human identity. He writes: 
[Within] a framework of a natural history that defines ‘humanity’ in part by vocal 
capacity, the perceived need to translate from ‘gestural language’ to spoken 
language takes on the familiar colonialist garb of the missionary. Gestural 
language might be recognized as sufficient to communication, while still 
remaining insufficiently ‘human,’ according to a taxonomy that privileged 
speech.168 
 
Recognizing gestural or signed language as a “natural language” or legitimate language would 
therefore defy “the taxonomic criteria that distinguished human from beast on the basis of 
spoken language.”169 Nash argues that not only were British oralist pedagogies connected to 
taxonomic criteria of the human, but in fact most instructors used rudimentary taxonomies as 
teaching aids for their students, as I will discuss in more detail later. This natural history was 
importantly part of a colonialist project that affected both deaf people in Britain and Europe, as 
well as non-European peoples the British encountered and sometimes colonized.  
However, natural history alone does not account for why British pedagogies centered on 
an oralist education: the French were equally interested in naturally history and taxonomies of 
the human, and yet French pedagogies for deaf students in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries focused on manualist instruction. Part of this difference may have to do with religious 
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differences between England and France: French sign language instruction to deaf students 
began in Catholic monasteries. Disabled, and especially deaf, children were sometimes put into 
the care of monasteries. Because Catholic monks often went through long periods of absolute 
silence, they often employed sign languages to communicate in the absence of spoken language. 
Catholic monks, then, were some of the first teachers of sign language to deaf children. Etienne 
de Fay, born around 1669, was one such child, who spent his life in the monastery and eventually 
took on deaf students of his own.170 Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider 
the way in which religious differences may have impacted instruction for deaf students, the 
dissolution of British monasteries in the sixteenth century can be seen as contributing to the 
difference between the British oralist tradition versus the French manualist one.  
 A number of writers interested in philosophy of language focused their inquiries 
specifically on deafness and instruction for deaf students, such as John Bulwer, William Holder, 
and John Wallis. Bulwer published two spoken language manuals intended for instructors of deaf 
students, as well as potentially deaf readers themselves: Chirologia: or the Naturall Language of 
the Hand in 1644, and Philocophus: Or, The Deafe and Dumbe Mans Friend in 1648. Chirologia 
presents gestural and sign languages as a contender for a universal language, whereas 
Philocophus is a manual to teach deaf students lip reading and oral speech. The mid-1660s saw a 
sudden development for universal language schemes that would attempt to resolve two main 
issues: 1) the gap between sign and referent so that signs would no longer be arbitrary or flawed 
and 2) cultural language differences that made contact and trade more difficult between nations. 
A universal language would be composed of signs and sounds that immediately invoked their 
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referent through a natural connection so as to be intuitive to new speakers. John Wilkin’s An 
Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (1668) explains that a real 
universal character “should not signifie words, but things and notions, and consequently might 
be legible by any Nation in their own Tongue; which is the principal design of this Treatise. . . . 
that some way might be found out to represent things by such peculiar signs and names as should 
express their natures.”171 Inspired by somewhat mistaken assumptions about Chinese characters, 
Wilkins wanted to create a system of language in which written characters represented their 
referents directly.  Importantly, Wilkins also thought the language should also look how it 
sounds: “For that Difference which there is in very many words betwixt the writing and 
pronouncing of them, mentioned before. Scriptio est vocum pictura: And it should seem very 
reasonable, that men should either speak as they write, or write as they speak.”172 Wilkins is 
clear about the benefits of such a universal language: “Besides that most obvious advantage 
which would ensue, of facilitating mutual Commerce, amongst the several Nations of the World, 
and the improving of all Natural knowledge; It would likewise very much conduce to the 
spreading of the knowledge of Religion.”173 This is a language suited for commercial interests; 
but it is clear that it would also function for scientific colonialist projects through which “Natural 
knowledge” was often obtained as well as imperial ones through “the spreading of the 
knowledge of Religion.” 
Whereas Wilkins’ universal language scheme is spoken and written, Bulwer proposes 
gestural or sign languages for this goal. Chirologia is primarily a compilation of cultural and 
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literary examples of gestural language. The text opens with a series of poems that imagine 
gesture as a “natural” language of humans: "The Tongue and heart th'intention oft divide: / The 
Hand and Meaning ever are ally'de."174 The status of the hand as a part of the body seems to 
contribute to its honesty; although the tongue “speaks” words, the sound of those words is 
“divided” from the heart. For the hand, motion and meaning are “ally’de”: the body and the word 
are not separated by sound. By understanding gesture as natural to the body, rather than a product 
of culture, gesture can transcend the cultural boundaries of spoken language: "All Tribes shall 
now each other understand, / Which (though not of one lip) are of one Hand, / Chirologie 
redeems from Babels doome, / And is the universall Idiome."175 Although “Babels doome” 
linguistically separated humans from each other, all humans share the same human body. 
“Chirologie,” or the study of the hand, is here presented as the study of the hand’s language. 
Gestural language is thus understood as a natural to the body as “Natures silent motions."176 
Bulwer continues: 
[The hand] speakes all languages, and as an universall character of Reason, is 
generally understood and knowne by all Nations, among the formall differences 
of their Tongue. And being the onely speech that is naturall to Man, it may well 
be called the Tongue and generall language of Humane Nature, which, without 
teaching, men in all regions of the habitable world doe at the first sight most 
easily understand. This is evident by that trade and commerce with those salvage 
Nations who have long injoy'd the late discovered principalities of the West, with 
whom (although their Language be strange and unknowne) our Merchants barter 
and exchange their Wares driving a rich and silent Trade, by signes, whereby 
many a dumb bargaine without the craft Brocage of the Tongue, is 




 John Bulwer, Chirologia: or the Naturall Language of the Hand. Composed of the Speaking 
Motions, and Discoursing Gestures thereof. (London: Printed by Tho. Harper, 1644), n. p.   
175
 Bulwer, Chirologia, n. p.  
176
 Bulwer, Chirologia, n.p. 
177
 Bulwer, Chirologia, 3-4.  
74 
 
For Descartes, it is specifically because language is not natural or instinctive, but creative and 
spontaneous, that allows it to demonstrate reason. For Bulwer, no such distinction exists— 
reason itself is naturalized, and it is only because of this naturalization that Bulwer is able to 
present gesture as a universal language. Gesture can be used “without teaching” and understood 
by “men in all regions of the habitable world.” Although Chirologia is a more positive portrayal 
of gestural and sign languages, by positing sign languages are more “natural,” Bulwer also 
participates in tropes about the “primitiveness” of sign language— a point that I will discuss in 
more detail later in this chapter.  
 Bulwer makes it clear that he views gesture as “the only speech and generall language of 
Humane Nature."178 The book is prefaced by a series of poems that represent gesture as a 
“universall idiome” through which diverse linguistic groups can come to understand each other. 
Bulwer sees gestural language as rooted in the body, and it is the body and its universality that 
ensures that the likewise “universall idiome” of gestures are also shared and easily recognizable. 
One of the underlying assumptions here, of course, is that our bodies are universally normative. 
Universality here is constructed with a specific type of body in mind— presumably the bodies of 
middle and upper class men who are able to travel as merchants to “salvage nations,” with whom 
Bulwer imagines a gestural language most useful. 
 Importantly, Chirologia is not a book specifically interested in deafness. Bulwer presents 
gestural language as a universal language that functions as a bridge between differences in oral 
languages based on its “natural” connection to the body. Sign language as used by deaf people is 
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Which may be more confirm'd by that wonder of necessity which Nature worketh 
in men that are borne deafe and dumbe; who can argue and dispute rhetorically by 
signes, and with a kinde of mute and logistique eloquence to overcome their 
amaz'd opponents; wherein some are so ready & excellent, they seeme to want 
nothing to have their meanings perfectly understood.179   
 
Because reason itself is “natural” for Bulwer, reason will manifest itself in humans regardless of 
hearing status. Manually signed language is thus capable of “logistique eloquence.” The gestural 
language that Bulwer presents in Chirologia, however, is primarily emotionally expressive— 
used to refer to more ephemeral communicative acts, rather than a language that is rooted in a 
grammatical structure and extensive vocabulary. For instance, he writes that "To wring the 
Hands is a naturall expression of excessive griefe" and that "To clap the raised hands one against 
another, is an expression proper to them who applaud, congratulate, rejoice, assent, approve, and 
are well pleased, used by all Nations."180 Bulwer’s presentation of a gestural language, then, is 
not a fully developed language of vocabulary and grammar, but seems rather to point to the 
possibility of its communicative properties that are already familiar to most hearing persons. 
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 Philocophus: Or, The Deafe and Dumbe Mans Friend is dedicated to “Sir Edward 
Gostwicke, of Wellington, in the County of Bedford, Baronet, who was deaf and mute.” 
Philocophus considers more deliberately the social conditions of deaf people than does 
Chirologia— although Bulwer builds on ideas he began there. As Brenda Brueggemann notes:  
Bulwer is credited with founding the 'elocutionary movement' in the history of 
rhetoric with his elaborately detailed descriptions (and prescriptions) of what the 
hands, body, and face could do in the act and art of persuasion in his two treatises 
on 'the art of the hand.' We now also know that he was one of the earliest English 
deaf educators and, even more significant, we now also know that he had a deaf 
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Philocophus offers a more nuanced presentation on sign language and its uses, possibly because 
Bulwer had developed connections with more deaf people by this point— both Gostwicke, as 
well as Bulwer’s own adopted daughter. 
Chirologia presents sign language as a universal panacea for both hearing and non-
hearing people to overcome various types of communication barriers. He writes: "What Babell 
did denie / To Lips and Eare, Th'ast given the Hand and Eye; / Hast reconcil'd the World, and its 
defect / Supply'd, by one unerring Dialect."182 Bulwer imagines sign language here and 
elsewhere as compensatory both for a world divided by “Babell” as well as those with hearing 
impairments. In Philocophus, his idea that the hand is “another tongue” gets worked into a kind 
of synesthesia through which the senses are represented as performing a kind of sensory 
translation.183 In a prefatory poem, he writes:  
How all the Sences have one common Stocke.  
Shewes how indulgent Nature for each sence  
Wanting, allowes a double recompence.  
How she translates a sence, transplants an Eare 
Into the Eye, and makes the Optiques heare.  
Inoculates an Eare with sight; whereby 
It shall performe the office of an Eie.184  
 
Because the senses all come from “one common Stocke,” they can “recompence” or “translate” 
sensory perceptions outside their usual functions in such a way that “transplants an Eare / Into 
the Eye” through the visual sense of gestural or signed language. In the prefatory dedication, he 
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writes, “What though you cannot expresse your mindes in those verball contrivances of mans 
invention; yet you want not speech, who have your whole body, for a Tongue, having a language 
more naturall and significant."185 Through the gestural language and bodily synesthesia that 
Bulwer describes, the “whole body” becomes a “tongue.” We might consider this insight as a 
form of Deaf-gain; as H-Dirksen L. Bauman and Joseph J. Murray explain: 
In the face of sensory loss, we may better appreciate the dynamic and pliable 
nature of the mind and the human will to communicate and to form community. 
In this light, deafness is not so much defined by a fundamental lack, as in hearing 
loss, but as its opposite, as a means to understand the plenitude of human being, 
as Deaf-gain. Deaf-gain . . . is the notion that the unique sensory orientation of 
Deaf people leads to a sophisticated form of visual-spatial language that provides 
opportunities for exploration into the human character.186  
 
Bulwer’s consideration of language outside of hearing leads him to extol the possibilities of 
visual-spatial language.  Sign language allows Bulwer to expand how and what he understands 
as language: the entire body and all of its senses are recruited in the process of both making and 
interpreting meaning.  
Despite endorsing manually signed language as a legitimate, more natural, and often 
more sophisticated language than orally spoken languages, Philocophus is a manual to teach deaf 
students lip reading and oral speech. In the dedicatory preface, Bulwer writes: 
Insomuch as being sollicited on your behalfe by a worthy Friend of yours (who 
had observed you not onely to be affected but seemingly edified upon the sight of 
the Alphabets of my Chirologia or naturall language of the hand which hee had 
presented you with, to an endeavour of accomodating them more to your use), I 
was enforced ingeniously to confesse, I could not improve them to any 
considerable advantage for you, since you already can expresse your selves so 
truely by signes, from a habit you have gotten by using always signes, as wee doe 
speech: Nature also recompencing your want of speech, in the invention of signes 
to expresse your conceptions. Yet a while after having well observed by your 
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multiplying signes and gestures, that you earnestly desired to unfold your lips to 
an orall elocution; seeming as if you accounted your dumbenesse to be your 
greatest unhappiness.187  
 
Acknowledging that Gostwicke’s sign language was already more sophisticated than what 
Bulwer had presented in the Chirologia, Bulwer claims that Gostwicke “desired to unfold [his] 
lips to an orall elocution.” Bulwer even conceptualizes an academy for deaf students, which he 
describes specifically in the language of accommodations, before confessing that everyone with 
whom he had shared this idea had laughed at him.188 Having thus abandoned his idea for the 
academy for the moment, he writes: "In the meane time for the enlarging of your Charter, and to 
bring you into a neerer incorporation of society and communion with us: I here commend unto 
you the Accommodations this Art holds out."189 And it is here where Bulwer’s objective 
becomes more clear: the manual never promotes oral language as superior as its raison d’etre; 
rather, the book seems to be a lamenting acknowledgment of the way in which deaf people are 
excluded from cultural and legal realms of society. To be brought into a “neerer incorporation of 
society and communication with us,” of course, implies that Gostwicke is not yet incorporated, 
but excluded. Because sign languages were often viewed as illegitimate, it is only through orally 
spoken language that Gostwicke can gain access a society that privileges and is structured around 
hearing.  
 Philocophus, although not a substitute for a testimony of an actual deaf person, provides 
insight to contemporary attitudes toward deaf people, and challenges that deaf people faced in 
the period. Bulwer goes into detail about the ways in which deaf people are excluded from daily 
social and legal life: 
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The condition that they are in who are borne deafe and dumbe, is indeed very sad 
and lamentable: for they are looked upon as misprisions in nature, and wanting 
speech, are reckoned little better then Dumbe Animals, that want words to 
expresse their conceptions.190 
 
It is here where the slippage between “dumbe” as in “mute” and as in “lacking reason” becomes 
most apparent by invoking “Dumbe Animals.” As “misprisions in nature,” he laments that deaf 
people are devalued or viewed as mistakes.191 In fact, Bulwer makes a non-exhaustive list of 
things from which those who were born deaf are excluded: 
A deafe and dumbe man cannot be a witnesse in those things which are perceived 
by the sense of hearing. [. . .] 
A deafe and dumbe man understanding nothing, is compared to an Infant. [. . .] 
A dumbe and deafe man cannot alienate among the living, for he is like to a dead 
man. [. . .] 
A man deafe and dumbe by nature, cannot make his last Will and Testament.  
A deafe and dumbe man cannot appoint his Executors of his last Will and 
Testament.192  
 
On these last points, Bulwer clarifies, "But if he be not mute or deafe by nature, and hath learnt 
to Paint or Write, hee may make his Testament. Yet some say that in making a last Will, there is 
neede of an articulate voyce, and that signes will not suffice."193 Although there are some 
instances in which deaf people were allowed to sign to an interpreter at court, Bulwer makes it 
clear that this was not always the case. In these laments, Bulwer’s motivation for drawing up a 
manual on lip reading and oral speech for the deaf becomes more clear: there were often material 
legal consequences for not being able to engage with a hearing community on their own (oral) 
terms. Under the law, Bulwer writes, a deaf person is “compared to an Infant,” and if he is 
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unable to satisfactorily prove that he is capable of reason to a judge, “he must have a Guardian 
appointed to him, it being left to the arbitriment of the Judge to determine whether he hath 
understanding or no.”194 The degree to which language, and specifically oral language, was 
viewed as the sign of reason, then, had real and material consequences on the lives of deaf 
people. 
Holder’s Elements of Speech: An Essay of Inquiry into the Natural Production of Letters: 
with an Appendix Concerning Persons Deaf & Dumb is an oralist manual to teach deaf students 
to speak that diverges greatly from Bulwer’s attitude toward deaf students and issues. Its method, 
and many oralists methods like it, focus on teaching mouth and tongue positions to deaf students 
to mimic in order to form words, as well as teaching lip reading. Holder, like Descartes and 
others, considers speech as that which separates humans from animals. He writes:  
But of all other, there is none for this use comparable to the variety of instructive 
Expressions by Speech, wherewith Man alone is endowed, as with an Instrument 
suitable to the Excellency of his Soul, for the most easie, speedy, certain, full 
communication of the Infinite variety of his Thoughts, by the ready Commerce 
between the Tongue and Ear. And if some Animals, as Parrots, Magpies, etc. may 
seem to be capable of the same discriminations, yet we see, that their souls are too 
narrow to use so great an Engine.195   
 
Holder’s thoughts do not appear dramatically different from Descartes’. Both emphasize that 
speech separates humans from animals, and that this difference is not anatomical: although 
parrots and magpies can “talk” or vocalize, Holder argues that the souls of such animals “are too 
narrow to use so great an Engine” and Descartes argues that despite speaking, animals do not 
“give evidence that they can think of what they say.” However, Descartes is clearly interested in 
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presenting language as a sign of reason— of being able to “think of what [one] say[s],” whereas 
Holder presents his interest in language slightly differently— in terms of its “use.” For Holder, 
animals are anatomically capable of speech, but their “souls are too narrow to use so great an 
Engine” as language (emphasis added).  
 In that same passage, Descartes’ discussion of sign language aligns deaf people who use 
sign language within a larger human community distinct from animals and animal 
communication—because all humans, hearing and non-hearing, are possessed of reason in a way 
that animals, Descartes argues, are not. In Holder’s presentation, we see the opposite:  
Common life is full of this kind of significant Expressions, by Knocking, 
Beckoning, Frowning, Pointing and the like; and Dumb persons are sagacious in 
the use of them. And even Brute Animals make use of this artificial way of 
making divers motions to have several significations, to Call, Warne, Chide, 
Cherish, Threaten, etc. especially within their own kinds.196  
 
Whereas Descartes aligns deaf sign language users to hearing spoken language users through 
their common use of reason, Holder aligns deaf sign language users to “Brute Animals.” In fact, 
to make this alignment, Holder’s presentation of animal language is far more generous than that 
of Descartes: Descartes does not grant animals any linguistic ability— whether spoken or signed: 
at best, animals can mimic sounds or motions, but they are performed without reason or 
understanding. Holder, on the other hand, claims that animals do make “significations”: “to Call, 
Warne, Chide, Cherish, Threaten” all seem to be “creative” and “spontaneous” expressions that 
fulfill Descartes’ definition of language.  
And it is specifically language in its spoken form that Holder is interested in as “the most 
easie, speedy, certain, full of communication of the Infinite variety of his Thoughts” which takes 
place “between the Tongue and Ear.” Whereas Descartes is willing to grant that those born deaf 
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“are in the habit of themselves inventing certain signs by which they make themselves 
understood by those who, being usually in their company, have leisure to learn their language,” 
Holder is primarily motivated by presenting spoken language as a superior method of 
communication over sign language since his goal in this manual is to teach spoken language to 
those who are deaf. Unlike Bulwer, who presented gestural language as a universal language 
capable of transcending oral linguistic differences, and who posited that "although Speech and 
Gesture are conceived together in the minde, yet the Hand first appearing in the delivery, 
anticipates the Tongue,"197 Holder emphatically favors oral communication as more “easie, 
speedy, certain.” Privileging spoken language thus underlies an oralist pedagogy. Indeed, later in 
the manual when Holder covers a finger alphabet, it becomes clear who Holder imagines this 
manual is for: 
And you may, when you please, have the recreation of surprising those with 
admiration, who shall hear the Deaf person pronounce whatsoever they (though 
with privacy) shall desire, without your seeming at all to guide him with your Eye 
or Mouth, otherwise than by beckoning to him to speak, whilst you secretly 
describe it with your fingers.198  
 
In this passage, the deaf student is figured as a source of entertainment for a hearing audience. 
The tutor presents the deaf person to another hearing companion, who is then “surpris[ed] with 
admiration” at the deaf student’s ability to recite what the tutor is silently signing to him through 
a finger alphabet. The deaf student, of course, does not share in the entertainment (as he is its 
source) because it is presented specifically in a form that he cannot enjoy: sound. Interestingly, 
this is the only portion of the manual in which Holder seems interested in communicating with a 
 
197
 Bulwer, Chirologia, 4.  
198
 Holder, 153-4. 
84 
 
deaf student in the accessible language of signing: when it is presented as benefitting a hearing 
audience, and in this case, in the form of a parlour trick. 
Holder privileges spoken language over signed language, in part, because he views 
spoken language as the primary form of language, and written or signed language as secondary 
forms of language. He writes: "the Original of these Signes for Communication is found in Viva 
voce, in Spoken Language"199 and that "Language is a Connexion of Audible signes, the most apt 
and excellent in whole nature for Communication of our Thoughts and Notions by Speaking. 
Written Language is a description of the said Audible Signes, by Signes Visible."200 Written 
language, then, is only a “description” of the “original” spoken language of “audible signes” — a 
point that Holder repeats several times throughout the manual.  
In 1670 and 1698, John Wallis published his letters on oralist instruction using similar 
methods to Holder in the Philosophical Transactions. Wallis is specifically focused on deafness, 
but like other writers, he is also necessarily interested and engaged with philosophies of 
language. He writes: 
To teach a person who cannot Hear, to Pronounce the Sound of Words: There is 
that other, of teaching him to understand a Language, and know the signification 
of those words, whether spoken or written, whereby he may both express his own 
sense, and understand the Thoughts of others: without which the latter, that 
former were only to speak like a Parrot; or to write like a Scrivener, who 
understanding no Language but English, transcribes a piece of Latin, Welsh, or 
Irish; or like a Printer of Greek or Arabick, who knows neither the sound nor the 
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Because Wallis presents himself as presenting a method of teaching language (as opposed to 
teaching specifically a spoken language), his letter also touches on the nature of language itself. 
Like Descartes, he distinguishes “real” language from that which is simply mimicked without 
thought “like a Parrot” or a “Scrivener” who writes without understanding the signs that he 
makes. Implicit within this passage is the Cartesian idea of language as a sign of reason; Wallis 
positions his goal at teaching the deaf to “understand a Language” (emphasis added), rather than 
simply mimic its sounds.  
Whereas Holder seems to acknowledge manually signed language as a language, 
although not necessarily a legitimate or “speedie and certain” one, implicitly through his constant 
invocations on the superiority of spoken language, Wallis does not acknowledge manually signed 
language as a language at all. In these letters, he consistently seems to assume that those who are 
deaf have no language at all, as his plan is "to Teach a person Dumb and Deaf, to Speak and to 
Understand a Language."202 His method is thus not to teach deaf students just to speak, but to 
teach “a Language” wherein no other is present. He continues:  
For it is very certain, that no Two Languages can be so much different the one 
from the other, but that the knowledge of the one will be subservient to the 
gaining of the other: not only because there is now a common Language, wherein 
the Teacher may Interpret to the Learner the signification of those Words and 
Notions which he knows not, and express his own Thoughts to him; but likewise 
(which is very considerable,) because the common Notions of Language, wherein 
all or most Languages do agree, and also so many of the Particularities thereof as 
are common to the Languages he knows already, and that which he is to learn, 
(which will be very many,) are already known; and therefore a very considerable 
part already dispatched, of that work which will be necessary for the teaching of a 
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Here Wallis comments on how, despite vast differences between languages, knowing a first 
language is an aid to learning a second language. Drawing on what the student already knows, 
the teacher of a second language draws from what is “already known” and “dispatched,” whereas 
the teacher of a first language is working with a student who “as yet knows none.” Wallis 
provides this anecdote to describe the difficulties in teaching deaf students to speak, but also 
reveals that he doesn’t consider manually signed language to be a language at all: the deaf 
student is “him who as yet knows none.” However, only a page later, Wallis reveals that he 
clearly recognizes when his students are making signs: "And if, by writing to one who 
understands a Language, it be thus difficult to give Instruction, how, without the help of Hearing, 
he may utter those Sounds, it must needs increase the Difficulty, when there is no other 
Language to express it in, but that of Dumb signs."204 Sign language is not quite recuperated here 
as an actual language— Wallis reveals that his students do, in fact, make signs, yet they are not 
quite a language, only “Dumb signs.” In fact, Wallis’s students were probably using a system of 
homesigns. Homesigns are often used by families or small communities when a deaf child is 
born or adopted by hearing and non-signing parents as a rudimentary form of communication of 
manual gestures, generally with little to no input from an outside source language. Scholars have 
shown that homesign systems use the grammatical categories of noun, verb, adjective205; 
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morphological paradigms206, recursion207, and sentence structure208. Homesign systems have 
been observed all over the world and are quite common; as Joseph C. Hill et. al. explain, “many, 
if not most, Deaf children start out as homesigners for the first few years of their lives (before 
they go to school) because they have limited exposure to the spoken language used in their 
family or the sign language of the Deaf community.”209 Although Wallis is clearly able to 
identify that his students are signing and communicating, he dismisses them as “Dumb signs.” 
Here we encounter again the slippage between “dumb” as in "Destitute of the faculty of speech" 
and “dumb” as in "Saying nothing to the understanding; inexpressive, meaningless; stupid, 
senseless"; or "Foolish, stupid, ignorant (chiefly of persons)." The signs are “dumb” insofar as 
they are not spoken— as, again, according to Descartes and others, only spoken language is 
connected to reason— , but Wallis also seems to be implying that they are also lacking in 
meaning, as they do not function as a “first language” that Wallis could otherwise use an aid to 
teach a “second language” that is spoken.  
 Like Holder, Wallis eventually reveals who he imagines as benefitting from teaching deaf 
students to speak orally. He writes: 
Nor can I promise, nor indeed hope, that how Accurately soever he may learn to 
speak, he should be able to make so great Use of it as others do. For since that he 
cannot hear what others say to Him, as well as express his own Thoughts to 
Them; he cannot make such use of it in Discourse as others may. And though it 
may be thought possible, that he may, in time, discern, by the motion of the Lips, 
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visible to the Eye, what is said to him . . . yet this cannot be expected, till at least 
he be so perfectly Master of the Language . . . For, that the Eye can actually 
discern all the varieties of Motion in the Organs of Speech, and see what Sounds 
are made by those Motions, (of which many are Inward, and are not exposed to 
the Eye at all,) is not Imaginable.210 
 
Although the deaf student who learns to speak orally will at best be able to “express his own 
Thoughts” to others, Wallis explicitly cannot promise that “how Accurately soever he may learn 
to speak, he should be able to make so great Use of it as others do.” Because lip reading is so 
difficult, and because many vocalizations proceed from areas within the mouth that are not 
visible to the eye, learning to speak orally and attempting to lip read will not accommodate deaf 
people to actually enter into spoken conversation. Like Holder, Wallis’s methods seem to be 
focused on benefitting a hearing audience, rather than empowering deaf students. Alexander 
Popham and Daniel Whaley, both deaf, were two of Wallis’s students, whom he brought before 
the Royal Society, and later to the king, to demonstrate the success of his methods on oralist 
instruction. In the letters, they are figured as “marvels” and products of Wallis’s success, rather 
than as successful and autonomous in their own right. We might see both this and Holder’s 
parlour tricks as an example of what David Hevey calls “enfreakment.” As Rosemarie Garland 
Thomson explains, enfreakment “emerges from cultural rituals that stylize, silence, differentiate, 
and distance the persons whose bodies the freak-hunters or showmen colonize and 
commercialize.”211 Holder and Wallis both used deaf students, trained to speak on command, 
before audiences to further their own scientific careers and status. Stylized and constructed as 
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“marvels,” these performances center deafness as an oddity of entertainment for hearing 
audiences.  
In Wallis’s 1698 letter, he goes into more detail on the specifics of his method, which he 
mostly condenses as a form of teaching vocabulary. He writes:  
'Tis then most natural (as Children learn the Names of Things) to furnish him (by 
degrees) with a Nomenclator . . . And these digested under convenient Titles; and 
placed (under them) in such convenient Order (in several Columnes, or other 
orderly situation in the Paper,) as (by their Position) best to express, to the Eye, 
their Relation or Respect to one another. As, Contraries or Correlatives, one over 
against the other; Subordinates or Appurtenaces, under their Principals. Which 
may serve as a kind of Local Memory.212  
 
Wallis is essentially describing vocabulary lessons as a form of taxonomy-making, through 
which nouns are named and arranged “best to express, to the Eye, their Relation or Respect to 
one another.” He continues: "Thus, (in one Paper) under the title Man-kind, may be placed, (not 
Confusedly, but in decent Order,) Man, Woman, Child, (boy, girle;)."213 Although Wallis 
describes this notebook as a “Dictionary,” it is also clearly a taxonomy meant to also 
communicate relationships and expressions of power through hierarchical ordering. As Nash 
argues, “Wallis’s pedagogic goal was itself shaped by a commitment to the Royal Society’s 
(taxonomic) construction of knowledge.”214 Wallis’s project, then, is not simply about teaching 
spoken language to deaf students, but also embedding a system of taxonomic order and 
hierarchical relationships within that form of language instruction. Examining British oralist 
pedagogy thus allows us to see the way in which language pedagogy and acquisition are 
activated to disseminate and create structures of power.  
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Origins of Language 
 
 Philosophies of language often attempted to understand the origins of language: how 
humans first came to speak, what primitive speech was like, and how humans came to more 
sophisticated forms of speech. In many of these theorizations of the history of human language, 
writers position sign language as a “primitive” form of language that was more rooted in the 
sensual and survival instincts of the body. In The Fable of the Bees (1714), Bernard Mandeville 
writes that “wild people must have an instinct to understand one another, which they lose when 
they are civilized.”215 Civilization and language coincide, and this codependence, for 
Mandeville, is due to the way in which civilization “teaches” men “new desires” and “appetites.” 
In the absence of these, a human couple of “untaught nature” “would not only be destitute of 
language, but likewise never find out or imagine that they stood in need of any; or that the want 
of it was any real inconvenience to them.”216 In the absence of the new desires and appetites that 
come with civilization, Mandeville imagines that there would be no real need to speak. He 
continues: “When a man’s knowledge is confined within a narrow compass, and he has nothing 
to obey but the simple dictates of nature, the want of speech is easily supplied by dumb signs.”217 
The “simple dictates of nature,” then, are less complicated, and less in need of speech, than the 
“taught” desires of civilization. Simpler needs, such as those required for basic survival, can be 
communicated through less complicated “dumb signs.”  
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Mandeville positions gestural language as more primitive than spoken language in a few 
different ways. Firstly, he describes it as only a transitional step to “real” language, which is 
spoken. Imagining a primitive human couple again, Mandeville writes that “a wild pair would 
make themselves intelligible to each other by signs and gestures, before they would attempt it by 
sounds.”218 This is, in part, because Mandeville, like Bulwer, understands gestural language as 
more “natural” than spoken language, which is a product of civilization: “and it is more natural 
to untaught men to express themselves by gestures, than by sounds.”219 Secondly, gestural 
language is more natural to “fiery tempers”: 
Horatio: From what you have said, it should seem that action is not only more 
natural, but likewise more ancient than speech itself, which before I should have 
thought a paradox.  
Cleo: Yet it is true; and you shall always find, that the most forward, volatile, and 
fiery tempers make more use of gestures, when they speak, than others that are 
more patient and sedate.220  
 
It is only through civilization that humans become less “volatile” and “fiery” — that is, less 
brute-like — and forms of language reflect this transition. “Natural” then comes to signify the 
“volatile, and fiery tempers” of brute-like humans as well as the gestural language they use to 
communicate.  
Like Mandeville, Jean Jacques Rousseau sees gestural language as more primitive than 
spoken language. He writes: “Although the language of gesture and spoken language are equally 
natural, still the first is easier and depends less upon conventions.”221 Both gestural and spoken 
languages are “natural” — although it isn’t clear here what is meant by “natural” — gestural 
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language relies less upon “conventions” — or more specifically, it need not be taught to be 
understood. “Convention” is translated verbatim from the French, and the words have similar 
meanings. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “convention” as "The act of convening; the 
action of coming together, meeting, or assembling" and "Agreement, conventional usage; an 
agreement or covenant between parties" or "an agreement creating legal relations" and "General 
agreement or consent, deliberate or implicit, as constituting the origin and foundation of any 
custom, institution, opinion, et.c, or as embodied in any accepted usage, standard of behaviour, 
method of artistic treatment, or the like."222 The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French 
dictionary Littré defines “convention” as “Terme de droit. Accord de volontés entre deux ou 
plusieurs personnes,” as “Dans le langage général, ce qui est convenu entre les hommes,” and as 
“Assemblée exceptionnelle des représentants d'un peuple, ayant pour objet d'établir une 
constitution ou de la modifier.”223 These meanings suggest an agreement between people as 
made law and which define relationships; an agreement which is artificial insofar as it is not 
instinctive, but must be arrived upon: the agreement itself must be made explicit for a 
convention to exist. I pause to meditate on this word because Rousseau returns to it again and 
again as he considers different types of languages. For Rousseau, language does not exist among 
isolated humans; language exists as conventions between humans in groups. This is similar to 
Hobbes, who views language as that which creates the possibility of groups coming together to 
build the commonwealth.  
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Rousseau also distinguishes between gestural and spoken language in terms of use: while 
gestural language can fully articulate the physical needs of survival, the more nuanced language 
of passion and complex ideas requires spoken language. Rousseau writes:  
if the only needs we ever experienced were physical, we should most likely never 
have been able to speak; we would fully express our meanings by the language of 
gesture alone. We would have been able to establish societies little different from 
those we have, or such as would have been better able to achieve their goals. We 
would have been able to institute laws, to choose leaders, to invent arts, to 
establish commerce, and to do, in a word, almost as many things as we do with 
the help of speech. Without fear of jealousy, the secrets of oriental gallantry are 
passed across the more strictly guarded harems in the epistolary language of 
salaams. The mutes of the great nobles understand each other, and understand 
everything that is said to them by means of signs, just as well as one can 
understand anything said in discourse. M. Pereyra and those like him who not 
only consider that mutes speak, but claim to understand what they are saying, had 
to learn another language, as complicated as our own, in order to understand 
them.224  
 
This passage reveals how capacious Rousseau considers what constitutes as “physical” needs: 
not merely that which is required for basic survival, but fully developed societies, laws, arts, and 
commerce. Rousseau also grants sign language the status as a “real” language here, “as 
complicated as our own” and capable of transmitting “anything said in discourse.” 
In many ways, then, it appears that Rousseau recognizes the legitimacy of signed 
language in ways that some of his contemporaries did not. However, he reaches this stance 
primarily through veneration of the “primitive,” which becomes more apparent as he makes 
cultural comparisons between languages. This first becomes apparent when he considers animal 
language:  
Animals have a more than adequate structure for such communication, but none 
of them has ever made use of it. . . . That those animals which live and work in 
common, such as beavers, ants, bees, have some natural language for 
communicating among themselves, I would not question. Still, the speech of 
beavers and ants is apparently by gesture; i.e. it is only visual. If so, such 
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languages are natural, not acquired. The animals that speak them possess them a-
borning: they all have them, and they are everywhere the same. They are entirely 
unchanging and make not the slightest progress. Conventional language is 
characteristic of man alone. That is why man makes progress, whether for good or 
ill, and animals do not. That single distinction is far-fearing. It is said to be 
explicable by organic differences.225  
 
Animals have the visual language of gesture, which Rousseau defines as “natural” insofar as they 
are “not acquired” — they do not need to be learned— “they all have them” and “they are 
everywhere the same,” “unchanging and make not the slightest progress.” Although some 
animals also make vocalizations to communicate, Rousseau would classify these as “inarticulate 
sounds” that occur outside of conventional language. “Conventional language,” which only 
humans have, requires some kind of learning— either through formal instruction or access to a 
linguistic environment. Humans have law and agreement, and these principles are intrinsic in our 
language.  
As we saw earlier, Rousseau believes that in humans, gestural language “depends less 
upon conventions,” which implies that it does have some dependence on convention. The 
question is: to what degree? If “conventional language” is defined simply as language which 
operates by formalized and agreed upon laws — of grammar, of vocabulary— then Rousseau 
seems to be positing that some portion of sign language is expressed through these laws, and 
some portion does not. The answer to this question, although not necessarily “solvable,” 
becomes more clear as Rousseau compares languages between cultures. On “primitive 
language,” he writes: “In primitive times the sparse human population had no more social 
structure than the family, no laws but those of nature, no language but that of gesture and some 
inarticulate sounds.”226 For primitive, early humans, language does not exist because laws do not 
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exist. Gestural language, here relegated to an even more diminutive form of “real” language, 
exists only as it can without any conventions whatsoever. Rousseau writes that primitive humans 
who used sign language were “not bound by any idea of common brotherhood and, having no 
rule but that of force . . . An individual isolated on the face of the earth, at the mercy of mankind, 
is bound to be a ferocious animal. He would be ready to do unto others all the evil that he feared 
from them.”227 Sign language is figured as a language predicated on isolation, fear, and hostile 
aggression. The movement from signed language to spoken, and then written, language is 
presented as one of entering into bonds with other humans. Importantly, Rousseau also imagines 
this process as one of empathy: “We develop social feeling only as we become enlightened.”228 
Rousseau imagines spoken language itself as the glue which binds humans together, without 
which we are only “ferocious animal[s]” who lack both “social feeling” and rationality, attacking 
other humans out of fear. In the absence of spoken language, the signed language of primitive 
humans is not simply private but isolating, and its signers sub-human.  
In the footnote to this passage, Rousseau adds:  
Genuine languages are not at all of domestic origin. They can be established only 
under a more general, more durable agreement. The American savages hardly 
speak at all except outside their homes. Each keeps silent in his hut, speaking to 
his family by signs. And these signs are used infrequently, for a savage is less 
disquieted, less impatient than a European; he has fewer needs and he is careful to 
meet them himself.229    
 
Although Rousseau is mistaken about the nature of Native American languages, he sees their 
usage of sign language as evidence of their primitive state: sign language is the mechanism that 
Rousseau uses to racialize language. “Genuine” languages must exist under a more formalized 
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social arrangement than the family structure; domestic ties are here distinct from “laws.” And 
this is important as Rousseau does not view Native Americans as having “societies” or “laws.” In 
the absence of the formalized social arrangements of societies and laws, Rousseau imagines that 
the Native American has no need for “conventional” language. Native American speech is just 
barely resuscitated as an exception: they “hardly speak at all except outside their homes.” Within 
the hut, Native Americans speak only by the gestural language of “signs.” Similar to Mandeville 
who sees civilization as producing more "taught" desires, Rousseau imagines Native Americans 
as less civilized, and therefore having fewer of the needs that would necessitate language. 
The footnote itself also simply functions to elaborate what is meant by “the sparse human 
population” of “primitive times” which lacks social structure, laws, and language. Although 
Rousseau began this section to consider languages of early humans— a temporal and historical 
exploration of language— he then expands this to make a geographic and cultural argument 
about language: that Native American languages are “primitive.” This is an early example of 
what Johannes Fabian refers to as a “denial of coevalness” in anthropology, which he defines as 
"a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other 
than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse."230 Fabian highlights the 
anthropological tendency to situate the subject of a study as being part of an “earlier” or “more 
primitive” time than the producer or scholar. Rather than understanding different cultures as 
changing and developing in different ways according to their own needs, a denial of coevalness 
presumes that historical time moves along a trajectory of unquestioned progress— and 
importantly, that there is only one version of progress (that of the producer of anthropological 
 
230
 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2014), 31.  
97 
 
discourse). The producer thus  “looks back” at the subject according to the producer’s own 
measure of what constitutes “progress” and posits the subject at an “earlier” time in historical 
development: they are not “coeval.” Rousseau’s construction of Native Americans as primitive 
function to produce them as an analog for the primitive human upon which his musings rest. 
While Europeans exist on a time-scale which expresses civilization and progress, Rousseau 
imagines Native Americans in a static, unchanging environment — much like the environment in 
which he imagines the gestural language of animals — through which he can project an 
imagined past. In this way, we begin to see the way in which philosophers of language implicitly 
imagine a subject who is both able-bodied and hearing as well as white and European as the real 
recipient of the historical development of language— language which is fully “conventionalized” 
and legitimate.  
 Rousseau then develops a hierarchy of written languages along a scale of primitiveness 
and civility, through which he views the culture itself. Similar to the way in which signed 
language functions absent of sound, Rousseau sees the “development” of language as a process 
that brings written markings closer to their auditory sounds. He writes that the “primitive way of 
writing was not to represent sounds, but objects themselves whether directly, as with the 
Mexicans, or by allegorical imagery, or as the Egyptians did in still other ways.”231 The second 
stage begins to represent sound, but is also structured by “convention” and “law”:  
The second way  is to represent words and propositions by conventional 
characters. That can be done only when the language is completely formed and an 
entire people is united by common laws; for this already presupposes a twofold 
convention. Such is the writing of Chinese; it truly represents sounds and speaks 
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And the third, and most developed way for Rousseau, is a system of written language arranged 
by an alphabet: “The third is to break down the speaking voice into a given number of 
elementary parts, either vocal or articulate, with which one can form all the words and syllables 
imaginable.”233 In this third stage, Rousseau sees the alphabet as a cypher to the sound of words 
“vocal or articulate”: each letter corresponds to a sound that is spoken in the word. As such, this 
final stage represents a marriage of writing and sound: writing’s ability to mirror articulate sound 
is revealed as the basis on which Rousseau sees development and civility. Rousseau sees the 
development of a language as parallel to its social structure:  
These three ways of writing correspond almost exactly to three different stages 
according to which one can consider men gathered into a nation. The depicting of 
objects is appropriate to a savage people; signs of words and of propositions, to a 
barbaric people, and the alphabet to civilized peoples.234 
 
Rousseau thus moves from an argument about language to one about nations and cultures: 
language becomes the conduit of hierarchical racialization. For Rousseau, it is written language’s 
connection to articulate sound that determines its civilized status. Because Rousseau views 
signed language as the most primitive possible language on this scale, he assumes no relationship 
at all between signed language and written language: the underlying assumption here is that 
written language is premised on a relationship to spoken language. Rousseau’s hierarchy of 
written languages, and their reliance on an oral equivalent, is important because Rousseau 
understands language as a sign of a culture’s civility. He writes, “Apply these thoughts to 
primitive men and you see the reason for their barbarity.”235 Because Rousseau assumes that 
signed language is necessarily a private non-conventional language, he takes it as the “reason for 
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their barbarity.” The signed language that he relegates to the domestic hut of the Native 
American is essentially a private one: only languages that are spoken between intra-familial 
communities are “conventional”-- and it is only these conventional languages that can take on a 
written form. 
 
Francis Williams and Poetic Language 
 
 This racialized portrayal of language ability— and its relationship to “civility” and 
reason— is not unique. By aligning spoken language with civility and signed language with 
savagery, European writers drew connections between deaf people and cultures they saw as 
“uncivilized” such as Native Americans and Africans. In a pamphlet published in 1783, Perier, 
an instructor at the Institute for the Deaf in France, wrote that “The Deaf-Mute is always a 
savage, always close to ferocity, and always on the point of becoming a monster.”236 Comparing 
the deaf to the “savages” of Africa, he continued: “the deaf will be restored to civilization, just as 
the men of color are about to be restored to their rights” following the recent French abolishment 
of slavery. Perier believed that only by being “taught language”-- and taught specifically from 
the hearing instructors at the Institute— could deaf children be “restored to civilization.”  
 At the same time, however, thinkers like Kant insisted that even after being taught “a 
language,” the deaf “can never achieve more than an analog of reason.”237 The idea that the deaf 
might learn speech or sign language but remain incapable of creative, spontaneous, and 
independent thought persisted. We see this same logic applied to non-deaf Africans who 
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achieved success in European writing styles and languages. In his essay “Of National 
Characters” (1758), David Hume uses the machine/parrot trope quite explicitly: 
I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all other species of men (for there 
are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never 
was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any 
individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures 
amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and 
barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, 
have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or 
some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, 
in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction 
betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE 
slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever discovered any symptoms 
of ingenuity; tho' low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and 
distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one 
negroe as a man of parts and learning; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender 
accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.238  
 
This passage begins with a polygenetic understanding of race, a view that posits that human 
races have different species origins, to buttress the judgment of white superiority. A series of 
assumptions cascade from this judgment: that “civility” has a universal, rather than a culturally 
and temporally specific, rule of conduct— and that only whites have achieved it; that no other 
races have developed manufactures, arts, or sciences; and that slavery is a state in which one 
could reasonably demonstrate “symptoms of ingenuity.” But Hume has clearly heard of an 
exception to this judgment: a man in Jamaica “of parts and learning.” Hume is referring to 
Francis Williams (1700-1770), a free Black Jamaican scholar who wrote poetry in Latin, 
travelled to Europe, became a citizen of Britain, and set up a free school for black children in 
Jamaica. Hume quickly reduces these accomplishments: he is “like a parrot, who speaks a few 
words plainly.” Like many of the authors who wrote on language, Hume makes a distinction 
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between understanding and possessing language versus mimicking language “like a parrot”: a 
difference between knowing language and being functionally and anatomically capable of 
language. This trope, used by philosophers of language, authors of deaf language instruction 
manuals, and those interested in supporting racialized social systems, functions to isolate white 
oralist language as the sole expression of reason. As William Guthrie writes in Geographical, 
Historical, and Commercial Grammar (1770), "the inhabitants [of the continent of Africa] were 
in the same rude situation near 2000 years ago in which they are at present, that is, they had 
nothing of humanity about them but the form"239 (emphasis added). Guthrie uses a similar denial 
of coevalness to Rousseau: he sees the history and culture of Africans as static. Discounting the 
existence and quality of African science and arts, he declares that they are only human “in form”: 
they may be able to functionally mimic— like a parrot— but Guthrie denies Africans reason, 
creativity, or ingenuity.  
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 Samuel Estwick, in his Considerations on the Negroe Cause Commonly So Called 
(1772), engages with Hume and Guthrie. The pamphlet is a response to Lord Mansfield after a 
court case over the question of if, upon arriving in England, an enslaved person immediately 
became free. Estwick’s writings are pro-slavery and argue for the compatibility of slavery with 
English law. One aspect of his argument rests on distinguishing white men from black men on 
the basis of moral reasoning. Estwick quotes the passage on Williams in full before adding: 
Thus Mr. Hume marks the difference betwixt the several species of men, by their 
natural capacity or incapacity of exerting in degree the rational powers, or 
faculties of the understanding; which is the distinction that Mr. Locke makes 
between man and brutes. I distinguish man from man by the moral sense or moral 
powers; and although a Negroe is found, in Jamaica or elsewhere, ever so sensible 
and acute; yet if he is incapable of moral sensations, or perceives them only as 
beasts do simple ideas, without the power of combination, in order to use (which I 
verily believe to be the case); it is a mark that distinguishes him from the man 
who feels and is capable of these moral sensations, who knows their application 
and the purposes of them, as sufficiently, as he himself is distinguish from the 
highest species of brutes.240  
 
240
 Samuel Estwick, Considerations on the Negroe Cause Commonly So Called, Addressed to the 
Right Honourable Lord Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, & By a West 
Indian. (London, 1773), 79. 
Figure 4: Artist unknown, Portrait of 




Despite Williams’ ability to “parrot” the “faculties of understanding,” Estwick posits that moral 
sense requires a finer degree of reasoning and that this is what distinguishes “man from man”— 
and this distinction is as great as that which separates humans from “the highest species of 
brutes.” Citing and building off Guthrie’s portrayal of the inhabitants of Africa, Estwick writes, 
"nor have I been able to find one author, by whom I could discover that there was any sort of 
plan or system of morality conceived by these tribes of Africa, or practiced among them. Their 
barbarity to their children debases their nature even below that of brutes."241 Here again we see 
the comparison between Africans and “brutes.” Estwick’s comparison of Africans to “brutes” is 
important, because the weight of his argument rests on the idea “that Negroes under the law 
should not be considered as human beings,”242 but only as property. Although Locke had 
proposed the “faculties of understanding”— or reason— as that which separates humans from 
animals, and that language is the sign of such “internal conceptions”— for Hume and Estwick, 
the connection between language and reason is broken once it is applied to a black man. 
Language alone proves insufficient as proof of Williams’, or any other African man’s, humanity; 
the sign is broken.  
 Edward Long’s The History of Jamaica (1774) includes a chapter that introduces 
Williams and his poetry. The work itself attempts to give a political, social, geographic, and 
economic account of the island and largely functions as a colonialist text and defense of slavery. 
Although Long claims that he wants to present Williams “impartially,” he writes that he “shall 
leave it to the reader's opinion, whether what they shall discover of his genius and intellect will 
be sufficient to overthrow the arguments, I have before alleged, to prove an inferiority of the 
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Negroes to the race of white men."243 Williams’ poetry is thus presented as a test of his 
humanity. Long presents both Hume’s and Estwick’s appraisals of Williams in his introduction 
before claiming that Williams “was pitched upon to be the subject of an experiment, which, it is 
said, the Duke of Montagu was curious to make, in order to discover, whether, by proper 
cultivation, and a regular course of tuition at school and the university, a Negroe might not be 
found as capable of literature as a white person.”244 Although as Vincent Carretta notes, 
Williams was unlikely “to have needed the patronage or financial support of the duke of 
Montagu, as Long asserts without corroborating evidence.”245 Long’s presentation of Williams’ 
intellect as the product of a white experiment in which he is the object of study functions to 
reduce Williams’ accomplishments— they are not his own, but Montagu’s work in “producing” 
him— but also interpolate Williams’ intellect into a specifically white frame of reference; 
intellect is proven through mastery of “literature as a white person.” Within Long’s larger 
defense of slavery, Williams’ success or failure— again, on white terms— to produce poetic 
language is taken of a sign of his rational capacity— a determining factor that pro-slavery writers 
used to defend the enslavement of humans. As Carretta writes, “For Long and his sympathizers, 
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 Later in his life, Williams returned to Jamaica and opened a school for black children— a 
significant contribution, as no other schools accepted black children. Long writes of one of 
Williams’ pupils: "but of this youth it may be said, to use the expression of Festus to Paul, that 
'much learning made him mad.' The abstruse problems of mathematical institution turned his 
brain; and he still remains, I believe, an unfortunate example, to shew that every African head is 
not adapted by nature to such profound contemplations."247 Alongside efforts to “prove” that 
Africans had inferior intellects to whites, pro-slavery writers often included warnings like these: 
that African minds could not “handle” scholarly training, that it would drive them “mad.” As 
Robert Boucher Nikkols, an abolitionist writer, explains: "The stupidity of negroes is . . . urged 
by the friends of slavery as a plea for using them as brutes; for they represent the negroes as little 
removed above the monkeys, or the oran-outang, with regard to intellects."248 Nikkols exposes 
how slavery was the driving force behind attempts to portray Africans as animalistic and of 
lesser intellect: to dehumanize and “use them as brutes.” 
In each of these works, Williams’s poetic skill is invoked in defenses of slavery. Each of 
these works also begins with the assumption of white superiority: this assumption of superiority 
expands across civility, ingenuity, arts, sciences, moral reasoning, and intellect, until it includes 
even the human: Williams is merely “like a parrot.” As Betty Joseph explains, narratives like 
Long’s “have historical fingerprints that reveal that Reason was often in the service of 
colonialism when it posited a universal human as a constitutive exclusion—an act of 
differentiation where the pretension of internal cohesion depends on the exclusion of non-
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Western others.”249 Although Williams performs reason in the way that white Europeans defined 
it, he is always already excluded from a theory of reason that is grounded in white supremacy 
and colonialism. In this way, Kerschbaum’s “presumed wholeness of a hearing identity,” which 
serves as a corollary to the belief that deaf people are more generally “deficient,” might also be 
understood as a presumed wholeness of a white identity.  
Kim F. Hall has examined the way in which Africans were compared to parrots in early 
modern painting. She writes: 
Not only are parrots associated with profit . . . but the parrot, along with the ape, 
figures prominently in discussions of racial difference as Englishmen try to tease 
out the difference between African and Englishman. However, the parrot figures 
in misogynist treatises as well, in which women are said to be incapable of 
autonomous speech, able only to mimic the language of mankind.250  
 
Although Hall’s focus is on the intersection of race and gender, it is clear that the parroting trope 
is applied to Black men as well. Early modern and eighteenth-century painters and writers used 
the parroting trope to deny the existence of legitimate African language more broadly. As Ian 
Smith argues in Barbarian Errors, "In the dawning era of English exploration, African contact 
literature not only revealed an appreciable cross-cultural linguistic difference, but also averred 
that its documentary subject was brutish and, hence, lacking in that most humanizing faculty, 
speech."251 Because language was defined as an autonomous, spontaneous, and creative exercise 
of reason— and therefore proof of humanity— defenders of slavery trivialized African language 
as a form of non-human mimicry.  
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 White able-bodied European constructions of reason were predicated on language, but 
also included mechanisms through which they could still deny reason to people based on 
language ability or race. This rejection of certain language users as having reason is, in Hobbes’ 
conception, also a rejection of those peoples to the commonwealth: if language is what allows for 
the existence of the commonwealth, the rejection of certain language users is also a refusal to 
allow those individuals full participation as political subjects. In this way, deaf people and 
Africans get cast as Descartes’ “the lowest type of man”-- likened to animals and barely 
recuperated as fully human. As noted in Bulwer’s Philocophus, deaf people were frequently 
denied legal rights, and slave traders and pro-slavery writers’ rejection of African intelligence 
and reason was used as a justification for chattel slavery. This is not to suggest that those two 
conditions are equal— they clearly are not— but rather to demonstrate the flexibility of 
constructions of reason to exclude others based on bodily difference. The trope of “parroting,” 
for instance, happens frequently throughout works both on deafness and in the writings on 
Williams’ poetry. Descartes and Holder both present the parrot as a kind of test-case for defining 
language: it is possible to recreate the sound of words without understanding what they mean. 
However, neither author uses the parrot simply to demarcate a line between human and animal 
language or vocalizations; instead the parrot is used as a link. The parrot’s proximity to language 
provides a mechanism of dehumanization: language is the sign of reason, but the exclusion of the 
parrot functions as a conceptual caesura to rationalize the exclusion of other humans and 
languages as well. Adjacent to language, the parrot provides a denominator to identify the 
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“lowest type of man,” a way of reducing signs used by deaf persons as expressions of alarm used 
by “brute animals,” or as a way of illegitimating non-white eloquence as mere “parroting.” 
Language ability is thus revealed as a ruse. Rather than trouble the use of language as a 
defining human characteristic, mechanical or animal language reinforces White able-bodied 
constructions of reason by offering exceptions to the rule: parrots do not have language, they 
merely mimic. By applying the logic of mimicry to humans, eighteenth-century writers construct 
reason not only through what Kerschbaum calls a “presumed wholeness of a hearing identity,” 




Chapter 4 : Frankenstein, Slaughterhouses, and Blood 
 
That the Creature in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is constructed from various materials 
and bodies is well known and commented on; what is less frequently commented on is that some 
of the materials used in the construction are from animal bodies. Indeed, “slaughter houses” are 
among the locations cited that Victor visits to collect materials; however, no other mention is 
made of animal parts used in the construction of the Creature, or in its general constitution, 
which is probably why so many critics have neglected it. In this chapter, I will consider 
slaughterhouses in their eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century context in which they were 
closely associated with death, disease, and in particular, blood. By analyzing how closely 
associated slaughterhouses were to the enormous amounts of blood they produced, as well as the 
poor waste management that allowed the blood to trickle and pool into the streets and alleys, I 
will ultimately argue that the material Victor collects from the slaughterhouses is specifically 
blood. I am obviously taking something somewhat silly (how one would have literally 
constructed a human-like body) very seriously, but in doing so I hope to provide new ways of 
thinking about the Creature’s human/animal hybridity, and specifically what it means that the 
Creature’s blood was non-human.  
This chapter diverges from previous chapters in some ways insofar as it performs an 
investigation into the way health was constructed through bio-cultural understandings of blood. 
In this chapter, I examine the Creature’s body as a medical production— one that relies on the 
purported therapeutic benefits of blood transfusion as bestowing both life and health. As a result, 
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this chapter utilizes both the medical model of disability— which understands disability as an 
individual problem that is natural, self evident, and in need of medical intervention. As Alison 
Kafer writes, "The medical model of disability frames atypical bodies and minds as deviant, 
pathological, and defective, best understood and addressed in medical terms."252 Unlike most 
medical interventions, the Creature’s very existence is the intervention. At the same time, 
however, I continue to engage in Kafer’s political/relational model of disability by focusing on 
the ways in which ideologies around animality, slaughterhouses, and waste contribute to the way 
in which the Creature is pathologized. 
 Many critics have examined the assemblage of the Creature in terms of the heterogeneity 
of its parts. Chris Baldick considers the very fact of the Creature’s monstrosity as deriving from 
this heterogeneity by examining its construction in the context of Romantic aesthetics in which 
beauty is considered in terms of the relation of parts to wholes. Baldick explains that “any living 
‘whole’—whether a plant, a poem, or a nation—was always more than a mere aggregation of its 
constituent parts.”253 Further, harmony was required to give “life” and form to the whole from 
otherwise “lifeless parts”: “Frankenstein takes its place within this pattern of Romantic contrasts 
between lifeless parts and living wholes, partly as a dramatization of that principle of inorganic 
aggregation.”254 The integrating principle that turns “lifeless parts” into “living wholes” 
determines the moral character of the organism. Baldick explains: 
the beauty of the whole can arise only from a pure vital principle within, to which 
all subordinate parts and limbs will then conform. The parts, in a living body, can 
only be as beautiful as the animating principle which organizes them, and if this 
‘spark of life’ proceeds, as it does in Victor’s creation, from tormented isolation 
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and guilty secrecy, the resulting assembly will only animate and body forth that 
condition and display its moral ugliness.255 
 
The “animating principle” which would function to harmonize, and perhaps even give beauty to, 
the “living whole” of the Creature is corrupted by the “tormented isolation” and “guilty secrecy” 
of Victor’s labor. The conditions of labor and creativity are reflected in the final product of the 
Creature’s “moral ugliness.” 
Like Baldick, Peter Heymans, in Animality in British Romanticism: The Aesthetics of 
Species, is also interested in the Creature’s ugliness, but in the context of how taxonomic 
systems, especially those which define the human, are shaped by aesthetic concerns. In 
particular, Heymans is interested in the way that human/animal hybridity was read as a 
threatening ugliness that “undermines the subject’s centralized, unitary identity and creates a 
hybrid creature, fragmented between its humanity and animality.”256 In Romantic aesthetics, the 
sublime and the beautiful function to contain that threat posed by ugliness and hybridity 
“whereby the sublime operates as a repressive mechanism domesticating the ugly and 
transfiguring it into an easy-to-handle object of beauty.”257 Against the repressive Romantic 
aesthetics of Burke and Kant, Heymans argues that “More liberal Romantics such as William 
Blake and Mary Shelley . . . interpret hybridity and its resistance to biological representation as a 
moral opposition to the oppressive and homogenizing subjectivities promoted by the family and 
the state.”258 On Frankenstein, he writes: 
Bearing in mind that Frankenstein fabricates his creature with both human and 
non-human body parts, it seems plausible to say that human identity for him is not 
a question of a single metaphysical or anatomical essence, but arises in the 
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tangled interplay between biological, socio-cultural and moral factors. What 
defines us as human, in his view, is our biological embeddedness in the social 
ecology of the family and our innate capacity for moral and rational action. . . . 
What Shelley’s novel captures . . . is the tremendous extent to which these social, 
moral and biological taxonomies are shaped by aesthetic principles.259 
 
What is interesting to me about Heymans’s argument is this casual and unexamined claim that 
the creature is made of “both human and non-human body parts.” Heymans himself is not 
interested in the “non-human body parts,” that he mentions; rather, Heymans argues that the 
creature’s monstrosity is an effect of the fact that he is ugly. Heymans continues:  
throughout the novel Frankenstein mobilises an aesthetic vocabulary to appraise 
social relations (domesticity is beautiful), evaluate moral integrity (criminals are 
ugly), and define biological status (hybridity is pretty disgusting). As a physical 
reflection of social, moral and biological law, beauty thus also serves a cohesive 
function.260 
 
To be clear, Heymans is not interested in how the creature’s ugliness is constructed, but rather 
the way in which evaluations of the creature’s ugliness rhetorically position him outside the 
human species. Whereas Heymans takes it as his starting point that the creature is part animal, in 
my essay I will be focusing on how the creature is part animal.  
Anne K. Mellor, in Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters and elsewhere, 
analyzes Victor’s creation in terms of patriarchal, capitalist, and colonial desires for power over 
women and nature. She writes: 
Frankenstein's scientific project is clearly an attempt to gain power. Inspired by 
Waldman's description of scientists who "acquired new and almost unlimited 
powers," Frankenstein has sought both the power of a father over his children, 
and, more omnipotently, of God over his creation. More subtly yet more 
pervasively, Frankenstein has sought power over the female. He has "pursued 
nature to her hiding places," in an attempt not only to penetrate nature and show 
how her hidden womb works but actually to steal or appropriate that womb. To 
usurp the power of reproduction is to usurp the power of production as such. 
Marx identified childbirth as the primary example of pure, or unalienated, labor. 
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Victor Frankenstein's enterprise can be viewed from a Marxist perspective as an 
attempt to exploit nature or labor in the service of a ruling class. Frankenstein 
wishes to harness the modes of reproduction in order to become the 
acknowledged, revered, and gratefully obeyed father of a new species. His project 
is thus identical with that of bourgeois capitalism: to exploit nature's resources for 
both commercial profit and political control.261  
 
Mellor sees Victor’s pursuit of knowledge through the production of the Creature in the context 
of class struggle that exploited both the proletariat working class and women. Mellor then 
analyzes Victor’s labor, and the materials of his labor, as analogous to the dehumanizing process 
of factory labor: 
Among these resources are animal and human bodies. Collecting bones and flesh 
from charnel-houses, dissecting rooms, and slaughter-houses, Frankenstein sees 
these human and animal organs as nothing more than the tools of his trade, no 
different from his other scientific instruments. In this sense he is identical with the 
factory owner who gathers men, his disembodied "hands" as Dickens's Bounderby 
would say, to manipulate his machines. We can therefore see Frankenstein's 
creature, as Franco Moretti has suggested, as the proletariat, "a collective and 
artificial creature," dehumanized by the mechanized modes of technological 
production controlled by the industrial scientist and, in modern times, by the 
computer.262  
 
In Mellor’s reading, the “animal and human bodies” become the “disembodied hands” of factory 
workers who are dehumanized and alienated from their labor. Like Heymans, Mellor 
acknowledges that the Creature is, in part, made of animal parts, but only insofar as it allows her 
to explain Victor’s indiscriminate attitude toward the materials of his production. Although 
acknowledging that the Creature is constructed of both human and non-human parts has allowed 
both Heymans and Mellor to make important contributions to the body of work on Frankenstein, 
neither have taken up the non-human aspect of the Creature as such.  
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We know that the creature must be a human/animal hybrid because of the locations where 
Victor collects materials for its body: the graves of churchyards, “bones from charnel houses,” 
slaughterhouses, and the “dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of my 
materials.”263 But what, precisely, was Victor gathering from slaughterhouses? And what did 
“slaughterhouses” evoke for nineteenth-century readers? Tim Marshall has done important work 
in illustrating the historical context of the dissecting room, anatomy laws, and grave robbing of 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in his analysis of Frankenstein to illustrate the 
stigma attached to surgeons and dissections. By placing Frankenstein in the context of the 
anatomy laws of the period, Marshall’s work allows us to understand that the bodies that Victor 
used in the construction of the creature were necessarily those of murderers and paupers, and 
further, that the bodies of those murderers and paupers necessarily contribute to the monstrosity 
of the creature. I would like to do something analogous to Marshall’s work by placing 
Frankenstein in the context of early nineteenth century slaughterhouses which also provided the 





 Shelley was writing during the beginning of the transition from private slaughter houses 
to public abattoirs, a movement that was accompanied by worries of health and hygiene. In his 
history of British slaughterhouses, Ian MacLachlan writes, "Abolition of London's private 
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slaughter-houses was motivated by the congestion created by livestock in city streets, the 
nuisance of slaughter-house refuse in residential neighbourhoods and public health concerns 
about diseased meat in the food supply."264 These private slaughter houses were “typically small 
facilities that were owned and operated by independent butchers and located behind or beneath a 
retail meat shop,” often in residential areas.265 As Chris Otter explains:  
When contemporaries used this word ‘slaughterhouse’ . . . they did not refer to a 
structure built with the explicit purpose of killing animals and dressing carcases. 
They simply referred to any building in which slaughter happened to take place. 
So there was usually nothing technically or architecturally distinct about the 
slaughterhouse, as this 1876 report from South Shields makes clear: ‘Many of the 
slaughter-houses are absurdly small, the ventilation is generally described as 
deficient, bad, very bad, or non, while in a considerable number there is no water-
supply (tap) within the slaughterhouse.’ Elsewhere, we find references to ‘sheds’ 
or ‘old washhouses’ being used for slaughter.266  
 
Despite frequent calls for reform, the private slaughterhouse persisted throughout the nineteenth 
century, as Otter here makes clear. 
Because many slaughterhouses were simply located in the homes of butchers, many of 
the houses lacked proper waste-management technologies, such as ventilation and running water.  
Neighbors complaining about the buildup of waste were therefore quite common: 
The filth, garbage, and impurities of every description generally to be found in 
slaughter-houses, in almost every stage of decomposition, contribute their 
quantum of deadly exhalations to the atmosphere of the slaughter-house, and then, 
after having impregnated the neighbourhood with offensive and unwholesome 
effluvia, are consigned to the sewers, by which they are ultimately conveyed to 
the Thames, to increase the noxious exhalations from its banks, or, detained in 
their progress through those notoriously defective channels, to breathe forth at 
every loophole putrescence and disease!267 
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For a scientist such as Victor who sought to understand “the structure of the human frame, and, 
indeed, any animal endued with life,"268 the opportunity to examine animal waste “in almost 
every stage of decomposition” would have been a boon. As Victor explains to Walton: "To 
examine the causes of life, we must first have recourse to death. I became acquainted with the 
science of anatomy; but this was not sufficient; I must also observe the natural decay and 
corruption of the human body . . . I was led to examine the cause and progress of this decay, and 
forced to spend days and nights in vaults and charnel-houses.”269 Indeed, the slaughterhouse was 
in fact a site of knowledge for scientists, as Otter explains: “The slaughterhouse had always 
functioned as a source of knowledge of animal pathology and, by implication, physiology. The 
abattoir clearly intensified this process, providing the curios zoonosologist (one who studies the 
diseases of animals) with a seemingly limitless supply of anatomical eccentricities.”270 In 
addition to the “vaults and charnel-houses” that Victor visits, the “filth” and “garbage” of the 
slaughterhouses would have also provided materials not only for the construction of the body, 
but also for the research required prior to its construction.  
In addition to the nuisance of bad smells emanating from the slaughterhouses, the “deadly 
exhalations” were considered a threat to public health by proponents of the miasma theory of 
disease—the idea that pollution, disease, and poisonous or noxious vapors circulated in the air of 
certain environments. As MacLachlan notes, the miasma theory of disease was used to justify 
calls to move private slaughter houses outside the city where they would pose a lesser public 
health threat: "In the view of adherents of the miasma theory of disease, the decomposition of 
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slaughter-house waste posed a public health hazard. Abolition of private slaughter in urban areas 
and the establishment of suburban public abattoirs was justified to reduce exposure to the 
miasma."271 Otter’s history of nineteenth century slaughterhouses focuses on the ways in which 
the lack of proper waste-management became a public health issue in discourses of civility and 
civilization. Many of the reforms attempted not necessarily to change the process of slaughter at 
all, but rather to remove it from public sight: “the history of meat in the modern West can be 
summarized thus: civilization develops by consuming more meat but devoting more effort 
effacing the gory evidence of its production.”272 Both the slaughter as well as the blood it 
produced were considered threats to civility: 
Chroniclers of urban disorder were obliged to mark their civility with predictable 
expressions of horror, as they depicted rivulets of blood and the cacophony of 
death cries reverberating through dank alleyways. Their rather monotonous 
discourse tells us one thing: the public presence of blood was becoming a problem 
worth commenting on at length.273 
 
And because slaughterhouses were located in residential neighborhoods, they posed a particular 
threat to the developing “sensibilities” of the children who lived nearby, as one writer records: 
“In some localities it became almost a pastime for young children of both sexes to frequent the 
slaughter-houses, and witness the death-struggles of the butchers’ victims. This familiarity with 
scenes of blood was justly considered as having an immoral influence.”274 Seen as a public 
nuisance, slaughterhouses were associated with other unpleasant aspects of society as they 
“infected and barbarized those around them, mysteriously stimulating drinking, fighting, and 
prostitution,”275 threatening the sensibilities of their residential neighbors.   
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 Furthermore, slaughterhouses were associated not just with the production of meat, but 
intrinsically connected with death. The putrid smells from blood, manure, and other animal waste 
were thought of as capable of transmitting disease and death, leading William Farr to cite both 
“slaughterhouses and rank churchyards” together as contagious threats of “miasma.” This 
association was widespread, as Otter notes: 
In his impassioned tirade The Rookeries of London, Thomas Beames described 
the smell from a knacker’s yard: “The stench from such a Necropolis, or colony 
of the dead, is dreadful,—must feed disease, and, when fever breaks out, aid its 
ravages!” More sober medical writers concurred. “It is not the slaughtering only 
which is objectionable,” declared the Lancet in 1872, “but the offal-selling, blood-
collecting, and catgut-spinning, which are productive of a state of atmosphere that 
is, at all events, offensive, if it cannot be demonstrated to be positively 
unwholesome.”276277 
 
In his poem “A Description of a City Shower,” Jonathan Swift also illustrates this mixture of 
blood, disease, and death associated with the slaughterhouse: 
Filth of all hues and odors seem to tell  
What street they sailed from, by their sight and smell.  
They, as each torrent drives with rapid force,  
From Smithfield or St. Pulchre’s shape their course,  
And in huge confluence joined at Snow Hill ridge,  
Fall from the conduit prone to Holborn Bridge.  
Sweepings from butchers’ stalls, dung, guts, and blood,  
Drowned puppies, stinking sprats, all drenched in mud,  
Dead cats, and turnip tops, come tumbling down the flood.278  
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The rain washes out the city, but in the process displays “dung, guts, and blood” as they flow 
from the butchers’ stalls, leaving a trail behind them. When Shelley includes slaughterhouses 
among dissecting rooms, churchyards, and charnel houses, then, it is in part because 
slaughterhouses were already so closely associated with death, human or otherwise, that its 
presence in the list of locations does not necessarily call attention to itself. 
Not only were slaughterhouses closely associated with death, but also with the enormous 
amounts of blood they produced. For instance, Louis-Sebastien Mercier writes of the 
slaughterhouses in Paris that “The rue-du-Pied-de-Boeuf has a number of dirty little alleys that 
are soaked in the blood of slaughtered animals. Some of this collects in puddles, the rest trickles 
in small streams to the Seine.”279 In fact, when Paris attempted to geographically consolidate its 
slaughterhouses in La Villette, the quarter was nicknamed “La Cité du Sang,” or the city of 
blood. The closeness of this association is important, because it is likely that Shelley included 
slaughterhouses in the list of locations Victor visits to collect materials for the body specifically 
to obtain blood.  
The materials used to construct organs and muscles could have been easily obtained from 
dissecting rooms, and Victor tells Walton that he “collected bones from charnel houses.”280 
Because Victor also claims that he “selected his features as beautiful,”281 it seems likely that the 
materials used to construct or assemble the Creature’s outer appearance would have likewise 
come from other humans, despite the ultimate failure of those materials to confer beauty on the 
Creature in its final form. Blood, however, would have been difficult to obtain from either of 
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these places, as blood coagulates soon after death and is then difficult to extract any substantial 
amounts from the body. As John Hunter notes, “it becomes a matter almost of surprise, how little 
[blood] is commonly found in the dead body.”282 Although blood would have been difficult to 
obtain from the dissecting room or the charnel house, then, it would have been abundantly 
available from slaughterhouses. Throughout the nineteenth century, “the poleaxe remained the 
predominant method of stunning cattle before bleeding,”283 during which the blood was either 
collected to be used for British blood pudding recipes, or else drained and collected along the 
streets and alleyways.   
What is important about the slaughterhouses in Frankenstein, then, is that they are 
associated with death, disease, and immorality. But even more importantly, because 
slaughterhouses were so closely associated with the enormous amounts of blood they produced 
(and failed to properly manage as waste), it is likely that Shelley imagined them as supplying the 
blood used in the construction of the Creature’s body. This seems important; as a hybrid creature 
composed of both human and animal parts, what is “animal” about Victor’s Creature cannot be 
discretely isolated as an organ, a limb, or even identifiably animal-like features such as bear teeth 
or wolf ears; rather, the animal component of the Creature is his blood which circulates 
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Whereas the first part of this chapter deals with the historicization of slaughterhouses in 
order to argue that it is specifically the Creature’s blood that is non-human and animal, the 
second part will focus on bio-cultural meanings of blood, the role of blood in debates on 
vitalism, the history of medical experiments on blood up to 1818, and will probe into the 
question of what it means that his blood was non-human. Additionally, this section will cover the 
history of blood transfusions between the mid-seventeenth-century and the early nineteenth-
century. These blood transfusion experiments, and the commentary surrounding them, reveals 
the way in which blood functioned in the scientific and public imagination as a bodily fluid 
containing physical, behavioral, and moral information that it could then “transfuse” to others.  
William Harvey published his discovery of the circulation of blood in 1628: De Motu 
Cordis, or On the Motion of the Heart and Blood. His work is obliquely alluded to in 
Frankenstein when Waldman says of modern scientists (contra the ancients): “But these 
philosophers . . . have indeed performed miracles. . . . they have discovered how the blood 
circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe.”284 When describing observations of experiments 
he performed on living animals so as to discern the precise moment of death, Harvey notes that 
blood continued to circulate for a time even after the death of the “heart.” He writes: 
Nay, has not the blood itself or spirit an obscure palpitation inherent in it, which it 
has even appeared to me to retain after death? and it seems very questionable 
whether or not we are to say that life begins with the palpitation or beating of the 
heart. The seminal fluid of all animals—the prolific spirit, as Aristotle observed, 
leaves their body with a bound and like a living thing; and nature in death, as 
Aristotle further remarks, retracing her steps, reverts to where she had set out, and 
returns at the end of her course to the goal whence she had started. As animal 
generation proceeds from that which is not animal, entity from nonentity, so, by a 
retrograde course, entity, by corruption, is resolved into nonentity; whence that in 
animals, which was last created, fails first; and that which was first, fails last.285 
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Harvey muses here that a “prolific spirit” is the source of life and animation of the body, life 
which may exist before and after the first and final beats of the heart. This prolific spirit moves 
through the body via the blood and produces “entity from nonentity.” At death, this prolific spirit 
recedes from the body, retracing its original steps, until even the heart has stopped. Despite the 
apparent death of the heart, the blood itself still retains some movement, and in fact the heart can 
sometimes be resuscitated. For instance, Harvey writes of resuscitating a pigeon’s heart by 
applying pressure: 
Experimenting with a pigeon upon one occasion, after the heart had wholly 
ceased to pulsate, and the auricles too had become motionless, I kept my finger 
wetted with saliva and warm for a short time upon the heart, and observed, that 
under the influence of this fomentation it recovered new strength and life, so that 
both ventricles and auricles pulsated, contracting and relaxing alternately, recalled 
as it were from death to life.286 
 
When Harvey says, “has not the blood itself or spirit an obscure palpitation inherent in it, which 
it has even appeared to me to retain after death?” then, he means that if the sign of life is made 
visible by the motion of the heart, life should then die entirely with the death or cessation of 
movement of the heart. But in the case of the pigeon, he observes that it is possible to revive the 
pigeon’s heart even after it has ceased to beat; therefore, under Harvey’s framework, “life” is 
located not in the heart, but in the blood itself.  
 Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood provided an understanding of blood 
that led to the blood transfusion experiments of the 1660s in England and France. Prior to 
Harvey, blood was understood as travelling a linear, one-way route through the body. However, 
proving that the blood circulates throughout the body allowed physicians to imagine the ways in 
which blood is in communication with and nourishes the body. Without this understanding of 
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blood circulation, blood transfusion cannot happen, as it would not have made sense under a 
Galenic model. The necessity of understanding blood through a Harveyan model as the basis of 
blood transfusion experiments is evident in the differing attitudes toward blood transfusion 
between England and France. Whereas British physicians were eager to attempt blood 
transfusion experiments, with the exception of Jean Denis, the French were extremely reluctant 
because they did not adapt to the Harveyan model until much later than England.  
 In the 1660s, members of the Royal Society began conducting blood transfusion 
experiments and publishing their results in Philosophical Transactions. Scholarship has largely 
ignored seventeenth and eighteenth-century experiments and writings on blood transfusions, and 
by charting its history in this section, I hope to fill that gap. In "Tryals Proposed for the 
Improvement of Transfusing Blood of One Live Animal into Another,” Robert Boyle defines a 
series of questions to define the experiments: 
1. Whether by this way of transfusing blood, the disposition of individual animals 
of the same kind, may not be much altered? (As whether a fierce dog, by being 
often quite new stocked with the blood of a cowardly dog, may not become more 
tame, and vice versa?) 
2. Whether immediately upon the unbinding of a dog, resplinisht with 
adventitious blood, he will know and fawn upon his master, and do the like 
customary things as before? And whether he will do such things better or worse at 
some time after the operation? 
3. Whether those dogs, that have peculiarities, will have them either abolisht, or at 
least much impaired by transfusion of blood? (As whether the blood of a mastiff, 
being frequently transfused into a blood-hound, or a spaniel, will not prejudice 
them in point of scent?) 
4. Whether acquired habits will be destroy'd or impair'd by this experiment? (As 
whether a dog, taught to fetch and carry, or to dive after ducks, will after frequent 
and full recruits of the blood of dogs unfit for those exercises, be as good as them, 
as before?) 
[................] 
8. Whether a dog, that is sick of some disease chiefly imputable to the mass of 
blood, may be cured by exchanging it for that of a sound dog? And whether a 
sound dog may receive such diseases from the blood of a sick one, as are not 
otherwise of an infectious nature? 
124 
 
9. What will be the operation of frequently stocking an old and feeble dog with 
the blood of young ones, as to liveliness, dulness, drowsiness, squeamishness, 
etc., and vice versa? 
10. Whether a small young dog, by being often fresh stockt with the blood of a 
young dog of a larger kind, will grow bigger, than the ordinary size of his own 
kind? 
[..............] 
13. Whether the operation may be successfully practis'd, in case the injected 
blood be that of an animal of another species, as of a calf into a dog, etc. and of a 
cold animal, as of a fish, or frog, or tortoise, into the vessels of a hot animal, and 
vice versa? 
14. Whether the color of the hair or feathers of the recipient animal, by the 
frequent repeating of this operation, will be changed into that of the emittent? 
15. Whether by frequently transfusing into the same dog, the blood of some 
animal of another species, something further, and more tending to some degrees 
of a change of species, may be effected, at least in animals of near kin? 
16. Whether the transfusion may be practis'd upon pregnant bitches, at least 
certain times of their gravidation? And what effect will it have upon the 
whelps?287  
 
These questions not only provide a framework for the perimeters of blood transfusion 
experiments, but also reveal some of Boyle’s beliefs about blood. Many of these questions refer 
to the ability of blood to contain and transfer physical and behavioral characteristics from donor 
to recipient—both natural and acquired. Blood here is imagined as carrying a variety of physical 
characteristics (species, size, color of hair or feathers), but also habits, skills, dispositions, and 
temper, as well as health or disease. Evident throughout this framework of hypothesis is the 
belief that blood transfusion has the ability to transform: it is the nature of that transformation 
that these questions seek to answer. As writing on transfusions and transfusion experiments 
began to take place, blood-as-medicine came to signify youthfulness, liveliness, and health. One 
author, who describes methods for blood transfusions, writes: "The most probable use of this 
Experiment may be conjectured to be, that one Animal may live with the bloud of another; and 
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consequently, that those animals, that want bloud, or have corrupt bloud, may be supplyed from 
others with a sufficient quantity"288. For this author, not only is it possible for blood to be 
“corrupt,” but it is possible for healthy blood to cure corrupt blood.  
Another author, who describes methods for blood transfusions, writes: "The most 
probable use of this Experiment may be conjectured to be, that one Animal may live with the 
bloud of another; and consequently, that those animals, that want bloud, or have corrupt bloud, 
may be supplyed from others with a sufficient quantity"289. For this author, not only is it possible 
for blood to be “corrupt,” but it is possible for healthy blood to cure corrupt blood. Richard 
Lower, in his Treatise on the Heart, elaborates “Every one . . .  is not equally qualified to receive 
the blood of others, and no treatment is so useful that its rash and unsuitable administration does 
not easily bring it into disrepute,” and is not appropriate for “Patients, whose blood is definitely 
putrid and has been long corrupt, or is very deeply tainted by a poisonous ferment from without, 
those, too, whose viscera are polluted and spoilt, as sometimes happens in cases of scurvy, 
venereal disease, leprosy, poisoning, or long-continued illness, cannot hope for any benefit or 
help from transfusion.”290 This is because “The impure blood, in its repeated passage through the 
viscera, imparts to them its defect and its pollutions, corrupts their ferments, and finally taints 
them with its own character and properties, so that fresh blood, substituted from without from 
however healthy an animal, by circulating constantly through the same organs, will pick up the 
disease and quickly degenerate into the same condition, just as wine soon picks up a smell and 
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defect from a mouldy vessel.”291 Likewise, Harvey writes that “Whence it appears that the 
contagion impressed upon or deposited in a particular part, is by-and-by carried by the returning 
current of blood to the heart, and by that organ is sent to contaminate the whole body.”292 
Because blood circulates throughout the body, through its “viscera,” Lower and Harvey theorize 
that blood becomes corrupt with contact with any other part of the body that is subject to 
“corruption” or illness.  
 Many of the essays on blood transfusion experiments on animals report that the recipient 
animal is revived by the transfusion. M. Denis writes that a weak dog, after "having been 
supplied the next morning with the blood of a calf, recover'd instantly his strength, and shew'd a 
surprizing vigor."293 Another author writes, "I was present, when M. Gayant shew'd the 
transfusion of the bloud, putting that of a young dog into the veins of an old, who, two hours 
after, did leap and frisk; whereas he was almost blind with age, and could hardly stirr before."294 
Even more surprising is an account first published in the Italian journal Giornale de Letterati, 
which describes an experiment in which he transfuses the blood of a lamb into the veins of an old 
and deaf spaniel: 
13 years old, who had been altogether deaf for above 3 years, so as what noise 
soever was made, he gave not any sign of hearing it. He walked very little, and 
was so feeble, that being unable to lift up his foot, all he did was to trail his body 
forward. . . . Two dayes after [the transfusion] he went abroad, and ran up and 
down the streets with other dogs, without trailing his feet, as he did before. . . . 
But that, which is more surprising is, that from that time he gave signes, that he 
began to hear, returning sometimes at the voice of his masters. The 13th of June 
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he was almost quite cured of his deafness, and he appeared without comparison 
more jocund than he was before the operation. At length, the 20th of the same 
month he had wholly recovered his hearing.295  
 
In each of these experiments, the animal is described as expressing renewed strength and vigor, 
as if the blood transfusion not only revived the recipient, but also seemed to transfuse the youth 
itself of the donor as the experimenters seem to conflate liveliness with youthfulness. Anita 
Guerrini suggests that “[i]n this age of therapeutic bloodletting the concept of injection led soon 
to the notion of renewing and invigorating old or diseased blood with an infusion of new, healthy 
blood.”296 If relieving the body of contaminated or unhealthy blood could cure a patient, its 
corollary of infusing healthy blood could impart therapeutic benefits as well.  
 The experiments and writings around blood transfusion in England were mixed with a 
sense of jovial rivalry toward similar experiments going on in France. English and French 
scientists shared their experimental reports and tried to learn from each other, but also critiqued 
and argued over transfusion methods. One author describes Gasper de Gurye de Montpoly’s 
theories of blood: 
He supposes, that the blood of every animal is endowed with its peculiar temper, 
and contains in the aggregate of its parts, different natures, principles, figures, and 
event a different center. Whence he concludes, that two substances thus differing, 
and containing plenty of spirits, are not reducible to one and the same center, nor 
to one and the same body without fermentation; and that this operation may prove 
of danger to him, that shall have admitted into his veins a strange blood (wont to 
be free in its native vessels) without passing through those degrees, that must give 
it impressions suitable to the temper and functions of the vitals of the recipient.297 
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The author then uses this theory of blood to explain the failure of the French experiment 
involving several dogs in which one died:  
Whence it seems evident to this writer, that the too large intromission of new 
blood was predominant over the native, and as 'twere, overwhelm'd it. Whence he 
again inculcates the dangerousness of infusing too much blood at once, in regard 
that such blood being now separated from the principle of life it had in the 
emittent, and as yet destitute of the stamp necessary to live the life of the 
recipient, it could not be moved and assimilated by the live blood, which 
remained in the recipient.298  
 
He concludes then that large transfusions are dangerous, and that they should instead aim to give 
smaller transfusions more frequently to allow the transfused blood to assimilate to the native 
blood.  
 Several blood transfusion experiments were also performed on human subjects. In 1667, 
Jean Denis performed the first animal-to-human blood transfusion in Paris. As Guerrini explains, 
“Denis believed that animal blood would have superior therapeutic value to the blood of a 
healthy human. He believed that the temperate-living animals produced purer, more wholesome 
blood than humans; and by analogy with nutrition, animal blood would be more easily 
assimilated than human.”299 More specifically, Denis believed that temperate climate domestic 
and docile animals had more wholesome blood than humans, and aimed to produce this docility 
in his human subjects—all of whom suffered some type of “madness.” Denis completed several 
animal-to-human blood transfusion experiments with apparent success until one of his patients 
died in January of 1668, leading France to impose a ban on blood transfusion experiments on 
humans.  
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 These early blood transfusion experiments are important because of their long-lived 
popularity, which is evident through the retelling and re-imagining of blood transfusion 
experiments throughout the eighteenth century. Thomas Shadwell’s The Virtuoso, a Restoration 
comedy and scientific satire, first produced in 1676, includes a scene in which Sir Nicholas and 
Sir Formal describe a blood transfusion experiment that Sir Nicholas had once performed on a 
“mangy spaniel” and a “sound bull-dog”: 
Sir Formal: "Indeed that which enfus'd upon the operation was miraculous; for the 
mangy spaniel became sound, and the sound bull-dog, mangy. 
Sir Nicholas: "Not only so, gentlemen, but the spaniel became a bull-dog, and the 
bull dog a spaniel. 
Sir Formal: "Which considering the civil and ingenuous temper and education of 
the spaniel, with the rough and untaught savageness and ill-breeding of the bull-
dog, may not be undeservedly challenge the name of a wonder.300  
 
In Sir Nicholas’s experiment, both dogs are emittent and recipient and receive the blood of the 
other. In this rendition, not only do the dogs take on the traits of the other, but seem to literally 
become the other, as “the spaniel became a bull-dog, and the bulldog a spaniel.”  
In "An Epistolary Poem to Richard Pockrich, Esp," written in 1743 but not published 
until 1769, Thomas Newburgh describes Pockrich’s thoughts and observations on blood 
transfusions in a footnote to the poem (although there is no evidence that neither Newburgh nor 
Pockrich, an Irish musician, ever performed or witnessed any blood transfusion experiments): 
Mr. Pockrich has often declared his Opinion that human Life may not only be 
prolonged, but perpetuated . . . Among other Experiments that have been try'd for 
this Purpose, he mentions the following: Take an inflex Tube in the Nature of a 
Scyphon, fix it at the extreme Ends in the Veins of two different Persons to be 
open'd to receive them, the one youthful, adult, and sanguine, the other aged, 
decripid, and wither'd. . . . The redundant fermenting Blood of the one, will 
immediately flow like Wine decanted into the empty shrivell'd Veins of the other. 
The effects will be found no less uncommon than surprising. The wither'd Skin 
Braces, the Flesh plumps up and softens, the Eyes sparkle, the Visage blooms, 
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and the Blood is invigorated with new Supplies and vital Warmth. When the 
Blood or Spirits begin to fail, or any Symptoms of Mortality do approach, the 
Experiment is only to be repeated, and so on, with equal success ad infinitum. 'Tis 
a common practice in Housewifry, to renew strong stale Beer for twenty, thirty, or 
any other Number of Years. Why not the Fluids of the human Body be renew'd in 
like Manner? 'Tis certain the Experiment has been try'd on other Animals with 
Success and if such creatures have happen'd afterwards to die, it has been wholly 
owing to the Neglect of the propos'd Discipline.301 
 
Pockrich’s ideas, summarized here by Newburgh, describe blood transfusion as providing the 
means to effectively live forever—to “prolong” and “perpetuate” life through transfusions any 
time the “Blood or Spirits begin to fail, or any Symptoms of Mortality” repeated “ad infinitum.” 
In addition to wanting to discover the principle of life, Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein also 
imagines discovering a method to effectively cure humans of death and disease: “If I could 
banish disease from the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but a violent 
death!”302 The inclusion of Pockrich’s experimental “method” as well as the “observations” of 
the experiment function to add authenticity to this most likely entirely fictional account. Further, 
as John Fleetwood has noted, Pockrich went so far as to propose a Bill to Parliament "which 
would provide that a person could be legally declared dead when he reached 999 years, and that 
among others the local clergyman might claim the fees he would normally receive for the burial 
service."303 In Pockrich’s imaginative vision of the future, then, a person would continue living 
beyond 999 years of age, but would no longer have any political rights it seems.  
Thomas Pennant, writing in 1793, summarizes Edmund King’s blood transfusion 
experiments with some of his own added thoughts:  
  The blood of a healthy young spaniel was conveyed into the veins of an old  
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mangy dog, who was perfectly cured, in less than a fortnight. The blood of a 
young dog was transfused into one almost blind with age, and which, before, 
could hardly move: the latter did in two hours leap and frisk, and yet the young 
dog, which received in return the blood of the old or distempered, felt no sort of 
injury. Would that the same experiment could be extended to the human species! 
And, should the change be effected on the mind as well as body, how unspeakable 
would be the benefit to the whole race! Not only every loathsome disorder would 
be done away, but every folly, meanness, and vice, changed to their opposite 
virtues, by a due transfusion of worthy plebeian blood.304  
 
Pennant imagines blood not only capable of curing physical ailments and diseases, but indeed 
bestowing behavioral and moral virtues onto its recipients. Pennant’s reporting, like those of 
many others, seem to conflate several different stories of blood transfusion into its narrative. For 
instance, The Times of London, in March of 1791, writes:  
The following facts have been sent to us for publication: 
The blood of a bull dog was transfused into the veins and arteries of a male 
lamb—the lamb in about two hours being in apparent good health was turned into 
a paddock where there were sheep, cows and bullocks. But instead of flocking 
with his own species, he flew at the nose of a bullock, and pinned him fairly to the 
ground.  
The blood of a hawk, was transfused into the veins of a dove, and the dove 
immediately killed his mate, and picked her bones.305 
 
Unlike the reports in the Philosophical Transactions that conduct experiments to transfuse the 
blood of the docile animal into that of the more agitated, the Times claims that the reverse is 
possible as well. The report moves between these slightly more plausible claims to more 
ridiculous and fantastical ones; for example: "The blood of a duck being transfused into the veins 
of the renowned Doctor Godbold—he waddled about the room crying out quac, quac, quac." 
Although these reports seem obviously false and fabricated, blood transfusion experiments were 
conceived of in precisely these terms: as transfusing not only blood but the physical and 
behavioral characteristics of the donor to the recipient. And in 1794, Erasmus Darwin proposed 
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blood transfusions as a potential cure for nervous fevers in Zoonomia: "Might not the transfusion 
of blood, suppose of four ounces daily from a strong man, or other healthful animal, as a sheep 
or an ass, be used in the early state of nervous or putrid fevers with great prospect of success?"306 
Although blood transfusion experiments were less frequent in the eighteenth-century, the idea 
that they could impart therapeutic benefits to recipients continued to circulate.  
  It was not until 1816 that John Leacock performed blood transfusion experiments and 
established the need for species compatibility. Two years later, in 1818, the year Frankenstein 
was first published, James Blundell would return to Leacock’s work and re-introduce the practice 
of blood transfusions on humans307, advocating that “in . . . transfusion on the human body, the 
human blood alone should be employed.”308 Although Leacock never published his dissertation 
on blood transfusion, Blundell published a number of works on his research into blood 
transfusion as a treatment for uterine hemorrhage.309 As Matthew Rowlinson notes, in Blundell’s 
experiments, “a male donor, often the patient’s husband, provides blood to replace that lost by a 
woman in childbirth.”310 And as Anne Marie Moulin has noted, because women’s blood was 
 
306
 Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia; or the Laws of Organic Life Vol. 1 3rd Ed. (Boston: Thomas 
Andrews, 1809), 291.  
307
 See P. J. Schmidt and A. G. Leacock, “Forgotten Transfusion History: John Leacock of 
Barbados.” BMJ: British Medical Journal 325.7378 (2002): 1485-1487; and James Blundell, 
“Experiments on the Transfusion of Blood by the Syringe.” Medical Chirurgical Transactions 
Vol. 9, (1818): 56-92; and James Blundell, “Some Remarks on the Operation of Transfusion.” 
Researches, Physiological and Pathological. (London: E. Cox and Son, 1825): 63-146. 
308 James Blundell, Researches Physiological and Pathological Instituted Principally with a 
View to the Improvement of Medical and Surgical Practice. (London: E. Cox, 1825), 92.  
309
 James Blundell, Observations on some of the more Important Diseases of Women. Ed. 
Thomas Castle. (London: Printed for E. Cox, St. Thomas's Street, Southwark, 1837). 
310
 Matthew Rowlinson, “On the First Medical Blood Transfusion Between Human Subjects, 
1818.” BRANCH: Britain, Representation and Nineteenth-Century History. Ed. Dino Franco 
Felluga. Extension of Romanticism and Victorianism on the Net.  
133 
 
considered of a lesser quality and thought to be less plentiful, women were rarely donors in the 
early blood transfusion experiments of the nineteenth century.311312 Rowlinson writes: 
Human transfusion was thus from the beginning a medical technique that 
embodied gender hierarchy, not only because of the relations of donors and 
recipients of transfused blood, but also because the emergence of transfusion as a 
part of obstetrical practice corresponded historically with the rise of obstetrics 
itself as a medical specialization and the displacement of the midwife by the male 
professional as the normal attendant on childbirth in the middle and upper 
classes.313  
 
The gendered vitalism of blood and the practices in which blood was transfused (obstetrics) both 
work to produce this hierarchy. It is perhaps worthy of note that it is only when the need for 
species compatibility is established that blood transfusion in obstetrics emerges, as well as the 
more codified version of the gendered hierarchy of blood’s vitality.  
Importantly, in early injections and transfusion experiments, scientists used quills, which 
were later replaced with a silver or gold tube, referred to as pipes.314 These instruments insured 
that only a very small amount was ever injected into the recipient, which is undoubtedly why 
early blood transfusion patients were able to survive the experiments. It was not until 1901 that 
Karl Landsteiner discovered human blood types, allowing for safer blood transfusions. When a 
patient receives the wrong blood type, there are two bodily responses that may occur. The lesser 
and less fatal response is that the patient experiences fever, aches, chills, and a burning sensation 
at the injection site. The immune system will then break down the foreign red blood cells, and 
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the liver and spleen will filter them out of the body. In the event of a fatal response to 
incompatible blood type transfusion, the following will happen: 
The most severe reactions involve an intravascular hemolysis; the donor [red 
blood cells] are destroyed by the recipient's antibodies while they are still inside 
blood vessels. Such reactions involve antibodies that strongly activate 
complement, which in turn lyses the donor [red blood cells]. Hemoglobin is 
released into the plasma and excreted in urine (hemoglobinuria), turning the urine 
a dark brown color. Bilirubin, a metabolite of hemoglobin usually secreted into 
bile by the liver, instead accumulates in the blood causing jaundice. Massive 
activation of complement can cause shock, as can the large amounts of tissue 
factor released by [red blood cell] debris that triggers an uncontrollable clotting 
cascade (disseminated intravascular coagulation).315 
 
Interestingly, jaundiced skin is, in fact, one of the characteristics of Frankenstein’s creature: “His 
yellow skin scarcely covered the work of the muscles and arteries beneath.”316 In her article 
“Frankenstein, Racial Science, and the Yellow Peril," Anne K. Mellor argues the yellow skin, in 
addition to several other details, functions to racialize the creature. She writes, "A yellow-skin 
man crossing the steppes of Russia and Tartary, with long black hair and dun-colored eyes—
most of Mary Shelley's nineteenth-century readers would immediately have recognized the 
Creature as a member of the Mongolian race, one of the five races of man first classified in 1795 
by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach."317 Mellor’s argument is persuasive and it is not my goal here 
to indicate otherwise; however, I think it is possible that the creature’s yellow skin has two 
functions: both to racialize, and to indicate his status as a blood transfusion recipient.  
 Because the creature’s blood came from slaughterhouses, his blood undoubtedly came 
from several different animal donors—most likely cows and sheep. To prevent coagulation, the 
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blood would be need to be taken at the time of death—or at the moment of the animal’s 
slaughter, a moment of intense fear and anger. If we understand contemporary understandings of 
blood as capable of transfusing the physical, moral, and perhaps even emotional dispositions of 
the donor, the significance of the creature’s blood becomes more clear: the creature’s life is in 
many ways defined by fear and anger. This fear and anger, I argue, comes not only from the 
creature’s lived experiences with other humans, but from the blood derived from animals at the 
moment of their slaughter. 
 
Blood in the Vitalism Debates 
 
In addition to being able to carry biological and acquired traits from one body to another, 
blood also played a role in the vitalism debates of the eighteenth-century and Romantic period. 
Vitalism debates revolved around the question of life—whether it is something that exists in 
matter itself, or something superadded to it. Vitalists attempted to understand what differentiated 
a dead body from a live one; how the body carried out unconscious automatic functions like the 
circulation of the blood and digestion; and how the body maintained its integrity against foreign 
substances—for instance, how the stomach differentiated between food and the body itself. 
Because vitalism and the life principle were often framed in terms of “animation,” the debate 
necessarily rested on a conflation between life, animation, soul, and the will, and it is not always 
possible to disambiguate them.  
 After Isaac Newton published his work on gravitational forces in Principia Mathematica 
(1687), physiologists were inspired to think about what unseen forces might also exist in the 
body. Physiologists were eager to explain bodily processes that had long eluded them—physical 
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processes that were carried out unmediated by the brain such as the circulation of the blood, 
respiration, physical reflexes, and digestion. If taxonomy had previously split the world into the 
animate and inanimate, vitalism debates considered what gave life to the animate: the physical 
organization of beings, unseen vital forces, a superadded quality, or something that living beings 
imbibed—like the air itself? If it were mere organization, what separated a dead body from a live 
one? If it were something that existed in the matter, where in the body was it located, and how 
did it bestow life? Many physiologists speculated that the life or vital principle is located in the 
air we breathe and transmitted through the body via the blood. Others like Herman Boerhaave, 
Albrecht von Haller, and Robert Whytt believed that the life principle exists within the nervous 
system; for Boerhaave and Haller via animal spirits that activated the muscles, whereas Whytt 
believed animation to be the result of an act of communication between the nervous system and 
the spinal cord.  
In the Romantic period, the debate became focused on mechanism versus vitalism, 
although this distinction often did not exist in the early to mid eighteenth century.318 The main 
actors of the vitalism debate of the Romantic period were John Abernethy and William 
Lawrence. Sharon Ruston summarizes their positions succinctly: “Abernethy believed that life 
did not depend on the organization of the body but existed as a material substance ‘superadded’ 
to the body. His opponent, Lawrence . . . . perceived life as simply the working operation of all 
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the body’s functions, the sum of its parts.”319 Further, because Lawrence’s materialist position 
was influenced by French materialists, Abernethy considered Lawrence’s position to be 
dangerously politically radical and atheistic. In 1819, Lawrence published his most radical book, 
Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man, which led to his suspension as 
surgeon from Bridewell and Bethlem hospitals, and Lawrence was forced to retracted statements 
he made in the book and promised to “suppress and prevent” its circulation to be reinstated as a 
surgeon, and the book was withdrawn.320 Ironically, because Lawrence had lost the copyrights to 
the book due to its “blasphemous, seditious and immoral” content, Lectures subsequently 
flourished in pirated editions.321 Many scholars have covered the ways in which Shelley’s 
Frankenstein was influenced and in conversation with the vitalism debates of Abernethy and 
Lawrence, giving context to the way in which “giving life” to the creature mirrored vitalistic 
theories.322 Although the vitalist debate between Abernethy and Lawrence has provided an 
important context to understanding the construction of the creature’s body and Victor’s 
aggressive materialism in Frankenstein, I would like to focus on a slightly earlier vitalism debate 
between John Hunter and John Thelwall.  
Hunter was a powerful influence for Abernethy and Lawrence, and both sought to better 
interpret his work to understand the “living principle” of the body through their own writings.323 
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Both Hunter and Thelwall sought to understand how “life” exists in the body: Hunter considered 
the blood to be the “living principle,” whereas Thelwall reinterpreted life not as a noun, but as an 
action. The debate between Hunter and Thelwall also provides another path to understanding the 
role of blood in the scientific and cultural imagination in addition to those provided by writings 
on blood transfusion experiments—in transfusions, blood was imagined as vivifying and 
invigorating the recipient, whereas in the writings of Hunter and Thelwall, blood is imagined as 
the living principle itself for Hunter, and a communicative fluid which produces action and thus 
life in the body for Thelwall.  
In the late eighteenth century, debates around vitalism polarized materialism and 
vitalism, at which point vitalism came to represent a conflation between “life” and “soul,” rather 
than animation. For instance, in his A Treatise on the Blood, Inflammation, and Gun-shot 
Wounds (1792), Hunter describes a vitalism against a materialist standpoint that would 
emphasize organization. He writes: “Without some such principle [as the living principle of the 
blood], all we have been examining is like dissecting a dead body without having any reference 
to the living, or even knowing it ever had been alive.”324 At this point, materialism no longer 
signified life as an inherent property of matter, as it had earlier in the century, but rather an 
anatomical understanding of the body’s organization. As Hunter writes above, organization alone 
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cannot account for life, because a dead body shares the same organization as a live one. Hunter 
writes: “But mere composition of matter does not give life; for the dead body has all the 
composition it ever had: life is a property we do not understand: we can only see the necessary 
leading steps towards it.”325 Organization does not give life, then; life is a “property” of living 
bodies. Similarly in Frankenstein, Victor first produces an organized body before attempting to 
give it life; Victor recollects: “I collected the instruments of life around me, that I might infuse a 
spark of being into the lifeless thing that lay at my feet” and later describes working toward “the 
sole purpose of infusing life into an inanimate body.”326 In both instances, the completeness of 
the body is implied by its readiness to receive life in its current “lifeless” or “inanimate” state.  
If life were a property of mere organization, one might wonder at what point a body’s 
organization might be considered “complete” enough for life. Indeed, one might imagine the 
completeness as a normative body; however, many bodies live perfectly well without both legs 
or arms, or in the absence of certain organs. Hunter thus describes life not derived from 
organization, but organization as arising from life: “organization, and life, do not depend in the 
least on each other; that organization may arise out of living parts, and produce action, but that 
life can never rise out of, or depend on organization.”327 It is life itself that produces the 
organization of bodies; it is life around which an organized body forms itself. Not only then does 
Victor endeavor to usurp the power of reproduction, but reverses the relationship between 
organization and life by first producing a body before then giving it life.  
The principle of life that Hunter urges other physiologists and surgeons to examine is 
blood. Hunter writes “To conceive that blood is endowed with life, while circulating, is perhaps 
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carrying the imagination as far as it well can go; but the difficulty arises merely from its being 
fluid, the mind not being accustomed to the idea of a living fluid.”328 For Hunter, the fluidity and 
motion of the blood are of utmost importance, specifically because the blood ceases to circulate 
after death. Although blood “retains its fluid state while circulating, and even for a long time 
when at rest in the living vessels, and coagulates when the vessels or the body dies, it might 
naturally be supposed that it was the life of the body or vessels which kept it fluid,” Hunter 
stresses that blood sometimes coagulates in a live body as well: “there is, therefore, something 
more than the mere situation of the blood, surrounded with dead parts, that allows of 
coagulation; and that must be a something in the blood itself.”329 In other words, Hunter takes the 
circulation of blood as the sign of life, and its globalized coagulation in the body as the sign of 
death. Further, he argues that it is the blood itself that has the power to maintain or cease fluidity, 
rather than the body acting on the blood: “for I have reason to believe, that blood has the power 
of action within itself, according to the stimulus of necessity; which necessity arises out of its 
situation.”330 It is not the blood responding to the death of the body, but blood itself that has “the 
power of action”; the body responds to the blood.  
The circulation of the blood is important to Hunter not only as the sign of life, but also 
because it communicates life to other parts of the body. He writes: 
One of the great proofs that the blood possesses life, depends on the 
circumstances affecting its coagulation. While the blood is circulating, it is 
subject to certain laws to which it is not subject when not circulating. It has the 
power of preserving its fluidity, which was taken notice of when treating of its 
coagulation; or, in other words, the living principle in the body has the power of 
preserving it in this state. . . . If the blood had not the living principle, it would be, 
in respect of the body, as an extraneous substance. Blood is not only alive itself, 
but is the support of life in every part of the body; for mortification immediately 
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follows, when the circulation is cut off from any part, which is no more than death 
taking place in the part, from the want of the successive changes of fresh blood. 
This shews, that no part of the body is to be considered as a complete living 
substance, producing and continuing mere life without the blood: so that blood 
makes one part of the compound; without which life would neither begin nor be 
continued.331 
 
Blood is not “extraneous” to the body, but is the life of the body itself, and “preserves” the life of 
the body in its circulation. The visual and evidentiary proof that Hunter provides is the 
mortification of body parts when deprived of blood: no part of the body can survive without its 
support and “successive changes of fresh blood.” Hunter understands blood as not only 
embodying the “life principle,” but also as communicating the life principle throughout the body: 
“and not only is the blood alive in itself, but seems to carry life every where.”332 Hunter’s 
thoughts on blood are not far removed from those who experimented on blood transfusion a 
century earlier; in both instances, blood is a communicative force that carries vitality, liveliness, 
or life itself. Hunter also believed that blood revealed aspects of a person’s character: “What are 
called different temperaments have their muscles redder, or paler; the darker the colour of the 
skin, hair, &c. of any one species, I believe the blood is in proportion redder.”333 Not only does 
the blood contain information about temperament and physical appearance, but Hunter claims 
also that this information is reflected in the shade of its redness.  
 A year after Hunter’s publication of A Treatise on the Blood, Inflammation, and Gun-shot 
Wounds, John Thelwall published An Essay Towards a Definition of Animal Vitality, positioned 
largely as a response to Hunter’s Treatise, specifically his sections on blood. Thelwall’s central 
concern is to understand vitality as a way of discerning between life and death. He writes: 
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Before we can possibly derive any sort of information from this antithesis, it is 
necessary that we should be instructed how life and death may be accurately 
discriminated; for how are we to make comparisons between objects which we are 
unable to separate from each other? But even this has never successfully been 
attempted; for though there are certain signs (as putrefaction, etc.) by which the 
death of the animal may be demonstrated; yet, as it is not even pretended that 
putrefaction is the act of vital dissolution,—or, in other words, that the body 
which is not putrid is necessarily alive—death must have taken place, 
independently of any such change; and we are, therefore, just as much in the dark 
as ever with respect to the ultimate test by which the presence of life may be 
ascertained.334  
 
Whereas Hunter understood coagulation of the blood and mortification of the body as the visible 
sign of death, Thelwall points out that bodies may be dead without demonstrating mortification 
or putrefaction—death occurs before these processes take place. Thelwall also criticizes Hunter’s 
claim that the life principle exists in blood; he writes: 
when the blood, or any very considerable portion of it, is drawn away, the vital 
functions of the animal will cease: but, unfortunately for this theory, these 
functions will also cease, without the proportion of this fluid being at all 
diminished: and as there are also several other parts entering in the composition of 
the animal, which, if subtracted, even in part, resign the body to inevitable 
destruction, we might as well say, that the stomach thereof, or the kidneys, or the 
liver thereof, is the life thereof, as that the blood is to be so considered.335  
 
Thelwall reveals Hunter’s conflation of correlation with causation, but also importantly 
diminishes the central importance of blood to the body but remarking on other organs necessary 
to sustain life. Thelwall here moves away from the common vitalist maneuver that attempts to 
isolate a “vital principle” or “life principle” to a discrete location in the body, and suggests that 
rather than understand life or vitality as a property, it might be better understood as an action. He 
writes:  
Life, then, in the animal, we will say, is that state of action, by which the 
functions, or any of the functions of the animal, are carried on. . . . I proceed, 
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therefore, to add, that, previous to the existence of life, the body must have 
attained a specific organization; and that Life, or, in other terms, the Vital Action, 
is induced by the application of proper stimuli: thus, then, life in the animal is that 
state of action (induced by specific stimuli upon matter specifically organized), by 
which the animal functions, or any of them, are carried on.336 
 
Unlike Hunter who understood organization as arriving from life, Thelwall argues that there is a 
“union” between Vital Action and “Specific Organization.” Thelwall here is not positing the 
existence of an organized body before life; rather, his formulation of vitality as an action, rather 
than a property, requires the presence of simultaneous organization/body and life. In other words, 
life, as a vital action, cannot act without an organized body with which to express its action: they 
are co-dependent.  
 Importantly, although Thelwall did not believe blood to have a vital “property,” he did 
agree with Hunter that blood communicated to the rest of the body. Thelwall writes that blood is 
the “medium, by which alone the stimuli necessary for the production and sustainment of Life 
can be absorbed and properly diffused through the organized frame.”337 As Robert Mitchell 
explains, “For Thelwall, blood functioned as a communication medium, in the sense that it 
transported and diffused stimuli throughout the body—yet what it communicated was precisely 
the stimuli of life itself.”338 This stimuli is what is necessary to produce Vital Action in other 
parts of the body. Thelwall writes: 
I consider the Blood, independent of its nutritive power, as the specific medium 
by which the stimuli must be conveyed to the different parts of the organized 
frame, so as to produce the Vital Action. This Blood, then, in its passage through 
the Lungs, collects a something, which generates a specific heat . . . which it 
diffuses through the whole vascular system, and then (exhausted of its vivifying 
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power) returns again to the lungs, to exhale whatever noxious particles it may 
have collected, and to inhale a fresh portion of the same vivifying principle.339  
 
Thelwall suspects this “fresh portion of the same vivifying principle” might be electrical fluid 
extracted from the air, but importantly, the role of both blood and air is here reduced to its 
communicative ability to produce action, known as Vital Action, in a way that mobilizes the 
entire body.  
 By considering the writings on blood transfusion experiments and the role of blood in the 
vitalism debates in relation to each other, it’s possible to see the matrix of meaning surrounding 
blood in both these contexts as both separate but converging. In addition to containing 
information about an individual’s disposition, acquired habits, temper, and virtues, in the 
writings on blood transfusion experiments, transfused blood is repeatedly described as conferring 
liveliness, health, youth, and vigor to the recipient. In the vitalism debate between Hunter and 
Thelwall, a similar matrix is produced: blood’s liveliness and vigor is purified as blood becomes 
the “living principle” itself for Hunter, whereas Thelwall understands it as the communicative 
fluid through which life is circulated throughout the body and produced through action.   
 
Harvey and Shelley 
 
 William Harvey’s On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals enjoyed a rich 
publication history after its initial debut. In the seventeenth century alone, it was published under 
various editions at least fifteen times, including two English translations, and an additional four 
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editions in the eighteenth century, including another English translation.340 This publication 
history suggests that his work was well known beyond scientific circles, and that his popularity 
endured well into the nineteenth century. In 1784, William Hunter published Two Introductory 
Lectures, which covered the history of knowledge of the circulatory system, beginning with 
Plato, that covered Harvey’s work, as well as work published after him. In 1792, John Hunter, 
William’s younger and more famous brother, published Treatise on the Blood, Inflammation, 
and Gun-Shot Wounds, which provided an updated account of the circulatory system. William 
Lawrence, who was friends with the Shelleys, published An Introduction to Comparative 
Anatomy and Physiology in 1816, which also covered the circulatory system and referred to both 
John and William Hunter’s texts. In Frankenstein, Shelley notes how philosophers “have 
discovered how the blood circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe,” which reveals that she 
had some awareness of scientific discoveries and conversations around the blood and its 
circulation.341 Additionally, Shelley was most certainly aware and fluent in the vitalism debates, 
which used much of the same language and imagery of blood as invigorating, life-giving, 
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think about how slaughterhouses contribute to the creature’s body and create meaning, I have 
provided a history of early blood transfusion experiments and examined the role of blood in the 
vitalism debates of the eighteenth century. In doing so, I’ve attempted to cover the matrix of 
ways blood functioned in the social and scientific imagination, and specifically to highlight the 
ways in which blood is associated with both life, as in the transfusion experiments and vitalism 
debates, as well as decay, filth, and disease, as it is in descriptions of slaughterhouse waste.  
The word “blood” is used frequently throughout the novel—twenty times to be exact, and 
an additional four references to the “pulse”— to refer to actual blood in the veins, to violence 
and bloodshed, to its status as an object of inquiry in science, to signify life and death, to signify 
lineage, and to express emotionality. It occurs most frequently in the context of violence, life and 
death, and emotion, but many of these categories overlap. For instance, when Walton is 
remarking upon the weather in Russia to his sister Margaret, he writes, “for there is a great 
difference between walking the deck and remaining seated motionless for hours, when no 
exercise prevents the blood from actually freezing in your veins.”342 Or slightly later, when 
describing the character of the master of the ship: “he will not hunt (a favorite, and almost the 
only amusement here), because he cannot endure to spill blood.”343 In this instance, blood 
functions to signify both violence and the death it produces. Similarly, when the creature asks 
Victor for a female creature, he threatens: “If you comply with my conditions, I will leave them 
and you at peace; but if you refuse, I will glut the maw of death, until it be satiated with the 
blood of your remaining friends.”344 Here, blood is figured as that which death consumes through 
violence, which is echoed again later in the novel when Victor notes: "as if to shew me that he 
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was not yet satiated with blood, he had murdered Clerval immediately after the enunciation of 
his threats."345 The creature is certainly out for blood, but he is out for more specifically for 
Victor’s blood: his family. The creature only murders those who make up Victor’s inner circle— 
family that is literally connected by blood— and Clerval, whom Victor claims as part of his 
“domestic circle.”346 For the creature, blood as violence is nuanced: it is both the blood that is 
shed through murder, but also the blood that bonds family, Victor’s family, together.  
Blood is also used in ways that express emotionality as a bodily experience. When the 
creature is speaking, he invokes blood to express emotions anger, hurt, and vexation. After the 
debacle at the De Lacy house, the creature notes that “the fever of my blood did not allow me to 
be visited by peaceful dreams.”347 Later, the creature confesses to Walton: "I, the miserable and 
the abandoned, am an abortion, to be spurned at, and kicked, and trampled on. Even now my 
blood boils at the recollection of this injustice."348 However, when Victor and Walton are 
speaking, they invoke blood to describe intense fear. When Victor hears Elizabeth scream when 
the creature attacks and then kills her, he says: “As I heard it, the whole truth rushed into my 
mind, my arms dropped, the motion of every muscle and fibre was suspended; I could feel the 
blood trickling in my veins, and tingling in the extremities of my limbs.”349 Victor’s description 
of fear and despair at instantly understanding that Elizabeth has been killed is telling: blood and 
the animation of the body are intimately linked. The blood reduces to a “trickle” as his body 
freezes into a kind of suspended animation—his “every muscle and fibre was suspended” even 
while the blood still produces a “tingle” in his limbs. Although Victor’s blood is still “vital” and 
 
345
 Shelley, 136. 
346
 Shelley, 21. 
347
 Shelley, 96.  
348
 Shelley, 160. 
349
 Shelley, 140.  
148 
 
“alive,” it has temporarily ceased to produce animation. In a letter to Margaret, Walton expresses 
a similar emotionality of blood: "You have read this strange and terrific story, Margaret; and do 
you not feel your blood congealed with horror, like that which even now curdles mine?"350 In 
this instance, the horror “congeals”  and “curdles” his blood—that is, the blood coagulates, it 
transforms from a fluid liquid to a non-moving solid. For both Victor and Walton, the creature 
produces an emotion that mirrors the horror of his own body: whereas the creature’s blood was 
reanimated by Victor from non-moving to moving, the blood of Victor and Walton change from 
moving to non-moving.  
Thinking of Victor Frankenstein’s creature’s blood in terms of its source 
(slaughterhouses) and its potentially vitalist role in producing life and animation in the body 
allows us to consider new ways in which its monstrosity is constructed. The creature’s vital 
source of life is, in fact, waste produced by slaughterhouses, waste described as “putrescence and 
disease,” “filth,” “garbage,” as a threat to both public health and civility. Although blood 
transfusion experiments were thought of as having the ability to invigorate the recipient with 
liveliness, health, and even-temperedness, the creature experiences quite the opposite: his body 
invokes death, disease, and fear. Indeed, Victor himself continues to refer to the creature as a 
“demoniacal corpse” even after he has given him life.351 Despite the creature’s human 
appearance, his “yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath”—and 
presumably also scarcely covered the blood pumping through those arteries and muscles352; the 
creature’s animality, his animal blood, is visible even from beneath the masquerade of human 
skin and features. Victor reflects his disgust at the creature: 
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Oh! No mortal could support the horror of that countenance. A mummy again 
endued with animation could not be so hideous as that wretch. I had gazed on him 
while unfinished; he was ugly then; but when those muscles and joints were 
rendered capable of motion, it became a thing such as even Dante could not have 
conceived.353 
 
Again comparing the creature to a corpse, or here, a “mummy,” Victor notes that the true terror 
of the creature’s ugliness was only made apparent once his body was finished and received 
animation— “but when those muscles and joints were rendered capable of motion.” If we 
consider the role of blood in the vitalism debates—for Hunter as the vital principle itself, for 
Thelwall as that which produces Vital action in the body—then it is specifically the animation of 
the blood, and thus the creature’s animality, that turns Victor’s stomach. In fact, immediately 
after the above quoted passage, Victor reflects: “I passed the night wretchedly. Sometimes my 
pulse beat so quickly and hardly, that I felt the palpitation of every artery.”354 The thought of the 
creature’s beating heart circulating animal blood causes Victor to become aware of his own heart 
and pulse.   
Victor is quite clear that he does not consider the creature human, but the creature’s non-
human status seems to derive from more than the fact of its animal blood. When Victor visits the 
spot where William was killed, Victor sees the creature: 
A flash of lightning illuminated the object, an discovered its shape plainly to me; 
its gigantic stature, and the deformity of its aspect, more hideous than belongs to 
humanity, instantly informed me that it was the wretch, the filthy daemon to 
whom I had given life. . . . Nothing in human shape could have destroyed that fair 
child. He was the murderer!355 
 
What Victor notes in this scene is the creature’s “gigantic stature” and his “deformity,” which are 
“more hideous than belongs to humanity.” “Gigantic stature,” is itself, of course, a type of 
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deformity. Victor has already established several times that he finds the creature ugly, but what 
draws his attention here is his form— “nothing in human shape.” It is the creature’s non-
normative body, here constructed as deformed in its gigantism, that excludes him from human 
status. At the same time of this exclusion, however, Victor hails him as a political subject—the 
creature did not simply “kill” William, he “murdered” him. Victor concludes his thoughts on the 
creature’s guilt, his non-human status is again invoked: “Justine, and indeed every human being, 
was guiltless of this murder.”356 The ambiguity of the creature’s nature is made clear here: 
although he is excluded from natural-historical taxonomical human-status, he is reclaimed as a 
subject of human politics and laws.  
 The creature in fact straddles several ambiguities: alive and dead, human and animal, 
citizen and stateless—and it is precisely these ambiguities that mark the creature as abject. As 
Julia Kristeva notes in her work on abjection, "It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that 
causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, 
positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite.”357 In particular, the abject is 
that which does not respect borders between life and death and human and animal. As Sophie 
Gee has written, abject matter is “marked by indistinctness between life and death or 
proliferation and rot” and that the “confusion, or conflation, of life and death is the very 
confusion of which the abject consists.”358 Further, she notes: “Objects of moral disgust have 
‘excessive vitality or vitality whose unfurling is misplaced’; they arouse the feeling of ‘life in the 
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wrong place.’”359 The creature, as a reanimated composition of of dead human and animal 
bodies, exemplifies “life in the wrong place.” Dead human and animal bodies become abject in 
the form of the creature because they are prevented from persisting and putrefying as waste; by 
imbuing them with life, Victor creates animated waste. Kristeva further states that the “abject 
confronts us . . . with those fragile states where man strays on the territories of animal."360 
Similarly, Martha Nussbaum has written on the way that specifically animal waste and proximity 
to animality and mortality defines the abject, noting that "In all societies . . . disgust expresses a 
refusal to ingest and thus be contaminated by a potent reminder of one's own mortality and 
animality."361 The abject in fact expresses a nexus of ambiguities between life and death, human 
and animal that the creature embodies. The creature is not only “contaminated” by mortality and 
animality, but he is also constituted of it.  
 That the creature’s blood is animal blood is important, then, because it destabilizes order: 
vitality (alive or dead) and taxonomic (animal or human). To create a human out of animal 
material— specifically livestock and food waste, puts even the food chain in question. How do 
we understand a creature as human that may also be composed of the food we eat, part cow, part 
sheep? The question is not entirely academic; indeed scientists are currently exploring ways to 
transplant pig hearts to human patients362. In this chapter, I have referred to the creature as a 
blood transfusion recipient; but he is, of course, much more than that. His entire body is the 
product of organ, bone, tissue, and blood transplants; he is, more than anything else, a collection 
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of transplants— but lacking an original, underlying body onto which they are grafted, this 
assemblage becomes monstrous. He is, in this way, adrift: a confusion of parts. If we understand 
his blood as an agent which puts the body in communication with itself, as some eighteenth-
century and Romantic vitalists did, how can the creature’s blood, itself cacophonous, 
communicate with the confusion of his body? What common language could such a body come 
to speak? For Shelley, that language is one of pain, isolation, and rejection. The creature’s 
relationship with Victor mirrors the language of his own body in this way: a body at odds with 
itself, fragmented and isolated in its individual grafted pieces. 
 By mapping out how discourses of transfusion and vitalism contributed to early 
nineteenth-century bio-cultural meanings of blood, I offer new interpretative methods for 
thinking about Frankenstein. Although Victor may seem like a megalomaniac in his pursuit to 
create a “new species,” his disease to “Banish disease from the human frame, and render man 
invulnerable to any but a violent death!” comes from a history of thinking of blood in precisely 
these terms: as vivifying and life-giving.363 Blood transfusion was imagined as having the power 
to  “renew life where death had apparently devoted the body to corruption.”364 Indeed, Victor 
describes the process of creation as “infusing life into an inanimate body”365 (emphasis added). 
When Victor assures us that he is not “recording the vision of a madman,” it is in large part 
because Shelley draws from a scientific tradition of imagining both blood and life as functioning 
in precisely the terms that Victor describes.  
 In this chapter, I have provided a history of slaughterhouses to demonstrate how closely 
they were associated with death, disease, and especially blood due to poor waste management 
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systems before the introduction of public abattoirs in the nineteenth century. With no running 
water or drainage in place, blood from slaughterhouses simply ran through the streets. I have 
contextualized slaughterhouses in order to argue that their inclusion in the list of locations Victor 
visits to collect materials for the creature’s body is specifically for blood.  Additionally, I have 
provided a history of blood transfusion experiments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
as a way of exploring the different forms of signification of blood. This chapter thus bookends 
the historical time frame of my dissertation as a whole—the early modern period, the eighteenth 
century, and the Romantic period—and underlines the importance of taking a long view of 
history to produce and examine these contexts.  
These histories produce a matrix of meaning: in the context of the slaughterhouses, blood 
signifies death, disease, filth, and immorality; in the context of blood transfusion experiments, 
blood signifies life, invigoration, health, and virtue. Both contexts are integral to understanding 
Frankenstein: Victor’s initial motivation to construct a human is to discover a means of 
“banish[ing] disease from the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but a violent 
death!”366; in other words, he begins the experiment with the context of blood transfusion 
experiments, in which infusing a constructed body with blood will render it alive, invigorated, 
healthy, and virtuous. However, because the source of the blood is the slaughterhouse, the 
transfused blood is tainted with the death and immorality of the slaughterhouse, which is then 
carried with the creature into life. The creature thus rests on two planes of ambiguity: human and 




 Shelley, 23. 
154 
 
Chapter 5 : Coda 
 
In Chapter 3, I discussed how oral language ability was used as a defining feature of the 
human. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers were invested in human taxonomy, 
often around the basis of spoken language ability as a sign of human reason. Philosophers further 
distinguished between the mechanical or functional ability to speak— which we share with other 
animals such as parrots— and spontaneous and creative language that only humans have. The 
idea that reason could be mimicked by false mechanical performances, as seen in parrots, was 
also used in pro-slavery texts to deny the language ability, eloquence, and human reasoning. I 
examined the reception of Francis Williams’ poetry as an example of when this criteria of the 
human is revealed as a ruse: although Williams’ performed “creative and spontaneous language” 
in his Latin poetry, white writers dismissed his eloquence as mere “parroting.” Thomas Herbert 
further links African language with animality explicitly in Some Years Travels Into Divers Parts 
of Asia and Afrique, where he writes that "their language is apishly sounded (with whom tis 
thought they mixe unnaturally)." A century later, early anglo black narratives (whether written 
by the authors themselves or dictated) were accompanied by prefatory notes in which a white 
editor vouched for the legitimacy of the work; only a white authority could be thought of as 
conferring truth-status to narratives. Language ability is deployed as an achievement of human 
status, requiring the policing and authorization of white writers and editors. 
Rather than functioning as the form of human criteria that it is rhetorically positioned as, 
discourses around language ability are a red-herring that defer the problem of racism. In the texts 
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that I examine in this dissertation, neither language ability nor eloquence improves the material 
status of its speakers and signers. Both Frankenstein and The Tempest depict or re-tell a 
pedagogical practice of language lessons, through which the character is meant to “improve” in a 
way that is morally affected. Whereas the creature takes it upon himself to learn language with 
the hope that it will make him more palatable to humans, for Caliban the lessons are delivered by 
his enslavers. Although both characters master eloquence, the achievement does not improve 
their lives; they are regarded not as humans, but as speaking monsters. 
In Frankenstein, the creature is deeply eager to learn language and demonstrates 
significant self-discipline. But it is also through language that he learns that he is an outcast to 
humans. When the creature first takes residence next to the De Lacey cottage, he is still quite 
“young” -- he has not yet existed very long. Observing the family through a crack in the wood, 
he notes: 
I found that these people possessed a method of communicating their experience 
and feelings to one another by articulate sounds. I perceived that the words they 
spoke sometimes produced pleasure or pain, smiles or sadness, in the minds and 
countenances of the hearers. This was indeed a godlike science, and I ardently 
desired to become acquainted with it.367  
 
The creature notices that words have the ability to affect and change the recipient— they produce 
tangible effects of pleasure or pain. This is important to the creature, because he desperately 
seeks to change the way people react to him. The creature’s perception of and desire for 
language specifically as a “god-like language” reveals the similarities he shares with Victor: the 
desire for control. Whereas Victor desires control over life and death, the creature desires control 
over the way in which he is perceived. In fact, the creature hopes that, through the power of 
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language, he will be able to win the love of the De Lacey family. The creature explains: 
“although I eagerly longed to discover myself to the cottagers, I ought not to make the attempt 
until I had first become master of their language; which knowledge might enable me to make 
them overlook the deformity of my figure.”368 For the creature, language initially holds the 
promise of admission to human status: “I imagined they would be disgusted, until, by my gentle 
demeanor and conciliating words, I should first win their favour, and afterwards their love.”369  
It is with Safie’s arrival that language finally becomes accessible to the creature as he 
listens to her language lessons. As though embedded into the language itself, the creature learns 
of human society: “While I listened to the instructions which Felix bestowed upon the Arabian, 
the strange system of human society was explained to me. I heard of the division of property, of 
immense wealth and squalid poverty; of rank, descent, and noble blood” as well as “all the 
various relationships which bind one human being to another in mutual bonds.”370 Upon learning 
of the way in which rank, descent, and noble blood structure human relations, the creature 
inevitably learns what he lacks: a family. Language, he realizes, is tied to human love and 
kinship. It is only later when he discovers Victor’s notes in his jacket pocket that he begins to 
understand his “accursed origin.”371 Despite learning that his own creator had rejected him in 
horror, the creature maintains his belief that his mastery of language will enable the De Lacey 
family to perceive him as human and deserving of love. The creature first presents himself to the 
elder De Lacey father, believing that the father’s blindness will allow him to better accept the 
creature. And indeed— the father does accept him; he responds: “I am blind, and cannot judge 
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your countenance, but there is something in your words which persuades me that you are sincere. 
I am poor, and an exile; but it will afford me true pleasure to be in any way serviceable to a 
human creature.”372 Believing he is speaking to a fellow human, the De Lacey father accepts and 
extends compassion to the creature, desiring to help him. The spell of human acceptance is 
broken once Felix returns, sees the creature, and attacks him. 
Like the creature, Caliban has also mastered language. Although most of Shakespeare’s 
The Tempest is written in verse, Caliban’s ability to speak in verse is notable because it is a form 
only reserved for characters with high social status in Shakespeare’s works. When Stephano and 
Trinculo fear the sounds of the island, Caliban finds their beauty: 
Be not afeard: the isle is full of noises, 
Sounds, and sweet airs that give delight and hurt not. 
Sometimes a thousand twangling instruments 
Will hum about mine ears; and sometimes voices, 
That, if I then had waked after long sleep,  
Will make me sleep again; and then, in dreaming,  
The clouds methought would open and show riches 
Ready to drop upon me, that, when I waked,  
I cried to dream again. 373 
 
These lines are some of the most beautiful lines in the entirety of The Tempest. We also know 
that Caliban has useful knowledge sets, even before he had ever encountered Prospero and 
Miranda. When describing his initial relationship with Prospero, Caliban says, “And then I loved 
thee / And showed thee all the qualities o’ th’ isle, / The fresh springs, brine-pits, barren place 
and fertile.”374 It seems clear that without knowledge of fresh water and fertile soil, Prospero 
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would not have survived on the island; Caliban’s knowledge is in fact vital. Caliban’s knowledge 
and eloquence seem connected to his relationship with the island.  
 Prospero and Miranda, however, claim full responsibility for Caliban’s language abilities. 
Miranda claims: 
   I pitied thee, 
  Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour 
  One thing or other. When thou didst not (savage) 
  Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like 
  A thing most brutish, I endowed thy purposes 
  With words that made them known.375 
 
Although Miranda claims that Caliban did not speak before her arrival with Prospero to the 
island, this seems unlikely. Given the timeline that Prospero presents, Caliban would have spent 
several years on the island with his mother before Prospero arrived— time in which he would 
have most certainly picked up language from her. Caliban knows, for instance, that his mother 
worshipped Setebos as well as at least some basic information about the deity.376 But we also 
know that even if Caliban did not have language, he clearly could communicate his meaning— 
Prospero would not have survived long without the information Caliban gave him about the 
island’s fresh water and fertile soil. In other words, it seems clear that Caliban did “know [his] 
own meaning.” Instead, it was Prospero and Miranda who did not know his meaning, and 
attributed this language difference to “gabbling” nonsense.  
 Trinculo’s reference to Caliban as “puppy-headed” further reinforces this flattening of 
language difference. Of the puppy-headed cynocephali, Edward Tyson writes that “they 
understand what is said to them, tho’ they cannot speak themselves. But by their Barking, and 
their Hands and Fingers, they signifie their Minds, as Deaf and Dumb Men do.”377 The tendency 
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of colonists to privilege some languages and cultures while devaluing others is palpable here, as 
the cynocephali “speak no language” but “understand one another.” Because their language is 
figured as “barking,” it is devalued as being a non-language altogether, despite the fact that it 
allows them to communicate with each other. Finally, the non-status of their language is 
reiterated (“they cannot speak for themselves”) before it is undetermined (“But by their Barking, 
and their Hands and Fingers, they signifie their Minds”) before they are likened to people with 
disabilities (“as Deaf and Dumb Men do”). Tyson’s comments on the speaking abilities of the 
pygmies and other “ancient” creatures are revealing in the way that they position the human. 
Tyson writes: “I do not find therefore any good Authority . . . that the Pygmies ever used a 
Language or Speech, any more than other Brutes of the same Species do among themselves . . . 
Had the Pygmies ever spoke any Language intelligible by Mankind, this might have furnished 
our Historians with notable Subjects for their Novels.”378 Language is only recognizable as 
language that is “intelligible by mankind”; human status is therefore always already assumed by 
intelligible speakers, rendering all languages that are unintelligible to English and European 
audiences as non-human and non-language.  
Caliban, like the cynocephali, is “puppy” or dog-headed, and although he is not described 
as barking or making signs with his hands and fingers, his language is similarly de-valued by 
Miranda. Caliban’s language is described here as “gabble like / A thing most brutish,” and 
Miranda assumes that he doesn’t know his “own meaning.” Because she is incapable of 
recognizing his language, she assumes he has none, and teaches him her own. As Stephen 
Greenblatt has pointed out, linguistic colonization is an integral part of conquest. In the 
Americas, linguistic colonization was aided by the ideology that Native Americans lacked both 
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culture and language: “This illusion that the inhabitants of the New World are essentially without 
a culture [and language] of their own is both early and remarkably persistent, even in the face of 
overwhelming contradictory evidence.”379  
 Miranda attributes her perception that Caliban cannot be morally improved by her lessons 
to his “vile race.” She claims that he is an “Abhorred slave, / Which any print of goodness wilt 
not take, Being capable of all ill.”380 When Miranda’s pedagogy fails to “print” onto Caliban’s 
character, he receives the imprints of “pinches” instead: Prospero threatens: “I’ll rake thee with 
old cramps, / Fill all thy bones with aches, make thee roar, / That beasts shall tremble at thy din” 
and that he will leave Caliban “pinched / as thick as honeycomb.”381 In other words, the failure 
of Caliban’s education results not simply in a lack of improvement, but in corporal punishment 
designed to enslave and force him to comply with Prospero’s demands. The education that was 
meant to improve Caliban’s propriety and morals only succeeds in equipping him with the tools 
to rebel against them: “You taught me language, and my profit on’t / Is, I know how to curse. 
The red plague rid you / For learning me your language!”382 Caliban’s foul speech is one proof 
that he has not achieved the “improvement” Miranda hoped for him. Importantly, Prospero’s 
speech and manner, although sometimes foul, are never used as proof of his need for 
improvement. As Miranda explains to Ferdinand, “My father’s of a better nature, sir, / Than he 
appears by speech.”383 Although both Caliban and Prospero are in similar positions insofar as 
they have both been usurped of a title and power, and although both are clearly capable of both 
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eloquent and foul speech, it is only Prospero whose “better nature” is taken for granted. 
Caliban’s language ability and eloquence fails to grant him human status. For Caliban, sharing a 
language with Prospero and Miranda only seems to assist in his enslavement, as Prospero 
delivers orders to him, and he curses them for teaching it to him. As Ian Smith writes, "Caliban 
knows that in reality he had little 'profit on't' (1.2.365) and that language training was designed to 
indoctrinate and inculcate as well as provide a ready medium for the issuing of orders concerning 
the various domestic duties that as a slave laborer he must carry out on pain of torture."384 For 
Caliban, language is disciplinary rather than liberatory.  
 For both Caliban and the creature, language is presented as a medium through which they 
can self-improve and achieve human status. As I argued in Chapter 3, however, language ability 
and eloquence as gateways to human status are a ruse: those who have been exempted from 
human status remain outcasts despite their eloquence. Neither the creature nor Caliban seem to 
experience any material benefits to learning language or achieving eloquence. Peter Brooks 
refers to the predicament that Frankenstein’s creature finds himself in as “the opposition of sight 
and language, of the hideous body and the persuasive tongue”385-- although it could just as easily 
be applied to Caliban. Brooks notes that the creature is the most eloquent character in the novel: 
“This hideous and deformed creature, far from expressing himself in grunts and gestures, speaks 
and reasons with the highest elegance, logic, and persuasiveness. As a verbal creature, he is the 
very opposite of the monstrous: he is a sympathetic and persuasive participant in Western 
culture.”386 Brooks’s analysis, perhaps unintentionally, devalues those who do not communicate 
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through oral language but through “grunts and gestures.” Brooks reinforces the failed promise of 
Frankenstein: that one who has been outcast from humanity due to the stigmatization of their 
deformity may overcome and persuade others to accept them through eloquence. This failure is 
the result of a logic that assumes deformity must be “overcome” at all— the failure is attributed 
to the creature, rather than the world around him. In effect, this opposition implies that the 
creature is responsible for his own dehumanization and inability to overcome visual prejudice. 
Both the creature and Caliban were always already excluded from human status as deviant 
bodies.  
 Narratives of “overcoming disability” are common in stories told and written by non-
disabled people. As Simi Linton writes, the phrase implies that “the person has risen above 
society’s expectation for someone with those characteristics. Because it is physically impossible 
to overcome a disability, it seems that what is overcome is the social stigma of having a 
disability.”387 To accept this notion that one may “overcome” a disability is to “accept the 
implication that the group is inferior and that the individual is unlike others in that group.”388 
However, the narrative of “overcoming a disability” leaves the social stigmatization of disability 
intact by emphasizing an individual’s achievement and exceptionality from the disability. This 
ultimately reinforces notions of what a “normal” body is, rather than complicating it. By 
emphasizing language ability and eloquence as avenues through which we might be able to 
consider the creature or Caliban as “human,” we end up supporting the stigmatization through 
which their dehumanization occurs in the first place. 
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 As spontaneous and creative elocutionists, both Caliban and the Creature both meet 
Descartes’s criteria for human language and reasoning. However, like Francis Williams, neither 
are seen as “human” in their respective narratives. Language ability, and indeed eloquence, are 
both revealed as a ruse: constructions of reason and language ability are malleable to the interests 
to those in power. Although neither are accused of “parroting,” both are represented as threats to 
white able-bodied authority— that is, to Prospero and Victor. This is made most explicit in The 
Tempest around Caliban’s threats to “usurp” Prospero’s status as owner of the island. 
Additionally, Prospero and Victor both fear that Caliban and the Creature will reproduce, 
creating a more numerous and potentially stronger “race” than that of humans. As Stephanie 
Kerschbaum notes, signs and rhetoric that define disability as lacking in “wholeness” disclose “a 
persistent cultural orientation to disability as a threat.” For Caliban and the Creature, their hetero-
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